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Authors’ note 
 
 
Since this report was first submitted to DEFRA, there have, as anticipated, been some 
developments in the UK quota management system. 
 
In October 2001, following a review of the operation of the FQA system to which POs and other 
industry bodies contributed, Fisheries Departments in the UK wrote to interested parties inviting 
comments on proposals for future quota management arrangements. The proposals were: 
 
(i) that UK quotas should continue to be managed on a UK-wide basis; 
(ii) that the FQA system should continue and should be further reviewed at the beginning of 
2006; 
(iii) that the separation of FQA units from fishing vessel licences should be permitted where 
(a) a vessel, along with its existing licence, was being transferred into new ownership but 
the current owner wished to retain the FQA units for the benefit of a replacement vessel, 
or (b) a licence entitlement was being cancelled or used to license another vessel; 
(iv) that the owners of vessels of 10 metres and under in length should be permitted to acquire 
FQA units so that they could fish as part of the sector on the same terms as over 10 metre 
vessels. 
 
Comments were also invited on whether special limitations should apply to the separation of 
FQA units from licences in respect of West of Scotland and Area VII Nephrops. 
 
Separately from these proposals for future arrangements, the Fisheries Departments conducted an 
exercise to adjust the FQA units associated with fishing vessel licences to take account of 
permanent transfers of quota which fishermen entered into during the period 1 January 1999 to 8 
October 2001. Some 900 such transfers were processed and were reflected in the quota 
allocations for 2002. 
 
At the time of writing, Fisheries Departments are considering future arrangements in the light of 
the response to the consultation exercise and an announcement is expected to be made shortly. 
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Short summary 
 
This report evaluates, from an economic perspective, the fish quota management arrangements 
adopted by the UK and considers options for the future, including the use of individual 
transferable quotas (ITQs). 
Quotas have the potential to effectively and efficiently control fishery output and hence 
the potential to achieve both stock conservation and industry profitability objectives. Problems 
for fishery managers are created by the difficulty of enforcing compliance with quotas. For 
practical reasons enforcement is usually at the quayside, but this gives vessels the opportunity to 
discard fish at sea when there are incentives to do so. Quota-related incentives to discard arise 
where parts of the catch under quota differ in their market value, and also in multispecies 
fisheries where quotas are out of proportion to the mix of species on the grounds. We distinguish 
between fixed quotas and variable or tradeable quotas. If quotas are fixed (at least for the current 
period), as they are when managers decide how much quota each vessel receives, incentives to 
land over-quota fish and to discard are likely to be increased. Allowing the market to allocate 
quota among vessels helps to reduce incentives to land over-quota fish and for certain types of 
discarding, but also maximises the economic profits from quota use. Although strong 
enforcement of fixed quotas would result in some downward pressure on overcapacity in the 
fleet, quota trading should greatly assist a rationalisation of fleet capacity. 
The UK’s quota management system has strengths in that it has made a real attempt to 
allocate and enforce quotas at the individual vessel level and it has devolved a significant amount 
of management responsibility to the industry through the producers’ organisations (POs). We 
argue that the effectiveness and efficiency of quota management in the UK would be increased, 
however, if existing impediments to freer quota trading were removed. Although there were 
sound reasons for the move from track record-based quota allocations to “Fixed Quota 
Allocations” (FQAs), the change has made permanent quota sales difficult and has resulted in an 
accumulating number of transactions for POs and Fisheries Departments to deal with. Also, many 
in the industry appear effectively to be excluded from the opportunity to adjust their quota 
holdings through trading. 
In an appraisal of future quota management options, we note the dynamic nature of the 
system and suspect that current arrangements will not continue long without further change. In 
particular, we believe that the drive towards quota trading within the industry will continue and 
that Government should accept and encourage this. We therefore recommend that there should, at 
least, be an annual reconciliation of FQAs. We go on to suggest that the nature of the legal title to 
quota should be clarified and that the fishing rights conferred by FQAs be examined, in particular 
for the non-sector. We consider that a move to an ITQ system proper should be seriously 
contemplated, at least for the over 10m fleet. The POs could, and arguably should, play a key role 
in an ITQ system, organising and facilitating the quota trade and helping to ensure collective 
responsibility for compliance. With regard to the inshore (10m and under) sector, we suggest that 
they be gradually brought into the quota management system applied to the rest of the fleet. 
Finally, we emphasise the importance of strong enforcement to the success of any quota 
management system. 
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Executive summary 
 
Introduction and objectives 
 
1. This study, undertaken for the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA), presents an economic evaluation of the UK’s current fish quota management 
arrangements and appraises various options for the future, including the possibility of moving 
towards a system of individual transferable quotas (ITQs). 
 
2. Economic and biological data that would enable a rigorous empirical evaluation of the 
performance of the UK’s quota management system in terms of stock conservation objectives and 
economic efficiency are simply unavailable. The primary approach adopted in this study is 
therefore to consider, based upon economic theory, the incentive structure created by the quota 
management system and to suggest how incentives for efficiency and stock conservation might be 
improved by making changes to the current arrangements. 
 
3. The report firstly outlines the economic theory of fishery quotas in general and of ITQs in 
particular. It then examines the development and operation of the UK quota management system 
in some detail and evaluates the current arrangements in the light of economic theory. 
 
4. We also report the results of a survey of the views of UK fishing vessel owners and their POs 
about the quota management system and the possibility of ITQs, and summarise a review of 
experiences with ITQ systems in other countries which was undertaken by Professor Ragnar 
Arnason of the University of Iceland (the full text is included as an Annex). A computer 
simulation of the possible effects on fleet size and employment if UK fishing capacity were 
completely rationalised through quota trading is then described. 
 
5. Finally, we consider future quota management options for UK fisheries, including an ITQ 
system proper, at least for the over 10m fleet. 
 
The economics of quota management in fisheries 
 
6. Quotas, provided they can be enforced, enable fishery managers to control fishing mortality 
and hence achieve stock conservation objectives. However, the practical difficulty (cost) of 
enforcing quotas has two main consequences which can seriously confound these objectives. One 
is that in most fisheries quotas can only be enforced at the quayside, not at sea. The result is that 
if there are incentives for discarding, as in multispecies fisheries for example, vessels will have 
the opportunity to discard in order to remain within quota limits. The second is that if the 
expected penalty from landing over-quota fish is too low, because the probability of getting 
caught is small, and/or the expected fine if caught is relatively small, incentives to land over-
quota fish will prevail. In either case fishing mortality will exceed target levels. 
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7. How quotas are allocated among individual fishing vessels in the fleet has important 
consequences, both for stock conservation objectives and for the economic performance of the 
industry. In our theoretical analysis we distinguish between quotas which are fixed for a period of 
time (such as non-transferable quotas or monthly catch limits) and quotas which are variable 
(tradeable). 
 
8. If a fixed quota imposes a constraint on the optimal (efficient) output of a fishing vessel for the 
period in question, i.e., the feasible output which maximises profits, then clearly profits will be 
constrained. It follows that the vessel operator will have an economic incentive to exceed the 
quota limit. In general we would expect that the tighter the quota in relation to the capacity of the 
vessel, the greater the incentive to exceed the quota. While some vessel operators may 
nevertheless always respect quota limits, if we assume that the individual is indifferent to the act 
of cheating itself then the quota can only be enforced if the expected fine for all units of catch 
over and above the quota limit is at least as large as the additional expected profit. 
 
9. In a multispecies fishery, fixed quotas can cause considerable discard problems, and these are 
likely to be exacerbated the more effective enforcement is at deterring over-quota landings. If the 
fixed quotas are not allocated to the vessel in the same proportion as the quota species occur in 
the vessel’s catch, then it may be profitable to discard the most constrained species and carry on 
fishing for the other species. The more valuable the least constrained quota species are, the more 
likely it is that the most constrained quota species will be discarded. 
 
10. Where different grades of fish command different market prices, there may be incentives to 
discard low-value grades in order to remain within quota limits. Such “highgrading” behaviour is 
more likely the greater is the difference in price between the least and most valuable parts of the 
catch. Again, the problem will be exacerbated by effective enforcement of quotas. 
 
11. With variable or tradeable quotas, the vessel operator has the option of buying more quota 
instead of attempting to land over-quota fish. Assuming effective enforcement, in a fishery the 
short term (rental) price of quota will be set equal to the profit that can be earned from the last 
unit of quota each vessel buys. Hence the quota price reflects industry profitability. Also, in 
general the smaller the total supply of quota, the greater the quota price. The equilibrium 
allocation of quota (which will be an efficient allocation, i.e., the allocation that maximises 
industry profits) both determines and is determined by the quota price. 
 
12. Variable quotas should reduce discard problems in multispecies fisheries compared to fixed 
quotas. The final distribution of quotas after trading will as closely as possible mirror each 
vessel’s pattern of catches. However, where at the national level the supply of quota for some 
species is too low compared to the availability of species on the grounds, discard problems will 
persist. 
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13. Although the problem of highgrading is often specifically associated with ITQs, other things 
being equal incentives to highgrade are likely to be similar under fixed quotas. Highgrading is a 
general problem with individual vessel quotas and is not restricted to ITQs. In practice it is 
difficult to predict whether highgrading would increase in a move to greater quota tradeability. 
 
14. The principal economic argument for ITQs is that the market will result in an efficient 
allocation of quota whereas other mechanisms for allocating quota are very unlikely to do so. The 
efficient allocation is the allocation which maximises industry profits given the total supply of 
quota. The report explains how this can be demonstrated using a simple economic model. Unless 
there are significant constraints on the quota market, the final (efficient) allocation is independent 
of the initial (first-round) allocation. 
 
15. Under an ITQ system, because quota can be traded and acquires considerable value 
(according to the profits that can be earned from it) an adjustment of industry capacity to the 
overall availability of quota will be facilitated. Some vessels will increase their quota holdings in 
order to operate more efficiently while inefficient vessels are more likely to exit since they will 
be compensated to the value of the quota they sell. The extent and speed of capacity adjustment 
will however depend on factors such as the value of second-hand vessels and the strength of 
quota enforcement. While a strong enforcement system would also be expected to result in some 
rationalisation of industry capacity under a system of fixed (non-tradeable) quotas, at least to the 
extent that some vessels were operating with non-viable levels of quota, there would be greater 
financial pain for the industry. 
 
16. Enforcement is in any case crucial to the performance of an ITQ system, in terms of both 
stock conservation and economic efficiency. 
 
17. The economic profits generated under a tradeable quota system will be substantially reflected 
in the short run quota price and hence will become capitalised into the permanent sale value of 
quota. These profits can be left entirely within the industry or could be subjected to a “resource 
rental” tax in order to extract some benefit to society as a whole. This raises fundamental issues 
about who should benefit from national fishery resources, but also who should pay for fishery 
costs such as enforcement. 
 
The UK approach to quota management 
 
18. Since the inception of the TAC/quota system under the EC’s Common Fisheries Policy, UK 
Fisheries Departments have progressively devolved a considerable amount of quota management 
responsibility to the fish producers’ organisations (POs), of which there are now 20 established in 
the UK. In 2000 the POs represented nearly 70% of all UK fishing vessels over 10m in length, 
85% in terms of nominal capacity measures. They were together responsible for managing over 
90% by weight of UK quotas. 
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19. Until 1997 the allocations of quota to the POs were based each year on the recorded landings 
of individual member vessels over the previous three years (so-called landings “track records”). 
In 1998 quota allocations were based on the same track records as the 1997 allocations, in 
preparation for a fixing of quota allocations. In 1999 the same allocations were converted into 
100kg quota “units”, giving each vessel its Fixed Quota Allocation (FQA). Vessels’ FQAs now 
remain the same each year, but the value of a quota unit depends upon the size of national quotas 
in relation to those set in 1999. One of the main reasons underlying the move to FQAs was to 
remove incentives to secure quota allocations by artificially inflating track records. 
 
20. The POs have always been allowed to determine their own internal quota allocation methods. 
Some operate a common quota pool and set monthly landings limits which apply to all members. 
Others allocate individual quotas (IQs) to member vessels on the basis of each vessel’s FQA. 
Some POs pool quotas for certain stocks and allocate IQs for others, or for some parts of the 
membership. Linked to an increase in quota trading (see below), in recent years more POs have 
implemented IQ systems while many which have traditionally operated quota pools now allow 
members to top up their pool allowances by buying in extra quota. 
 
21. For the over 10m vessels which do not belong to a PO, a quota pool is reserved based on the 
sum of these vessels’ FQAs. This is relatively small since many of these vessels target primarily 
shellfish stocks which are not subject to quotas. Their landings of quota stocks are regulated by 
means of monthly limits. Vessels of 10m or under in length, which make up some two-thirds of 
the fleet by number, do not have FQAs. The quota pool reserved for them is a very small part of 
the total UK quota, but for certain stocks, mainly in the English Channel, they account for a 
significant proportion of total landings. Their landings are mostly unregulated, although monthly 
limits are now routinely imposed for Nephrops (Norway lobster). 
 
22. Since they were first introduced in their present form, UK restricted fishing licences have, to a 
greater or lesser extent, been privately tradeable. In 1995 landings track records became 
associated with licences rather than vessels and this gave the licences a greatly increased value 
because of the quota rights they now carried. Under the licence aggregation scheme, first 
introduced in 1990, vessels could now increase their quota allowances by combining licences 
from more than one vessel. In 1997 a number of track records were also permanently traded 
during the last decommissioning round, when owners of decommissioned vessels were permitted 
to sell rather than surrender their quota rights. 
 
23. The main driving force behind an increase in quota trading, however, came from relaxed rules 
on the swapping of quota between POs, in particular the facility from 1996 for POs to make quota 
“gifts” (i.e., with no reciprocal transfer of quota, which had previously been required). This made 
it much easier for a vessel in one PO to lease or sell quota to a vessel in another PO. Deals were 
complex, involving the vessel owners and the PO officers, but under the track record-based 
allocation system a quota sale could be completed in three years. Within the POs operating IQs, 
of course, quota trading had always been possible. 
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24. The move to FQAs meant that trading of quota could not affect each vessel’s basic quota 
allocation. This facilitated quota leasing but permanent sales of quota became effectively 
impossible, a quota “sale” becoming instead a long-term lease agreement. Nevertheless, quota 
trading has escalated in recent years, evidenced by an increase in the annual number of quota 
swaps between POs from 90 in 1994 to more than seven times that number in 2000. 
 
25. The UK’s quota management system has both strengths and weaknesses from an economic 
point of view. Its principal strength is that it has made a real attempt to allocate quotas at the 
individual vessel level and to enforce them (at least in the case of over 10m vessels), something 
which cannot be said of some other countries. The devolution of management responsibility to 
POs can also be seen as a strength, to the extent that the POs foster collective responsibility and 
so help to ensure that quotas are respected and that they are used as efficiently as possible. 
 
26. In economic terms the main weaknesses of the UK system relate to the obstacles to greater 
freedom in quota trading and hence a more efficient allocation of quota between vessels. Vessels 
in the “non-sector” (those which do not belong to a PO), as well as many vessels in POs which 
pool quota, cannot participate in quota trading. The FQA system, which currently does not permit 
permanent transfers of quota, means that trading produces an increasing number of complex lease 
arrangements which are subject to considerable financial risk and uncertainty and place a 
significant administrative burden on both POs and Fisheries Departments. 
 
27. We also have some concerns over the current strength of quota enforcement in general and 
over the apparent lack of any real control on landings by the inshore (10m and under) fleet. 
 
28. Evaluating the various quota management approaches used by different POs is not 
straightforward, not only because of the lack of empirical data on economic and biological 
outcomes, but also because the objectives of the POs are not clear. Efficiency and effectiveness of 
quota management would suggest a market allocation of quota, and hence the use of IQs and full 
participation in quota trading, but it is possible that some PO memberships pool quota and subject 
all members to the same restrictions because they are prepared collectively to sacrifice profits for 
some notion of equality. This may not be very effective in reducing incentives to land or discard 
over-quota fish, however. 
 
The views of the UK fishing industry 
 
29. A telephone survey was undertaken to investigate opinions among the owners of just over 400 
vessels, including more than 20% of the UK over 10m fleet, concerning existing management 
arrangements, the trading of quota, and the possibility of some sort of ITQ system for the UK 
industry. 
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30. Less than half of the “sector” as a whole (PO member vessels over 10m in length) were 
generally satisfied with the present management arrangements, although this may well have 
reflected a dislike of quotas as such more than the UK’s quota management approach. Overall 
satisfaction was lower still among the non-sector and the 10m and under fleet. 
 
31. Around 70% of the sector had supported the move to FQAs and considered that they 
represented an improvement on track record-based allocations, although nearly 80% were in 
favour of an annual reconciliation of quota trades. Overall, more than half thought that the 
amount of freedom to trade quota was about right while around a quarter wanted more freedom, 
in particular the pelagic vessels and the larger demersal trawlers. The majority wanted quota 
“ownership”restricted to active fishermen. Most of the non-sector and 10m and under boats did 
not support FQAs, but while two-thirds of the non-sector thought there was now too much 
freedom to trade quota, the same proportion of the inshore vessels were content with the current 
amount of quota trading. 
 
32. The great majority of the sector appeared to be happy with their POs’ quota management 
arrangements, although a significant number of demersal trawlers sought a move to IQs. More 
than half of all sector vessels had been involved in quota trading by some means or another, 
either by leasing or buying quota or acquiring additional track record/FQAs through licence 
transactions or from decommissioned vessels. The most quota trading activity was shown by the 
pelagic boats, the larger demersal trawlers and the North Sea beam trawlers, but in no segment 
were less than a quarter of vessels involved in quota trading. 
 
33. Most of the non-sector vessels did not belong to a PO out of choice and had never been in a 
PO, but over a quarter had tried to join a PO and had been unsuccessful due to a poor track 
record/FQA. Just over half the sample expressed a desire to be able to have their FQA as an 
individual quota, although this increased to over two-thirds if they were also able to trade quota. 
More than half of the 10m and under vessel owners surveyed had previously owned an over 10m 
vessel and the great majority fished in the inshore sector out of choice. Nearly 90% did not want 
to be subject to the quota management arrangements applied to the over 10m vessels. 
 
34. Nearly 80% of the sector thought that ITQs in the UK were inevitable and well over half were 
in favour of them. Support for ITQs was strongest among the demersal trawlers, the pelagic boats 
and the North Sea beam trawlers, and weakest among the Nephrops trawlers and the Area VII 
beam trawlers. Most thought they should apply at least to all finfish species under quota and to all 
vessels, even those of 10m and under. More than half of the sector thought that ITQs would 
reduce over-quota landings. The great majority thought that POs should continue to have a central 
role in the management system. Nearly three-quarters of the non-sector and 10m and under 
vessels sampled were against ITQs. 
 
35. Concern about the possible effects of ITQs on the regional or sectoral concentration of UK 
fishing activity was expressed by around two-thirds of the sector with rather more concerned 
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about the possible implications for new entrants to the industry. Concern over the nature of the 
legal title to quota was expressed by nearly 70% of the sector. 
 
36. Of the 18 POs who responded to the survey, only four were basically unsatisfied with the 
present quota management arrangements and just two did not think that FQAs were an 
improvement over track record-based allocations. All but two were in favour of an annual 
reconciliation of quota movements. Six POs thought there was now too much freedom to trade 
quota while three were in favour of more freedom for quota trading. On the other hand, five POs 
favoured trading between all over 10m vessels and seven thought that trading should in principle 
involve the inshore sector as well. 
 
37. ITQs were considered inevitable by 15 POs although only 8 were in favour, in most cases for 
all stocks and for all vessels, at least those over 10m (including the existing non-sector). Most, 
but not all, were concerned about a possible concentration of ownership under ITQs and the cost 
of quota for new entrants to the industry. Seven POs were very concerned about the legal title to 
quota with a further nine were only slightly concerned about this. 
 
ITQs in practice: an international review 
 
38. A review of the experiences with ITQs in a number of other countries around the world was 
commissioned from Professor Ragnar Arnason of the University of Iceland. The full review is 
contained in an Annex, with only a summary included in the main body of the report. 
 
39. The first ITQ systems were introduced in the 1970s. ITQs are now employed in a number of 
important fishing nations including Australia, New Zealand, the USA, Canada, Iceland and, 
within Europe, the Netherlands. Overall, the experience with ITQs has been positive. Fishing 
effort has generally decreased, depleted stocks have recovered, and the quality of the catch has 
often increased. In general, industry profitability has greatly increased. 
 
40. When ITQs have been introduced, the initial allocation of quotas has normally been made on 
the basis of catch history. In all existing ITQ systems, quotas are defined in terms of percentage 
shares of the current TAC. Only rarely have institutions been set up by government in order to 
facilitate or manage the quota trade; generally the industry itself has created the necessary 
institutions for trading to take place efficiently. In almost all cases, however, governments have 
restricted the freedom to trade quota in some way or another. Typically quota ownership is 
limited to fishing firms. Firms may be restricted in the amount of quota they can own (as a 
proportion of the TAC). Often there are other restrictions. In all ITQ systems, however, quota can 
be both leased on a temporary basis and sold permanently. 
 
41. In many ITQ fisheries governments have taken the opportunity to impose on quota holders a 
charge towards the costs of fishery management. Few governments, however, have attempted to 
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extract a resource rent from the industry (by imposing a charge greater than that necessary to 
cover management costs). 
 
42. Enforcement of ITQs is essential to their successful operation. Generally, this relies upon self-
reporting of landings backed up by an effective system of random checks, together with sanctions 
which have a real deterrent effect. Checks will involve inspections of landings but may also 
include the monitoring of buyers, processors etc., where a “paper trail” approach has been 
adopted. 
 
43. ITQs generally result in increased industry profitability, which in most cases will reflect real 
increases in economic efficiency. Although fishing effort is likely to be significantly reduced 
under ITQs, the effect on capacity will depend upon factors such as the extent of overcapacity, 
the market for second-hand vessels and fishing opportunities for non-quota stocks. We would 
expect some reduction in capacity under ITQs, although this has varied greatly from country to 
country. Under ITQs stocks have generally improved in health, although this may reflect more 
the increased attention to controlling output effectively than the use of ITQs per se. 
 
44. ITQs reduce incentives to discard in multispecies quota fisheries but create incentives to 
discard low value grades of fish. However, the incentives to discard low value fish under fixed 
individual quotas may be as great, while ITQs can encourage more selective fishing which will 
help to reduce discards. Although the empirical evidence is inconclusive, reports of significant 
changes in discarding behaviour point to reduced discards under ITQs. 
 
45. ITQs may be associated with industrial concentration, in terms of quota ownership, 
geographical distribution of fishing activity and fleet make-up, but only to the extent that such 
concentration is a consequence of increased economic efficiency. Other factors are also making 
fisheries technologically more efficient, and ITQs will only alter the pace of change. While there 
is evidence of some concentration of ownership in many ITQ fisheries, this largely reflects the 
reduction in overall capacity. Overall, there is no clear pattern of geographical or sectoral change 
under ITQs, but in many cases there are restrictions on quota trade designed to limit such 
changes. 
 
46. ITQs have been used extensively in multispecies fisheries and they generally reduce problems 
of quota mis-matches at the vessel level. Where problems persist despite quota trading they may 
reflect TACs which are not in proportion to the actual relative abundance of fish. Increased 
fishing selectivity and flexibility of quota rules can ameliorate the problem but only to a limited 
extent. Significant fluctuations in TACs are a problem for the industry under ITQs as they are 
under any quota system, but the operational flexibility provided by ITQs will give the industry 
more capacity to cope with TAC fluctuations than under other systems. To the extent that ITQ 
management is successful in rebuilding a fishery, however, future TACs should be more stable. 
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47. In all existing ITQ fisheries the nature of the property right inferred by quota “ownership” 
extends only to the permission to harvest a given share of the TAC. No ownership over the fish 
stocks themselves is established. The permission to harvest may be defined over some specified 
time period but in many cases the legal title to quota is rather vague in this and other respects. 
 
Modelling the possible socio-economic impact of ITQs 
 
48. A computer model was used to simulate the possible effects of liberalised quota trading 
across the entire UK over 10m fleet on fleet size, fishery profits and employment. The model is 
based on physical capacity: the FQAs of similar vessels are compared and those with the highest 
quota holdings are assumed to be the ones operating at full capacity. Vessels operating near full 
capacity utilisation are assumed to then buy quota from those operating with lower levels of 
capacity utilisation; trade takes place until a smaller fleet are all operating at full capacity defined 
in this way. Other simplifying assumptions include completely free and costless trading 
conditions and instantaneous exit of excess capacity (redundant vessels). 
 
49. Various scenarios were investigated, including no restrictions on the transfer of quota, 
transfers restricted to vessels within the same fleet segment, transfers restricted to vessels within 
the same locality, and transfers restricted to vessels within the same region (Channel, Irish Sea, 
North Sea and West of Scotland). The analysis necessarily excluded 10m and under vessels. A 
version of the model was run without the shellfish boats, most of which have relatively small 
FQAs. Including these vessels overestimates the degree of fleet adjustment since it is possible 
that many vessels would increase their effort on non-quota stocks rather than exit the fishery. 
 
50. Given the assumptions of the model, it was estimated that a complete rationalisation of the 
fleet through quota trading could reduce the pelagic and beam trawl fleets to just over 80% of 
their former size in terms of vessel numbers, while the demersal trawl segment could be reduced 
to around 65% of current vessel numbers. Smaller reductions would result if quota trading was 
restricted in some way. 
 
51. Direct employment in fishing could be reduced by as much as 20-50% in some regions, 
depending on the region and whether restrictions on quota trading are applied, but again 
reductions of this magnitude assume that there is a complete rationalisation of capacity in the 
short term, which is unlikely in practice. Real reductions are likely to be significantly smaller. 
 
52. It was estimated that a rationalisation of fleet capacity through quota trading could result in an 
increase in economic profits ranging from around 5% in the English Channel to as much as 20-
25% in the North Sea. These sorts of economic gains would be reduced if quota trading was 
restricted in order to protect direct employment in fishing. The trade-off between potential 
economic profitability and fishing employment is straightforward, as the model illustrates. 
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Future management options for UK fisheries 
 
53. From an economic perspective the main problem with existing arrangements is that there are 
significant obstacles to quota trading. In particular, many vessels are effectively excluded from 
the opportunity to trade quota while the transactions necessary in order to accomplish trades 
appear unnecessarily complex and cumbersome, with considerable risk associated with long term 
deals. We believe that economic efficiency and effective stock conservation are compromised by 
the existing impediments to a freer trade in quotas, both as sales and leases. Quota sales, in 
particular, have actually been made more difficult by the move to FQAs. It is considered that the 
accumulating number of quota deals between POs will begin to place real strains on both the POs 
and Fisheries Departments and that some changes to current arrangements are probably 
inevitable. 
 
54. We note that among vessel owners and their POs there is considerable support for a routine 
annual reconciliation of quota trades onto vessels’ FQAs. We would encourage Departments to 
agree to annual reconciliations in order to enable permanent transfers of quota under the current 
management system. 
 
55. We suggest that the nature of the legal title to quota represented by FQAs should be clarified. 
We note that in many functioning ITQ systems the legal title to quota use rights is often not very 
clear, but in general the more secure “property” rights are the greater the economic efficiency of 
their use. Further to this, a clarification of the rights conferred by FQAs on individual vessels 
may then raise questions over the rights which should be enjoyed by vessels not in membership 
of a PO or in a PO which pools quota. 
 
56. If individual vessels are able to fish against their own quota allocations, and are able to trade 
quota, then we effectively have an ITQ system. We argue that Government should seriously 
consider an ITQ system for the UK, at least for the over 10m fleet. We see no economic reason 
why any particular quota stocks or fleet segments should be excluded, and note that current 
trading does not appear to exclude any particular stocks or segments. We believe that an ITQ 
system would have benefits in terms of economic efficiency and stock conservation. 
 
57. Restricting the transferability of quota, for example, by region or segment, in order to reduce 
employment impacts will impose economic costs in terms of the efficiency and effectiveness of 
quota management. Nevertheless, some restrictions on quota ownership may be necessary in 
order to avoid the emergence of market power and to deter speculation. 
 
58. Although there may be employment impacts as a result of liberalised quota trading, these are 
unlikely to be of the scale predicted by our theoretical model. Nevertheless, some rationalisation 
of fleet capacity is an intended objective of an ITQ system and is necessary in order to achieve 
stock conservation and economic profitability objectives. If there is overcapacity, it is possible 
that some boats may need to exceed quotas in order to remain viable. Although we question the 
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usefulness of the MAGPs, they are likely to continue and so the UK will have to reduce its fleet 
size in any case. 
 
59. An ITQ system would not mean an end to the role of the POs in quota management. As we 
have suggested, the POs could play an important role in facilitating quota trading, administering 
the quota management system and helping to ensure compliance with quotas. There are also ways 
in which a collective approach to quota management may be advantageous. For example, in a 
multispecies fishery it may be efficient for the PO to manage quota pools for non-target species 
while vessels fish against their ITQs for target species. 
 
60. There is no economic reason why vessels of 10m and under targeting quota stocks should be 
excluded from the management system applied to the over 10m fleet. Problems are presented by 
the size of the inshore sector and the fact that vessels do not presently have any individual quota 
entitlements. Nevertheless, we suggest that the 10m and under fleet should be brought fully into 
quota management, perhaps gradually by reducing the lower length threshold over a number of 
years. 
 
61. Finally, we emphasise again the importance of enforcement in quota management. Allowing 
vessels to exceed quotas will seriously compromise stock conservation objectives. Although we 
suspect that enforcement in the UK authorities may compare very favourably with some other 
countries, we would urge Departments to consider how enforcement of quotas could be 
strengthened. Increased enforcement effort can be costly and we suggest that Government should 
reconsider the possibility of an industry contribution to the costs of management. 
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1. Introduction and objectives 
 
This study was commissioned by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), now 
the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), in order to evaluate the 
UK’s existing fish quota management arrangements and to appraise various options for the 
future, in particular whether the UK should consider moving towards a system of individual 
transferable quotas (ITQs). The detailed objectives of the study were set out by MAFF/DEFRA as 
follows: 
 
Evaluation of current management arrangements and POs  
 
The evaluation will assess the role of POs within the overall system of quota management 
in the UK. In particular the evaluation will: 
(a) provide a short review of the development of the UK quota management 
arrangements and their current operation and incentives. In particular, the evaluation 
will assess to what extent current management arrangements (post-FQAs) are proving 
successful in conserving fish stocks for future generations and ensuring the biological and 
economic sustainability of the sea fishing industry. 
(b) present an overview of the development and current quota management practices 
of Producer Organisations; 
(c) consider the effectiveness of different approaches to management used by POs, 
having regard to effective conservation, sustainability and economic efficiency, 
highlighting areas of best practice; 
(d) consider in particular the advantages and disadvantages to fishermen, POs and 
Departments of transferable quota systems as operated internally by some POs. Account 
should also be taken of the requirements of fishermen in the non-sector and the under 10 
metre fleet. 
 
Appraisal of future management options 
 
The research will then go on to assess how far the current overall UK quota management 
arrangements (post-FQAs) capture the main putative benefits of ITQ systems (as they 
might apply in the EU/UK context); and what scope may exist for additional net benefits 
from moving closer towards an ITQ system in the UK. Specifically, the research will: 
(a) provide an assessment of the current arrangements against the ITQ “benchmark” 
in order to consider the differential gains and losses associated with the current system 
against a fully-fledged ITQ system (of a type which would be expected to apply in the 
EU/UK context); 
(b) put forward options for improving quota management in the UK, assessing gains 
and losses against the following criteria: enforcement and compliance issues; economic 
resource use and profitability; implications for employment; fleet and quota 
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concentration; discards and conservation; 
(c) suggest means of alleviating any problems which might arise e.g. ring-fencing 
quota; different treatment for different sectors - pelagic, inshore etc. 
 
In addressing the objectives of the study, our approach was necessarily determined to a great 
extent by the availability of suitable data. In order fully to evaluate the performance of the UK’s 
quota management system and the quota allocation methods employed by the different POs, for 
example, we would require detailed data on the economic profitability of the fleet over a 
reasonable time period, which are not available in the UK, as well as reliable data on actual 
landings and on discards at sea, which are not available and would be extremely difficult to 
obtain in any case. 
 
The question of whether UK quota management arrangements have resulted in the conservation 
of fish stocks is also complicated by the fact that nearly all the stocks exploited by UK fishermen 
are also exploited by fishermen from other countries. Clearly, the conservation of fishery 
resources for the future requires effective management measures to be implemented and enforced 
by all the countries with significant exploitation shares. It is clearly not possible for this study to 
evaluate the quota management systems of other countries (although in our analysis of the UK 
system presented in Chapter 3 we do suggest that the UK approach is probably superior in this 
respect to that of some other countries). 
 
The basic approach adopted in this study is to consider, based upon economic theory, the 
incentive structure presented by a quota management system and then to evaluate the UK system 
in this light and suggest how the incentive structure might be improved by making changes to the 
current arrangements, including moving to an ITQ system. Some of what can be demonstrated 
about quota management using economic theory may seem intuitively obvious, but if this is the 
case then one might reasonably question why policy-makers in general (not necessarily UK 
policy-makers in particular) have not always appeared to take this into account when designing 
fisheries management systems. At the same time, we do recognise that in practice some aspects of 
policy design, ensuring an adequate enforcement system, for example, are not always as 
straightforward as economists may like to assume. 
 
We incorporate into the study a detailed examination of how the UK quota management system 
has developed and how it currently operates in practice, and we have also undertaken a wide-
ranging exploration of the opinions of UK fishermen about the quota management system in 
general and the possibility of ITQs in particular. A review of the experiences with ITQs of a 
number of countries world-wide has been compiled by Professor Ragnar Arnason of the 
University of Iceland. In addition, a computer simulation of the UK fleet under a perfectly 
transferable quota system demonstrates the possible effects on fleet size and employment if fleet 
capacity were to be completely rationalised. 
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The report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents an outline of the economic theory of 
quotas in a fishery and the principal economic arguments for ITQs. Chapter 3 traces the 
development of the UK quota management system and examines how it now functions, looking 
in particular at the quota allocation methods adopted by the UK producers’ organisations (POs), 
and concluding with a critical appraisal of the system in the light of economic theory. Chapter 4 
then presents the results of the survey of the views of UK fishermen and their POs. Chapter 5 
summarises the review of ITQ systems in other countries, which is included in full as an Annex 
to this report. Chapter 6 contains the results of the computer modelling exercise for the UK fleet. 
Finally, Chapter 7 presents an overall assessment of the UK quota management approach and 
examines certain changes which could be made, including moving to an ITQ system proper. 
  4
2. The economics of quota management in fisheries 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
A fundamental goal of most, if not all, fishery management regimes is to ensure conservation of 
the fishery resource into the future and hence the sustainability of fishery exploitation. 
Management measures are therefore imposed upon the industry in order, directly or indirectly, to 
control fishing mortality, i.e., the portion of the stock biomass that is removed by fishing within a 
given period. 
 
Restrictions on the output of the fishery (as catches and/or landings) are intended to control 
fishing mortality directly. From estimates of stock biomass, recruitment etc., a Total Allowable 
Catch (TAC) is established for each species stock in the fishery, usually on an annual basis. In the 
case of a fishery involving more than one country (as is the general rule within the EU) the TACs 
are divided into national quotas. 
 
Adherence to the TAC should, in theory at least, restrict fishing mortality to the target value on 
which the TAC is calculated, i.e., to the level desired by the management authority. In practice, 
however, ensuring adherence to the TAC is usually difficult (and therefore costly). Furthermore, 
the way in which the management authority attempts to ensure adherence potentially has 
profound economic implications for the fishery. At the very least, a quota management system 
will involve some allocation of quota at the individual vessel level, in order to avoid the economic 
wastage associated with a “race to fish” a global (aggregate) quota. 
 
It is not technically impossible for a vessel’s catch to be observed, but in most fisheries the cost 
of, say, a full-time observer on each and every vessel would be prohibitive. For this reason the 
first point of control in most fisheries is at the quayside where fish are landed. But even observing 
all landings is likely to be very costly, so practical fishery monitoring systems usually involve a 
rationing of inspections both quantitatively (a system of random inspections and/or targeted 
inspections) and qualitatively (cursory to thorough). 
 
If all quota violations can be detected, the economics of the quota management problem is 
relatively straightforward, at least in theory. All the management authority has to do is to ensure 
that the penalty for landings in excess of a quota or quotas is in every case large enough to make 
any violation unprofitable and therefore unattractive to the vessel operator. Under a real-world 
enforcement system there is, however, uncertainty about whether a given violation will be 
detected or not. In this type of problem we therefore have to focus on expected penalties which 
depend on the probabilities of enforcement events occurring. 
 
The general practical reliance on enforcing quota controls at the point of landing raises the issue 
of discarding. To a greater or lesser extent discarding is inevitable in all fisheries and in simple 
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terms will occur whenever the cost of retaining a particular part of the catch on board exceeds the 
benefit from landing it.(1) Discarding because of quota controls means that quotas (and therefore 
TACs) may be exceeded in terms of catch even if they are adhered to in terms of landings. Not 
only is discarding very difficult to observe, in many quota management systems it is implicitly 
condoned in order that vessels comply with quota regulations at the quayside.(2) 
 
In this chapter we look at the economic incentives that arise when a fishing vessel, whose 
efficient operation is otherwise unconstrained, is subject to catch limits (quotas). In the context of 
this report we distinguish in particular between fixed quotas and variable (transferable or 
tradeable) quotas, i.e., between quotas which cannot be varied in the short run (such as periodic 
catch limits or non-transferable individual quotas) and quotas which, in principle, can be varied 
(and which may therefore effectively be considered as variable inputs). We then consider the 
theoretical underpinning to ITQ systems in more detail, focusing on the economic efficiency 
arguments for ITQs in addition to the effect on incentives to evade quotas or discard fish. 
 
2.2 Fixed quotas 
 
2.2.1 Fixed quotas in a single species fishery 
 
Consider a fishing vessel which is capable, under normal conditions, of catching and landing an 
amount of fish q* within a given period (say, a week, or a month). This is the level of catch, we 
will assume, which maximises vessel profits and is therefore the level of catch which the vessel 
operator (the skipper) will seek to achieve, other things being equal. For simplicity we will 
assume that there is a determinate relationship between fishing effort and catch, i.e., that the 
vessel can precisely choose its level of catch by adjusting its effort. This is not very realistic - in 
practice there is a lot of random variation in catches - but the assumption does not fundamentally 
alter the economics of the problem.(3) 
 
If the vessel catches less than q* then it can always expand its effort further and earn more profit 
by catching q*. If the vessel tries to catch more than q*, however, we assume that the cost of the 
additional effort needed is greater than the additional revenue obtained and so profits are less than 
at q*. For a profit-maximising vessel operator, therefore, q* is the optimal level of catch. It is also 
the level of catch which is most efficient for the vessel, i.e., which maximises the economic return 
on the capital invested in the boat and its gear.(4) 
 
                                                
1 See Pascoe (1997) for a review. 
2 UK licence conditions, for example, refer to the amounts of fish “which may be retained on board, landed or 
transshipped” 
3 We could think of q* as the average catch over many periods. 
4 Note that here fishing “effort” refers to a bundle of inputs used per period. We assume that for any level of catch the 
vessel operator employs an efficient, i.e., cost-minimising, combination of inputs (gear, fuel, labour etc.). 
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If a management authority now imposes a fixed quota Q on the vessel for the period in question, 
then clearly if Q is greater than q* the quota will not affect the efficient operation of the vessel at 
all. If, on the other hand, Q is smaller than q* the vessel will be subject to a constraint on its 
efficient operation. In any given period the vessel will now earn smaller profits than it otherwise 
could (and would choose to in the absence of the constraint). It may be that Q is small enough 
that the corresponding level of profit is below the opportunity cost(5) of all the factors employed 
by the vessel. If this is the case then some factors (the capital invested in the boat, for example, or 
the owner’s own labour) must receive less than their opportunity cost and the vessel will make a 
loss.(6) 
 
In economics the effect of a constraint such as this can be represented by a “shadow price”. The 
shadow price of the quota constraint, which we will denote by the Greek letter λ (lambda), 
represents the incremental addition to profit from a marginal relaxation of the quota, or, 
equivalently, the incremental loss in profit from a marginal tightening of the quota. Generally, the 
tighter the quota, the greater the shadow price. 
 
We refer to λ as a shadow price because the price associated with the quota constraint may not 
actually exist in a market, but it is the maximum price that a vessel would be willing to pay for an 
additional unit of quota if a market for quota did exist. It is also theoretically equivalent to the 
charge that would have to exist on a unit of fish to produce the same effect as the constraint. If, 
for example, all catches were taxed at a rate of λ per unit, then the vessel operator would freely 
choose a level of catch equal to Q which would now be the optimal (profit-maximising) level of 
catch given the tax. Indeed, taxes are in theory an alternative way of attempting to regulate 
catches in a fishery.(7) 
 
This is illustrated by the graph in Figure 2.1. The downward sloping line traces out the vessel’s 
marginal profit as it increases its catch per period. By assumption, the cost of each additional unit 
of effort, and hence catch, is greater than the previous unit, while the market value of each unit of 
catch is the same. Hence the marginal profit, the additional profit from each successive unit of 
catch, decreases as catch increases. At a level of catch q* the marginal profit is exactly zero and 
so this is the profit maximising level of catch per period; units of catch above q* earn negative 
profit.  
 
 
                                                
5 The “opportunity cost” of a factor of production is the return that could be earned by using it in some best 
alternative activity. For example, the opportunity cost of capital may be taken as the return that could be expected 
from investing that capital in the best available alternative investment opportunity. 
6 A boat may make a financial profit but an economic loss, although this is unlikely if the capital invested in the boat 
is borrowed at a market interest rate. Also, while a skipper may appear to make an economic loss by using his own 
labour in fishing, he may be compensated by the “psychic” income derived from being a fisherman. 
7 In practice the taxation approach to fishery management has rarely been pursued, partly due to practical difficulties 
and partly due to the political unpopularity of taxes. 
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Figure 2.1: A constraining quota and the associated shadow price 
Importantly, the shadow price is also equivalent to the minimum fine (per unit of catch) that the 
management authority would have to impose on the vessel for over-quota catches in order to 
ensure that a strictly rational and risk-neutral(8) vessel operator would not exceed the quota. 
Again, in general, the tighter the quota, the greater the shadow price and therefore the greater the 
fine needed to prevent a vessel from exceeding the quota. 
 
In the real world, as we have already observed, the problem for the authority is monitoring 
catches (or, more strictly, landings) and hence detecting violations. Since in all practical cases the 
overall probability of inspection, detection, prosecution and sanction will be less than 100%, we 
need to model the problem in terms of the expected fine. The expected fine in this case is simply 
the fine the vessel would expect to incur if caught landing over-quota fish multiplied by the 
expected (subjective) probability of incurring that fine. If the expected fine was too small, either 
because the expected probability of getting caught and fined was very low, or the expected fine if 
caught was very low (or both), a (rational, risk-neutral) vessel operator would choose a level of 
catch and therefore landings greater than the quota limit.(9) 
 
A relatively small “lump-sum” fine (i.e., a fine that is not directly related to the size of the quota 
violation) may not have any deterrent effect at all on a purely rational vessel operator. A very 
                                                
8 By “rational” we mean that the individual is indifferent between legal and illegal behaviour except with regard to 
the expected monetary outcomes. By “risk-neutral” we mean that the individual is indifferent between the expected 
pay-out from a gamble and the certain equivalent in money terms. 
9 As long as the expected fine is greater than zero, however (and is non-decreasing as the level of over-quota catch 
increases), the level of catch will still be less than it would be in the absence of any quota limit. 
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large lump-sum fine, on the other hand, as long as the expected probability of detection were 
reasonably high, could be expected to deter all quota infringements. 
 
Notice that we have not so far considered the problem of discarding. Because in this simple case 
we have assumed that there is a determinate relationship between fishing effort and catches, and 
that there is only one species in the fishery, there will not be any incentive for the vessel to 
discard any of its catch.(10) If, however, there are price disparities between different grades of fish 
in the catch then we will need to consider discarding. We look at this case in Section 2.2.3 below. 
 
2.2.2 Fixed quotas in a multispecies fishery 
 
Now consider a vessel in a multispecies fishery. For simplicity we will assume that there are just 
two species for which there are two associated fixed quotas per period, Q1 and Q2. We will 
further assume that the two species are always caught in the same fixed proportion. 
 
If the two quotas are allocated to the vessel in exactly the same proportion as the two species 
appear in the vessel’s catch, then the problem is really just the same as in the single species case. 
Both quotas will always be filled at the same level of catch/effort and there will never be any 
incentive to catch more fish and then discard it. 
 
If, however, the quotas are allocated to the vessel in a different proportion to that in which the 
species appear in the vessel’s catch, then clearly one quota will be filled before the other. Now we 
do need to consider the problem of discarding. If the penalty (or, more strictly, the expected 
penalty) for landing over-quota fish is high enough to deter the vessel from doing so, then there 
will be an incentive to discard fish of the species for which the quota is filled. In simple terms, as 
long as the expected fine incurred from landing a unit of over-quota fish is greater than the 
market value of that unit of fish, then provided that it is profitable to expand effort further in 
order to catch more of the other species (for which the quota is yet unfilled) it will be optimal to 
discard the over-quota fish. In this case it is apparent that the TAC for the discarded species may 
be exceeded in practice even if it is observed to be adhered to at the quayside. 
 
These observations can be extended to a fishery in which any number of quota species are caught 
together. Unless the quotas are in exact proportion to the species in the catch, there is a 
straightforward trade-off between enforcing fixed quotas in a multispecies fishery and 
discouraging discards. The more effectively the enforcement regime deters landings of over-
quota fish, the greater the incentive for vessels to discard that fish if they have quota left for other 
species and can profitably increase effort in order to catch and retain those species alone. The 
only solution to this problem would be for the vessel to employ progressively more selective gear 
                                                
10 In this chapter we focus only on quota-related discarding. We therefore ignore discarding of non-target or non-
marketable species, discarding of undersized fish, and discarding due to a limit on the space available in a vessel’s 
hold or fish room. We also assume, implicitly, that discarding is a costless activity. For a full treatment of the 
economics of discarding see Arnason (1994). 
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and fishing methods as each quota is filled in order to avoid catching over-quota fish, but this 
may not be possible except to a very limited extent. 
 
The more a vessel’s overall parcel of quotas become filled, however, the greater the likelihood 
that, even if some quotas remain unfilled, it will no longer be profitable to continue to increase 
effort only to retain a small part of the catch. This is more likely if the market price of the species 
subject to the less constraining quotas are relatively low. If the market price of the species subject 
to the least constraining quota were very high, however, it might well be profitable to increase 
effort for that species even if all other quotas are filled (and so all other species are being 
discarded from the catch). In this case the enforcement system could only enforce the least 
constraining quota at sea, even if all quotas are being effectively enforced at the quayside. 
 
2.2.3 “Highgrading” with fixed quotas 
 
Suppose now that we have a single species fixed quota, but that there are different grades of fish 
of that species (different sizes perhaps) which command different prices. If the quota becomes 
filled, there may be an incentive to continue to increase effort and to discard the least valuable 
grades in the hold as long as the fine expected to be incurred from landing that fish is greater than 
their market value. 
 
Note that for this type of discarding (often referred to as “highgrading”) to be profitable, the 
revenue earned from an additional unit of catch (once the quota is filled), less the value of the 
discarded fish, must be greater than the cost of catching that additional unit. It would not be 
profitable to highgrade if the additional profit earned from an additional unit of catch were no 
greater than the market price of the fish thrown over the side in order to “make room” within the 
quota limit.(11) 
 
It is not difficult to see that this is exactly analogous to the case of a “multispecies quota”, i.e., a 
quota covering more than one species. The possibility for highgrading across species is one 
reason why multispecies quotas may not represent an attractive option in a multispecies fishery, 
even though it is the problem of quota-induced discarding which has led some to suggest this 
option. The difference between the incentives to discard fish of different species with single 
species quotas and with a multispecies quota is that with single species quotas there will never be 
incentives to discard species already in the hold, since quota cannot be substituted between 
species. With a multispecies quota there may be such incentives. 
 
                                                
11 When deciding whether or not to discard any part of the catch that is already on board, the value of that part of the 
catch represents pure profit, since the cost of catching it has already been incurred and cannot be recouped. A 
thorough treatment of highgrading can be found in Anderson (1994). 
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2.3 Variable quotas 
 
2.3.1 Variable quotas in a single species fishery 
 
In the previous section we assumed that the quota per period was fixed, so that the vessel could 
attempt to maximise its profits only by choosing its level of effort (and therefore catch) and, 
where appropriate, by also choosing whether or not to discard. 
 
We now let the quota be variable, and we assume that it can be varied because quota is 
transferable privately and that there exists a market for it. We further assume that the market 
operates so efficiently that quota can be bought and sold in any quantity (subject to the TAC or 
national quota) and at any time. Because we are examining the short run behaviour of a fishing 
vessel we implicitly consider only the short run (lease) market for quota. Therefore by the quota 
price we mean the lease or rental price of quota for the period in question. 
 
The implication of tradeable quotas is that, given an active market in quota, the vessel operator 
has a choice between landing a unit of fish illegally and purchasing a unit of quota in order to 
land the fish legally. Theoretically, with a constant (flat-rate) fine per unit of over-quota fish, a 
vessel operator who behaves strictly rationally will buy enough quota to cover all his landings 
(only) as long as the expected fine for over-quota landings is greater than the quota price. If the 
expected fine were less than the quota price, all the landings would be made illegally. However, it 
is more realistic to suppose that the expected penalty per unit of over-quota fish will, for one 
reason or another, increase as the volume of illegal landings increases. It can be shown that if the 
expected fine per unit of fish increases with the size of the illegal landings in this way, the 
proportion of landings for which the vessel owner will rationally buy quota will be somewhere 
between 0% and 100%, depending on the steepness of the expected penalty function.(12) 
 
Assuming compliance (i.e., that the vessel operator chooses, freely or otherwise, to buy enough 
quota to cover his landings) the effect of the cost of quota for each unit of fish landed is that the 
optimal (profit-maximising) output for the vessel will be lower than in the absence of quotas. In 
its effect, the quota price is really the same as the hypothetical tax referred to in Section 2.2.1. 
Taking that particular case, if the quota price were equal to the shadow price λ then the vessel 
would maximise profits by producing an output equal to Q.(13) 
 
2.3.2 Variable quotas in a multispecies fishery 
 
Assuming, again, that the expected fine for landing over-quota fish is high enough to deter illegal 
landings, in a multispecies fishery the vessel operator will attempt to buy enough quota to cover 
the vessel’s catches of all quota species. In theory the problem of quota combinations out of 
                                                
12 This assumes that the extent of cheating is not so widespread that the expected fine influences the quota price. 
13 The equilibrium quota price in a fishery will in fact be equal to the shadow price of the quota equalised across all 
vessels in the fishery (see Section 2.4). 
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proportion with the mix of species in the catch should not arise as long as there is active trading 
in all quotas and there are no supply constraints for particular quotas. 
 
Given these conditions, as long as there are no different size grades in the catch for each species 
(see below) it will only be profitable to discard fish of a particular species if the quota price for 
that species is greater than the market price. While a quota price in excess of the market price is 
conceivable as a very short term phenomenon, or where the quota price is determined in a wider 
market and there is locally very weak demand for a particular species, in most circumstances it is 
unlikely.(14) Given a sufficient supply of quota, there should not be any incentives for quota-
induced discarding. 
 
If, however, there are supply constraints for some quotas, the sort of discard incentives expected 
with fixed quotas will appear. For example, where for some reason the TACs (or national quotas) 
for different species are not in proportion to the typical mix of species in the catch, it may become 
impossible for many if not all vessels in the fishery to purchase enough quota for some species to 
cover their catches of that species. Discards and/or illegal landings are then inevitable unless 
fishing practices can be adjusted to change the composition of the catch accordingly. 
 
2.3.3 Highgrading with variable quotas 
 
As before, suppose that we have a single species quota covering different grades of fish which 
command different prices, but now we let the quota be variable (tradeable). In this case there will 
be an incentive to discard any grade of fish for which the market price is less than the quota price, 
which is quite possible if there is a wide disparity between the market price for different grades of 
fish.(15) 
 
With a fixed quota, we observed that for highgrading to be profitable, once the quota limit has 
been reached the revenue earned from an additional unit of catch, less the value of the discarded 
fish, must be greater than the cost of obtaining the extra catch. With tradeable quotas (assuming 
an expected penalty high enough to deter over-quota landings) the revenue earned from every 
unit of catch must always be greater than the cost of catching it and the cost of the quota required 
to land it. At the same time, once fish is caught it is only worth retaining it for landing if it is 
worth more than the cost of the required quota. Given this, assuming the quota price remains 
constant either all of the low value fish will be discarded or none of it will. As long as the market 
price of the fish retained on board is greater than the quota price, it will always be more profitable 
                                                
14 The quota price may, nevertheless, be proportionately higher for the least valuable species in the catch. Because it 
is likely to be potentially profitable to discard these low value fish while continuing to catch high value species, the 
quota price for the low value fish need not take account of the cost of catching them, only their market price. As a 
result, the quota price of by-catch species may be relatively higher (compared to the market price) than the quota 
price of target species. 
15 Note that since the quota price, in turn, reflects the market value of (and the cost of catching) the fish actually 
landed, there is a direct causal relationship between patterns of discards in the fishery and the equilibrium quota 
price. 
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to buy quota than to discard fish from the hold. If the quota supply for a particular species 
becomes constrained, then the discard incentives associated with fixed quotas will appear. 
 
It is difficult to say whether, all else equal, in the short run we would expect more or less 
highgrading with tradeable quotas as compared to fixed quotas. In theory, with a distribution of 
fixed quotas among vessels that exactly mirrored the efficient equilibrium quota allocation we 
would expect a quota market to produce (see Section 2.4 below) we should end up with exactly 
analogous incentives for highgrading. In practice, the inefficient quota allocation we would 
expect under a system of fixed quotas will distort incentives to highgrade. It is certainly possible 
that under some conditions there may be more highgrading with tradeable quotas. 
 
2.4 ITQs in theory 
 
2.4.1 Economic efficiency 
 
We have so far considered the incentives for landing over-quota fish and for discarding under 
fixed and variable quota systems. Given certain conditions, incentives for exceeding quotas and 
for some types of discarding are likely to be reduced with variable quotas. The principal 
economic argument for a fully variable individual transferable quota (ITQ) system, however, 
focuses on the efficiency of fishing operations. 
 
We have so far assumed that the management authority is primarily interested in trying to ensure 
adherence to the TAC (or a national quota). This is not unreasonable, since domestic objectives 
and, in many cases, international obligations generally place considerable emphasis on resource 
conservation and hence on the enforcement of conservation policies. Given a TAC, however, we 
should perhaps also be interested in how that TAC might be allocated to the fishing industry in 
such a way that industry profits are maximised. 
 
There are really only two ways in which quota can be allocated amongst fishing firms. Either an 
administrator decides how much quota each firm should get, either arbitrarily or according to 
some qualifying criterion such as recent catch history, or the (final) allocation could be left to the 
market, which is the idea behind ITQs. We can show that a market allocation necessarily 
produces an efficient allocation, i.e., an allocation which maximises economic benefits, whereas 
an administrative allocation will not (except by chance). 
 
Suppose we have an industry composed of just two fishing firms (vessels). Let’s call them vessel 
i and vessel j. Suppose that an administrator allocates an identical fixed quota Q to each vessel. 
Suppose, further, that vessels i and j are not identical in their capacity and efficiency, with the 
result that the fixed quota Q constrains each vessel’s operation to a different extent. The quota 
will then have a different shadow price(16) for each vessel, i.e., λi does not equal λj. 
                                                
16 see Section 2.2.1 
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Assume that λi is greater than λj, as we depict in Figure 2.2a. This means that the quota constraint 
on vessel i is associated with a greater marginal increment to profit than the constraint on vessel j, 
and this means that a unit of quota is worth more to vessel i than to vessel j. If vessel j could sell a 
unit of quota to vessel i at a price somewhere between λi and λj (they could agree on a price by 
bargaining) then vessel j would gain more profit by selling a unit of quota than it would lose by 
reducing its output, while vessel i would increase its profit (by increasing its output) more than 
the cost of buying another unit of quota. Since the trade has been profitable for both vessels, total 
industry profits must have increased. 
 
 
Figure 2.2a: Equal quota allocations - unequal shadow prices 
 
 
Figure 2.2b: Equalised shadow prices - unequal quota allocations 
 
 
 
After this trade the shadow price of vessel i’s quota will have reduced and the shadow price on 
vessel j’s quota will have increased. If, after the trade, there was still a difference between λi and 
λj, then further trade would be mutually advantageous (by the same argument) and total industry 
profits would increase again as a result. It is not difficult to see that trading should take place until 
λi equals λj at which point industry profits are maximised. Because the two vessels are different in 
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their capacity, as a result of trading each now has a different quota allocation, Qi and Qj (although 
the TAC is the same). This result is shown in Figure 2.2b. 
 
The equalisation of shadow prices across firms is the necessary and sufficient condition for 
maximising profits subject to the total quota constraint (the TAC). The shadow price will then be 
the equilibrium short-run price at which quota is traded among fishing firms. 
 
It would be very difficult for an administrator to achieve this efficient quota allocation. To do this 
he would need extremely detailed information about the technical characteristics of each vessel, 
the day-to-day decisions of the skipper, and so on. He might closely approach such an allocation 
by using a “rule of thumb” performance-based criterion such as past catch history, but his 
allocation would almost certainly soon become rather inefficient as different vessels change their 
characteristics and become relatively more or less profitable with time. The argument for 
tradeable quotas, therefore, is that allowing the market to allocate quota among fishing firms 
ensures an efficient, i.e., profit maximising, allocation, both automatically and continuously. 
 
In fact, no matter what the initial distribution of quota, the market will produce the same 
allocation after trade. Given significant variation within the industry in vessel capacity and 
efficiency, in the short term some vessels may find it profitable to purchase enough quota to 
operate at full capacity while other vessels may be so inefficient that they find it more profitable 
to sell all their quota and exit the industry. In a newly-introduced ITQ system, we would 
therefore expect some short term reduction in capacity, at least at the margins. 
 
In the longer term all firms will have an incentive to reduce costs in order to increase profits. 
Some operators will do this by scaling down their capacity (or exiting the fishery) while others 
will be able to invest profitably in additional capacity and benefit from economies of scale. 
Overall, we would expect total industry capacity, over time, to align itself more efficiently to the 
size of the TAC(s) or national quota(s).(17) A better balance between capacity and quotas is likely 
to have the general effect of reducing overall incentives to land over-quota fish and to discard. 
 
The value (price) of ITQs reflects the profits(18) that can be earned from their use, but also the 
total supply of quota relative to demand. Other things being equal, increased industry profitability 
will result in increased quota prices, but individual vessels (who cannot alone influence the quota 
price) will continue to have incentives to increase their own relative profitability. They can do 
this by reducing unit costs, or indeed by increasing revenues, for example by landing a higher 
quality product. 
                                                
17 The extent to which capacity will adjust, and how quickly, will depend upon a number of factors, including the 
degree of “capital malleability” (the ease with which excess capacity can be disposed of) and operators’ differing 
expectations about future economic conditions in the fishery and future fish stock sizes (and hence the present value 
of quotas as capital assets). Adjustment will also depend, crucially, upon enforcement of quotas. 
18 Note that here we mean economic or “excess” profits, i.e., profits in excess of the normal return that could be 
expected on capital invested in a particular sector of the economy. 
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The foregoing assumes, importantly, that there is adequate enforcement of quotas. To the extent 
that vessels are able to land fish without quota, the potential short term and dynamic efficiency 
gains from an ITQ system will not be achieved in full. However, the value acquired by quotas 
may well produce a degree of “self-enforcement” within the industry to the extent that vessels 
who have paid for quota are not prepared to tolerate free-riding by others. 
 
It is worth mentioning here that we would also expect capacity to adjust under a system of fixed 
quota allocations, provided those allocations were fully enforced. Vessels whose profits are 
significantly constrained will have an incentive to increase profits by scaling down their capacity 
and hence reducing their capital costs, while vessels forced to make a loss should exit the 
industry. ITQs, however, are generally assumed to facilitate capacity adjustment in the fishery 
since given an initial endowment of quota (see below) vessel owners exiting the industry are 
compensated to the value of the quota they sell to those remaining in the industry. 
 
Useful references on the economics of ITQs include Arnason (1990) and Anderson (1995). Less 
technical accounts of ITQs in theory and practice can be found in Squires et al (1995), Grafton 
(1996) and Squires et al (1998). 
 
2.4.2 Distribution of economic benefits 
 
Policy makers are often interested not just in the size of economic gains but also in how those 
gains are distributed within society. Economic gains from an ITQ system will be reflected in the 
value of quota. Who in society benefits from these gains depends upon who is in a position to 
realise quota values. 
 
If quotas were sold by the Government at the outset, say by auction or competitive tender (as 
rights over a reasonably long time period), then their value would be captured by Government on 
behalf of society as a whole. If, on the other hand, quotas were initially distributed free of charge 
to the industry (as often happens in practice) then the industry is in a position to obtain the value 
of the quotas. If the first round ITQ owners, i.e., the individuals or companies who initially 
receive free quota from Government, proceed to sell all or any of their quota (either outright or by 
renting it) they will realise the quota value as a windfall gain. Second round and subsequent 
owners of quota, however, will not receive any such windfall gain unless the value of quota 
appreciates while in their possession. 
 
Once quotas have been freely given to the industry it is possible subsequently to recoup some of 
their value to the public purse, through taxes on quota holdings or profits for example, but any 
individuals or companies who have sold quota prior to the introduction of such measures will not 
forfeit any of their private gains and there is the possibility of a double charge on those who have 
acquired their quota on the open market. 
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Who should benefit from the economic value of a fishery is essentially a normative question. It 
could be argued that society as a whole should capture the benefits of what is known as the 
resource rent since fishery resources are owned by the nation state. This is the view that is 
usually taken with regard to other natural resources such as oil or gas. Some argue that allowing a 
significant part of economic profits to be retained by the industry ensures strong incentives for 
static and dynamic efficiency gains and may help assure compliance with quotas (i.e., respect for 
private property rights).(19) 
 
2.5 Summary 
 
A quota gives rise to a shadow price which is the marginal value (as marginal increments to or 
from profit) of the quota constraint. In general the greater the constraint on the vessel’s 
profitability, the greater the shadow price. In order to enforce a quota, the management authority 
should ensure that the expected fine for exceeding the quota is at least as large as the shadow 
price. This can be assured with a sufficiently large fine per unit of over-quota landings or a large 
enough lump-sum fine for any violation.(20) 
 
In a multispecies fishery, fixed quota allocations out of proportion to the species mix in the catch 
will result in discards of the most constrained species, unless the enforcement system is so weak 
that it is profitable to land over-quota fish. In either case the TACs for these species are likely to 
be exceeded. 
 
Variable (tradeable) quotas allow vessels to purchase enough quota to operate profitably unless 
and until the total supply of quota becomes constraining. The ability for vessel operators to buy 
and sell quota, however, will assist the adjustment of capacity to the total quota supply. The 
equilibrium short run quota price represents the shadow price of quota equalised across all vessels 
in the fishery. The resulting market allocation of quota should be the efficient allocation, i.e., the 
allocation which maximises industry profits given the TAC. 
 
Tradeable quotas should reduce problems of discarding in a multispecies fishery but cannot 
entirely resolve problems of relative quota deficits for some stocks at the national level. 
Highgrading, i.e., discarding low value fish in order to utilise quota to land fish of a higher unit 
value, is a possible cause of catch discarding under any quota system. Other things being equal, 
the problem of highgrading should not be significantly greater under a tradeable quota system, 
but it is difficult to predict in practice. Some highgrading is nevertheless possible wherever the 
market price of fish is lower than the quota price. 
                                                
19 There are a number of conceptual and design issues concerning rent capture; see, for example, Grafton (1995), 
Johnson (1995) and also Hatcher and Pascoe (1997). 
20 There are two conditions for effective enforcement. The marginal condition requires that the expected penalty for a 
marginal unit of violation is greater than the profit from that unit of violation. The total condition requires that the 
expected penalty for any single act of violation is greater than the total profit expected from the violation. 
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3. The UK approach to quota management 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As a Member State of the European Community (EC), the United Kingdom is bound in its fishery 
management decisions by international obligations under the EC’s Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP). Since 1983 the CFP has included a conservation and management system which provides 
for restrictions on the volume of catches from Community waters, with total allowable catches 
(TACs) distributed to Member States on the basis of “relative stability” of fishing activities.(21) 
 
Member States have an obligation under EC law to put in place a system for the distribution and 
use of their quotas(22) and to monitor and enforce quota uptake by fishing vessels flying their 
flag.(23) Notwithstanding the stated objectives of the resource conservation and management 
system at the Community level, however, Member States are only required to ensure that their 
vessels do not land fish over and above the national quotas. They are not required to adopt any 
particular method for internal quota allocation,(24) so long as basic Community law is respected, 
or to allocate quota in such a way that any particular social or economic objective is fulfilled. 
 
In addition, the Council Regulation which establishes TACs and quotas each year explicitly 
prohibits the retaining on board and landing by a Member State vessel of catches from a stock for 
which the Member State’s quota is exhausted. Thus although limits are set in terms of catches, 
their practical implementation is prescribed in terms of landings. Discarding in order to remain 
within quota limits is therefore implicitly allowed for in Community law. 
 
In this chapter we describe the arrangements which the UK Government has adopted in order to 
manage the uptake of national quotas by the UK fleet. We briefly trace the development of the 
“sectoral” quota management system since 1983 and then present an outline of the system as it 
operated in 2001, focusing in particular on the role of the UK fish producers’ organisations (POs) 
to which a substantial degree of management responsibility is now devolved. Finally, we consider 
the strengths and weaknesses of quota management in the UK, particularly in the light of what 
economic theory tells us about the implications of different methods of quota. 
                                                
21 Article 8 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3760/92 establishing a Community system for fisheries and aquaculture 
(Official Journal of the European Communities, No L 389, 31.12.1992, p.1). The TACs and national quotas for 2001 
were set out in Council Regulation (EC) No 2848/2000 fixing for 2001 the fishing opportunities and associated 
conditions for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks, applicable in Community waters and, for Community 
vessels, in waters where limitations in catch are required (Official Journal of the European Communities, No L 334 , 
30.12.2000, p.1), as amended. 
22 Article 9(2) of Regulation 3760/92. 
23 Articles 2, 21 and 31 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 establishing a control system applicable to the 
common fisheries policy (Official Journal of the European Communities, No L 261, 20.10.1993, p.1). 
24 The basic EC marketing regulation, however, does suggest that producers’ organisations be given some 
responsibility for quota management. 
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3.2 Development of the UK system 
 
When the resource conservation component of the CFP was put in place in 1983, the UK 
Government already had a history of quota management arrangements for a number of stocks for 
which quotas had previously been agreed under the auspices of the North East Atlantic Fisheries 
Commission (NEAFC). UK vessels fishing for the Western mackerel stock and for the main 
herring stocks, for example, were subject to weekly or fortnightly landings limits set according to 
vessel length, while daily or weekly limits had from time to time been applied for cod, haddock 
and whiting stocks in ICES Areas IV and VI (generally set according to the size of a vessel’s 
crew). In addition, since 1980 separate allocations from the quotas for mackerel and the main 
herring stocks had been reserved for the relatively small pelagic freezer trawler sector (these 
vessels, together with the big purse-seiners, were the only UK fleet sectors to come under 
restrictive licensing before 1984, when the “pressure stock” licensing system(25) was introduced). 
 
In 1983 a much wider range of stocks became subject to quotas under the CFP. As fishing effort 
increased over the next few years by an industry which was still expanding in domestic waters, 
particularly in the Area VII demersal fisheries, weekly (later to become monthly) landings limits 
were extended to cover fishing for quota stocks by all vessels over 10 metres in length. 
 
Early in 1984, however, the Shetland Fish Producers’ Organisation (SFPO), one of 14 POs then 
established in the UK, successfully applied to the Government to be given its own annual 
allocations from the Area IV and VI haddock quotas to manage on behalf of its members. These 
allocations were based on the historic share of the UK’s haddock catches landed by SFPO 
members. Later that year a number of other POs (as well as a few of the larger fishing firms) 
were given allocations from the Area IV and VI cod quotas on a similar basis, while in 1985 
annual quotas were allocated to POs for Area IV/VI cod, haddock, whiting and saithe as well as 
Area IV herring. By the following year, most of the POs whose members were active in the North 
Sea and West of Scotland areas were receiving annual quota allocations for most of the stocks in 
these areas. Also from 1985, annual allocations from the main mackerel and herring quotas were 
granted to individual freezer trawlers and purse-seiners instead of parts of the quotas being 
reserved for these sectors as a whole. 
 
The system of PO quota allocations was extended, at the industry’s request, to cover quotas in the 
Irish Sea in 1990 and then the remainder of Area VII in 1991. By this time all the UK POs were 
managing quota allocations on behalf of their members. Annual allocations were now routinely 
based on the combined landings track records of each PO’s over 10 metre vessel membership 
during the previous three years (calculated as a percentage of the total landings by UK vessels 
over the same reference period).(26) Fishing for quota stocks by vessels not belonging to a PO, as 
well as by PO member vessels whose PO had not requested an allocation for a particular stock, 
                                                
25 The development of the UK’s restrictive licensing system, to which the quota management system is linked, is 
described in Appendix I. 
26 The reference period was two years in the case of some pelagic stocks. 
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continued to be regulated directly by the Government by means of (in most cases) monthly 
landings limits. The uptake of the quota shares reserved for the inshore (10 metre and under) 
sector was not regulated unless the level of estimated landings dictated an early fishery 
closure.(27) 
 
Before 1995 the POs could more or less freely decide each year which quotas they wished to 
manage. Given the track record-based allocation system, this allowed for a degree of strategic 
behaviour. For example, it was possible for POs to “build up” relatively strong track records for 
particular stocks while fishing against the Government’s monthly landings limits before 
requesting a sectoral allocation. Conversely, it was possible for a PO to decline an allocation if its 
catch performance in the preceding three years would result in stricter quota controls for its 
members than they would face fishing against anticipated non-sector monthly limits. In addition, 
vessels in some POs had allegedly been reporting catches as coming from areas in which the PO 
had not taken allocations instead of counting those catches against their sectoral quotas. 
 
In 1995, in order to simplify the system and to press the POs into taking more management 
responsibility (and to reduce the possibilities for “ghost fishing” in order to inflate track records), 
the Government obliged the POs to accept allocations for all demersal species quotas (however 
small some of the allocations might be), although the management of the various pelagic quotas 
remained optional. From 1999, however, POs and other groups choosing to receive sectoral 
allocations for pelagic stocks were similarly obliged to take allocations for all pelagic stocks. 
 
Under the sectoral quota system each of the POs were free to decide on the means by which they 
managed their quota allocations. Some chose to operate a common quota pool and set monthly 
landings limits for the membership, others allocated individual annual quotas to member vessels 
or companies for some or all stocks, normally based on each vessel’s track record. The quota 
management approaches currently adopted by the various POs are examined in the following 
section. Individual vessel allocations were granted directly by the Government only to purse-
seiners and freezer trawlers in respect of the main mackerel and herring stocks (where the vessels 
were not in membership of a PO taking a quota allocation for these stocks). 
 
The POs were also able to undertake quota swaps between themselves at any time (as well as 
with the small number of companies which received allocations of pelagic quotas). To begin 
with, all such swaps had to balance in terms of “cod-equivalents”(28) but in 1993 this restriction 
was removed, although some exchange of fish still had to take place. In 1996 quota “gifting”, i.e., 
one-way transfers of quota, was allowed for the first time. Any financial arrangements associated 
with these transactions, however, were left as a private matter for the POs and their members. 
                                                
27 More recently temporary stops, and lately monthly limits, have been imposed for a few stocks in an attempt to 
spread a fishery over 12 months. 
28 The notion of “cod-equivalents” was first used in the early 1980s during the negotiations over international TAC 
shares. Tonnages of species other than cod are inflated or deflated according to their average market price compared 
to that for cod. 
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In 1994 the Government introduced a provision to enable POs to retain the landings track records 
of any member vessel whose owner would agree to surrender his licence. In practice the PO 
would pay financial compensation to the owner for decommissioning his vessel. The PO could 
then arrange to “ring-fence” the additional landings track record, so that if any of the remaining 
member vessels subsequently left the PO, that proportion of their track record which was 
attributable to extra quota obtained in this way could be retained within the PO. This facility was 
used in a few cases, effectively enabling some POs to buy in additional quota, but apparently 
became relatively unattractive as the value of licences and track records grew following changes 
in the licensing system and an increasing demand for licences and quota allocations (see below). 
 
As Appendix I describes, various types of licence have been freely traded since they were 
introduced, except where transferability between ownerships was explicitly restricted or 
prevented. Before 1995 individual landings track records were normally associated with the 
vessel rather the licence, except where a licence was transferred onto a new vessel (or at least a 
vessel new to a particular fishery) or where a licence aggregation was undertaken (in which case 
the track records of the previously licensed vessels were aggregated onto the new vessel). From 
1995, however, track records were formally associated with licences. This move greatly increased 
the value of licences and facilitated licence trading. 
 
The most significant advance in quota tradeability came not from developments in the licensing 
system, however, but from the changes in the rules governing quota swaps between POs. Once 
quota could be transferred more or less freely between POs, it could be traded between a member 
of one PO and a member of another PO, either permanently (a straight quota sale) or on an annual 
lease basis (see below). To begin with it was only the relatively small number of POs operating 
individual quota systems whose members could take advantage of this possibility, but recently 
more POs have introduced IQs for certain stocks and a number of the POs operating quota pools 
have permitted members to “top up” their allowances under a “pool-plus” system with quota 
bought or leased in from other vessels (see Section 3.3). 
 
Under the track record quota allocation system based on the three-year rolling reference period, a 
(permanent) sale of 100 tonnes of quota from a vessel in PO A to a vessel in PO B would involve 
the transfer of 100 tonnes from PO A to PO B in year one, 67 tonnes in year two and 33 tonnes in 
year three. In year four the transaction would be complete, since PO B would now receive the 
entire extra 100 tonnes of quota in its allocation. For deals between vessels within the same PO, 
the same time would be needed for the track records to adjust. A one-off annual lease of 100 
tonnes of quota from a vessel in PO A to one in PO B in year one would require PO B to transfer 
back 33 tonnes of quota to PO A in each of years two, three and four in order that track records 
would be completely readjusted by year five. Note that a one-off annual lease of 100 tonnes of 
quota from a vessel in PO A to one in PO B in year one with no subsequent transfers either way 
would eventually be reflected in an additional 50 tonnes of quota for PO B but this would take 7  
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years to work through the system (assuming that allocations were rounded to the nearest half 
tonne - trades in smaller amounts would be resolved more quickly).(29) 
 
The Government implicitly recognised the reality of quota trading in 1996/7 when it allowed the 
track records of vessels removed from the fleet in the final round of the 1992-1997 
decommissioning schemes to be retained or transferred onto another vessel. This almost certainly 
provided a stimulus to quota trading between individuals and led to a number of POs taking the 
opportunity to increase their quota pools or to move to a pool-plus system. 
 
The system of rolling track-record based allocations was ended in 1999 following consultations 
between Government and industry over the previous two years. From 1999 quota allocations 
were formally fixed, although the allocations for both 1998 and 1999 had been based on track 
records over the period 1994-1996 which was the normal reference period for the 1997 
allocations. This was done to avoid incentives to increase track records over a qualifying period 
leading up to the fixing of allocations; in effect, therefore, allocations had become fixed in 1997. 
The “Fixed Quota Allocations” (FQAs) attached to vessels’ licences were denominated in quota 
units which were equivalent to 100kg shares of the 1999 allocation. For 2000 and 2001 the value 
of a unit was then inflated or deflated according to changes in the UK’s national quota 
allocations. 
 
The move to FQAs, in common with many of the developments in the UK quota management 
system, was to an extent industry-led, although by no means all sectors of the industry were in 
favour of the change.(30) Among the advantages cited for the new system in the 1997 Report of 
the Working Group on FQAs were: 
• “greater year on year stability in managing quota allocations;” 
• “less pressure on fishermen and their POs to maintain their track records by utilising their 
full quota allocations;” 
• “a disincentive to ‘paper fish’ or ‘ghost fishing’” 
• “the ability to swap or gift quota without suffering a reduction in future quota allocations” 
• “facilitating investment in the fleet by ensuring that track records were retained whilst 
vessels were being replaced or modernised” 
 
During the move to FQAs the Government allowed all outstanding quota trades to be resolved 
with a once off reallocation of quota units. Each PO membership was allocated the number of 
units that reflected their current track records, but these units could be transferred to other POs or 
reallocated amongst the licences of the membership as appropriate. The Government insisted, 
however, that this did not set a precedent for future reallocations. The implications of this for 
quota trading are to simplify short term leases but to complicate deals to sell quota permanently 
                                                
29 These examples also assume no change in the relevant TAC. 
30 Of the responses received to a widely circulated 1998 consultation paper on FQAs, 5 out of 19 POs were against 
the move, along with 20 out of 24 Fishermens’ Associations, 2 out of 18 fishing companies and 197 out of 215 
individual vessel owners. 
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(apart from sales of units for aggregation on the licence market). A “permanent” transfer of quota 
from one vessel to another would now require the transfer of the same amount of quota between 
vessels (and their POs if the vessels are in different POs) in perpetuity. Particularly where TACs 
fluctuate significantly, the contractual terms of such deals are normally set out in quota units 
rather than tonnes of quota. Despite the increased risk associated with long term quota transfer 
deals, a large number have nonetheless been concluded since the introduction of FQAs in 1991, 
with around 900 such transfers being notified to Fisheries Departments in the context of the 
recent FQA adjustment exercise (see p.iii). 
 
Particularly complex agreements can arise when a licence is put up for sale. Typically, 
transactions are arranged by licence brokers and may involve the “stripping” of units from the 
licence and their sale to one or even a number of purchasers. As far as Fisheries Departments are 
concerned, the units remain associated with the original licence, so in practice all sales must 
involve vessels in POs and wherever quota units are not to follow the licence the POs must agree 
to transfer the appropriate amounts of quota back each year. 
 
Independent quantitative data on the total trade in quota that has taken place in the UK is not 
available, but from interviews with people directly involved (including licence and quota brokers) 
it was possible to gain an overall impression of how the quota trade has developed. It appears that 
quota trading to any significant extent began in 1995, following the association of track records 
with licences and an increased demand for both licences and track record. Quota leasing appears 
to have begun in earnest at around the same time, although one-way quota swaps between POs 
were not officially sanctioned until the following year. 
 
Table 3.1: Total numbers of licence aggregations 1995-2001 
 
 
Year 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001* 
 
Donor licences 
 
227 
 
224 
 
199 
 
105 
 
154 
 
112 
 
6 
 
Recipient licences 
 
110 
 
91 
 
94 
 
49 
 
83 
 
67 
 
4 
Source: DEFRA. *as at 31.03.01 
 
Recently the trade has been dominated by quota leasing, and the number of licence aggregations 
has decreased as Table 3.1 shows. One broker reported that the annual number of leases he 
handled had increased from around 20 in 1995-1998 to 60 in 2000 and nearly that figure during 
the first half of 2001. Anecdotal evidence suggests that much of the increase in leasing in recent 
years is due to demand by vessels in the North Sea demersal fisheries, in response to an increased 
enforcement effort by the authorities (and decreases in the UK cod quota in Area IV). The move 
to FQAs would be expected to have increased the proportion of leases, although one broker was 
of the opinion that FQAs per se had had no noticeable effect on trade. There was also a 
suggestion that leasing was now the dominant form of trade due to a shortage of available capital 
for outright purchases, but it also seems probable that leasing is simply the type of transaction 
that is optimal under the FQA system as it now operates. 
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A significant piece of circumstantial evidence for the increasing number of quota trades between 
vessels in different POs is provided by Fisheries Departments’ records of the total number of 
swaps arranged between POs over recent years. As Table 3.2 shows, there has been a massive 
increase in the number of swaps undertaken annually between POs in the last five years and it 
seems likely that this trend reflects the increasing numbers of transfers needed to give effect to 
quota trades between PO vessels.(31) 
 
Table 3.2: Total numbers of inter-PO swaps 1994-2000 
 
 
Year 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
Swaps 
 
90 
 
251 
 
368 
 
397 
 
499 
 
488 
 
680 
Source: DEFRA 
 
Table 3.3: Observed sale prices for UK quota 1996-2000 
 
 1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000* 
Hake VI & VII £1,600 £3,250 £3,000 £2,500 
Monkfish VI £2,500 £3,000 £3,000 £2,500 
Monkfish VII £3,000 £4,000 £5,000 £4,000 
Megrim VI £1,600 £3,000 £2,500 £1,100 
Megrim VII £1,600 £3,250 £2,750 £1,500 
Cod IV £900 £1,000 £1,000 £1,200 
Cod VI £900 £1,500 £1,350 £1,200 
Cod VII £900 £1,500 £1,350 £1,200 
Haddock IV £300 £300 £700 £500 
Haddock VI £800 £1,400 £1,700 £1,400 
Haddock VII £200 £200 £350 £300 
Saithe IV £300 £300 £400 £600 
Saithe VII £300 £300 £400 £300 
Whiting IV £200 £300 £300 £300 
Whiting VI £200 £200 £300 £300 
Whiting VII £200 £200 £300 £300 
Plaice IV £1,000 £1,200 £1,200 £1,000 
Plaice VII £1,000 £1,200 £1,200 £1,000 
Sole IV £3,000 £5,000 £9,000 £5,000 
Sole VII £3,000 £5,000 £9,000 £5,000 
Pollock IV £200 £200 £400 £300 
Pollock VII £200 £200 £400 £300 
Nephrops IV £1,000 £1,500 £1,700 £1,500 
Nephrops VI £900 £1,100 £1,450 £1,250 
Prices are median nominal prices per tonne of quota/*per 10 quota units. Source: two (anonymous) licence/quota 
brokers. 
 
                                                
31 Note that the system cannot distinguish between swaps that give effect to private trades and those which, for 
example, are arranged by POs on behalf of the collective membership. 
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Table 3.3 shows the nominal prices (median values) per tonne of quota for sale or permanent 
transfer for a number of stocks, as observed by two important quota/licence brokers during 1996-
2000. These figures are reproduced here simply to illustrate the level of quota prices in recent 
years and the number of stocks for which there has been trading. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the UK’s quota management system has developed as an 
administrative arrangement between the Government and the fishing industry. Legislation 
requires fishermen to comply with the terms of their licences, issued by the Secretary of State at 
his (her) discretion under the provisions of the Sea Fish Conservation Act 1967 (as amended). 
Licence conditions include, in the case of non-sector vessels, restrictions on the amounts of fish 
which may be retained on board, but in the case of PO members the licence schedule simply 
requires observance of the quota management rules of the PO. Aside from this, the quota 
management system is not currently dependent on primary or secondary legislation. 
 
3.3 Current management arrangements 
 
3.3.1 Quota management rules 
 
The principal features of the quota management arrangements as they operated in 2001 are set out 
below.(32) Firstly, the allocation mechanism can be summarised as follows: 
 
• Quota allocations are made to POs in respect of the vessels over 10m in length in their 
membership(33) in proportion to the total number of units associated with those vessels’ 
licences. POs opting to manage demersal species quotas or pelagic species quotas must 
accept allocations for all demersal stocks and all pelagic stocks respectively. In the case of 
pelagic stocks allocations can also be made to groups of vessels other than POs (currently 
this applies to just one fishing company). 
 
• For each stock a “non-sector” allocation is reserved for those over 10m vessels not in 
membership of a PO, in proportion to the total number of units associated with those vessels’ 
licences (but see below). 
 
• Allocations are set aside for the 10m and under fleet on the basis of the total number of units 
assigned to this group (but see below).(34) 
 
                                                
32 Based on the Rules for the management of the UK’s fisheries quotas in Areas IV, VI and VII (and associated areas) 
for 2001 issued by the Fisheries Departments in the UK, November 2000. 
33 as at 1 January each year. 
34 Note that at the time of introduction of FQAs individual track records were not held by the inshore fleet, but a track 
record was established for the group as a whole for the period 1994-96. 
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The main exceptions to these general rules of allocation include the following: 
 
• Specific allocations are also made for the South West mackerel handline fishery (as 0.83% of 
the Western mackerel quota or 1,750 tonnes, whichever is the greater) and the Mourne 
herring fishery, defined as the fishery involving vessels of 12.2m and less using drift nets in 
the Mourne area of the Irish Sea (annual allocation and management as agreed with the 
industry). 
 
• The non-sector allocations for a number of stocks are subject to minimum shares based upon 
1994 allocations to the “pure” non-sector (vessels not belonging to a PO). These floor levels, 
in contrast with the main allocation mechanism, are calculated each year according to the 
number of vessels with certain minimum qualifying landings track records. This is known as 
“underpinning” of allocations, introduced in 1995 in response to industry concerns over a 
(disproportionately) shrinking non-sector share for many stocks. 
 
• Underpinning also applies with respect to a number of stocks in the allocations made to the 
10m and under fleet. Underpinning for all stocks in Area VII is determined as a minimum 
percentage (from 34.8% for VIId sole to 0.7% for Nephrops); for those stocks concerned in 
Area IV some floors are defined in percentage terms, others as a fixed minimum tonnage, 
while in Area VI the floors for all the stocks affected except Nephrops are defined in tonnes. 
 
As described in the previous section, in the case of over 10m vessels the FQAs (defined in quota 
units) are associated with each vessel’s licence. The number of units is fixed, but units will be 
aggregated if licences are aggregated.(35) If a vessel moves from one PO to another, the respective 
number of units and hence the resultant quota allocations move as well.(36) Otherwise, as we have 
seen, POs can exchange quota in-year (either on behalf of individual members or the membership 
as a whole) but this will not affect their allocations in subsequent years. 
 
3.3.2 Management of the non-sector and 10m and under vessels 
 
The Government Fisheries Departments regulate the uptake of quota allocations by the non-sector 
and the 10m and under fleet by varying the amounts these vessels are allowed to catch and land 
by virtue of the conditions attached to their licences. In the case of the non-sector (over 10m 
vessels) landings for most stocks are restricted to monthly limits (or per trip limits in the case of 
some pelagic stocks) which are varied as necessary, in consultation with the industry. Although in 
the past limits were often set according to vessel length, the size and composition of the non-
sector is now such that all limits are flat-rate, i.e., the same for all vessels. Landings by the 10m 
                                                
35 No penalty is applied to the resulting total, as it is to the number of vessel capacity units (VCUs) attached to the 
licence (see Appendix I). 
36 In the case of movements of vessels between POs during the course of the year (rather than at 1 January) the 
adjustment of quota allocations is a matter for agreement between all the parties concerned (the vessel owners, the 
POs and Fisheries Departments). 
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and under fleet have until recently generally been unrestricted although temporary fishery 
closures were sometimes imposed for certain species (notably sole and Nephrops). Towards the 
end of 1999, however, monthly catch limits were imposed for Nephrops in the North Sea and 
these were extended to other areas in 2000. For some specific fisheries such as the Mourne 
herring fishery there is an annual closed season. Note that these arrangements apply whether or 
not the 10m and under vessels belong to a PO. 
 
Monitoring of landings by the non-sector is achieved by means of submitted logsheets and 
landings declarations backed up by inspections of landings. A rather ad hoc sampling-based 
approach is apparently used for estimating the total level of landings by the 10m and under fleet, 
including landings surveys, submission of logsheets on a voluntary basis by some boats and data 
collected from auctions and buyers. 
 
Monitoring and enforcement is the responsibility of the Sea Fisheries Inspectorate (SFI) for 
England and Wales, the Fisheries Inspectorate of the Department of Agriculture and Rural 
Development in Northern Ireland, and the Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency (SFPA) for 
Scotland. Infringement of licence conditions is covered by Section 4 of the Sea Fish 
(Conservation) Act 1967 (as amended) and can result in a licence being suspended or revoked by 
the Secretary of State (which has happened on four occasions) and/or referral to the courts, where 
the maximum statutory penalty is currently £50,000. 
 
3.3.3 Quota management by the POs 
 
There are now 20 sea fishing POs established and officially recognised in the United Kingdom. 
As can be seen from Table 3.4, in 2001 their combined membership accounted for nearly 70% of 
the total number of over 10m vessels active in the UK fleet, but in terms of total physical capacity 
(measured in VCUs)(37) and aggregate engine power the figure was around 85%. 
 
Table 3.4: PO membership in the UK fleet as at 1 January 2001 
 
 
Fleet sector 
 
number 
 
total kW 
 
total VCUs 
 
Over 10m vessels 
 
2,030 
 
680,339 
 
555,308 
 
of which PO member vessels 
 
1,409 (69%) 
 
579,795 (85%) 
 
469,085 (85%) 
 
of which non-sector vessels 
 
621 (31%) 
 
100,544 (15%) 
 
86,223 (15%) 
 
10m & under vessels 
 
5,235 
 
257,491 
 
219,580 
 
All vessels 
 
7,265 
 
937,830 
 
774,888 
Source: DEFRA 
 
                                                
37 Total tonnage figures could not be calculated due to the incomplete transition from the “GRT” to the “GT” 
measure of vessel tonnage. VCUs are explained in Appendix I. 
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Table 3.5: Membership of individual POs in 2001 
 
 
 
 
No. vessels 
over 10m* 
 
Mean 
length 
 
Mean 
VCUs 
 
Aberdeen Fish Producers’ Organisation (AFPO) 
 
44 (0) 
 
23.7 
 
352.6 
 
Anglo-North Irish Fish Producers’ Organisation (ANIFPO) 
 
70 (10) 
 
18.7 
 
265.3 
 
Anglo-Scottish Fish Producers’ Organisation (ASFPO) 
 
82 (8) 
 
17.3 
 
208.9 
 
Cornish Fish Producers’ Organisation (CFPO) 
 
120 (75) 
 
18.1 
 
230.5 
 
Fife Fish Producers’ Organisation (FiFPO) 
 
35 (0) 
 
21.4 
 
415.8 
 
The Fish Producers’ Organisation (FPO) 
 
38 (0) 
 
30.9 
 
706.2 
 
Fleetwood Fish Producers’ Organisation (FFPO) 
 
38 (3) 
 
27.6 
 
370.8 
 
Grimsby Fish Producers’ Organisation (GFPO) 
 
50 (0) 
 
17.2 
 
206.3 
 
Lowestoft Fish Producers’ Organisation (LFPO) 
 
9 (0) 
 
38.1 
 
913.8 
 
North East of Scotland Fish Producers’ Organisation (NESFO) 
 
68 (0) 
 
24.3 
 
398.0 
 
North Sea Fishermen’s Organisation (NSFO) 
 
39 (0) 
 
32.5 
 
676.4 
 
Northern Producers’ Organisation (NPO) 
 
43 (0) 
 
25.9 
 
395.3 
 
Northern Ireland Fish Producers’ Organisation (NIFPO) 
 
120 (26) 
 
18.5 
 
244.7 
 
Orkney Fish Producers’ Organisation (OFPO) 
 
7 (0) 
 
30.8 
 
602.0 
 
Scottish Fishermen’s Organisation (SFO) 
 
365 (0) 
 
22.2 
 
347.5 
 
Shetland Fish Producers’ Organisation (SFPO) 
 
52 (2) 
 
28.7 
 
614.0 
 
South Western Fish Producers’ Organisation (SWFPO) 
 
115 (15) 
 
17.7 
 
221.8 
 
Wales and West Coast Fish Producers’ Organisation (WWCFPO) 
 
41 (0) 
 
36.1 
 
564.4 
 
West of Scotland Fish Producers’ Organisation (WSFPO) 
 
49 (12) 
 
14.7 
 
160.7 
 
Yorkshire and Anglia Fish Producers’ Organisation (YAFPO) 
 
20 (1) 
 
15.6 
 
192.7 
*number of 10m and under member vessels shown in parentheses. Sources: DEFRA, POs 
 
Table 3.5 lists all 20 POs and shows their individual membership of vessels under and over 10m 
in length as at 1 January 2001 , together with the average length and number of VCUs of the over 
10m membership. It can be seen that the POs vary widely in size and composition. Few have 
many member vessels of 10m and under in length, the notable exception being the Cornish FPO, 
while a number have no inshore vessels at all in membership. This largely reflects the 
predominant quota management role of POs in the UK(38) and the fact that the POs can have no 
quota management responsibility for 10m and under vessels under the current system. Some, such 
as the SFO, the largest UK PO, have a very wide range of vessel sizes and types in membership. 
Others have a distinct sectoral identity. The CFPO, SWFPO, LFPO and NSFO between them 
                                                
38 As an institution of Community market policy, POs were originally designed specifically to organise the first-sale 
marketing of fishery products and to implement market support measures such as compensated withdrawals, carry-
overs, etc. In contrast to other countries such as France, market support has been relatively little used in the UK in 
recent years. 
  28
contain most of the beam trawlers fishing in Areas VII and IV; the FPO and NPO represent many 
of the largest demersal trawlers (including those fishing in distant waters); the WSFPO is made 
up mostly of Nephrops trawlers on the Scottish west coast. The WWCFPO was set up some years 
ago by a number of the UK’s Spanish-owned vessels and the FFPO and Northern FPO have more 
recently absorbed many of the others. The NSFO was set up by predominantly Dutch-owned 
boats but a number of Dutch-owned boats are also now in the Fife FPO. At one time the POs all 
tended to have fairly strong regional identities. While for the most part this is still the case, in 
recent years their divergent quota management approaches have resulted in many vessels 
choosing to belong to a particular PO because of the quota management arrangements on offer 
rather than because it is the local or regional organisation. 
 
Table 3.6: Allocation of UK demersal quotas in 2000 
 
Quota stock UK quota (t) % to POs % to non-sector % to 10m&under 
Area IV     
Cod 34,149 95.3 1.3 3.4 
Haddock 53,056 99.8 0.1 0.2 
Whiting 19,470 99.1 0.3 0.6 
Saithe 6,820 99.7 0.1 0.2 
Plaice 26,520 98.4 1.2 0.4 
Nephrops 14,862 91.6 3.7 4.7 
Area VI     
Cod 3,530 100.0 0.0 0.0 
Haddock 15,002 99.7 0.2 0.1 
Whiting 2,875 100.0 0.0 0.0 
Nephrops 12,305 79.0 9.8 11.3 
Area VII     
Sole VIIa 
Sole VIId 
Sole VIIe 
Sole VIIfg 
Sole VIIhjk 
206 
711 
385 
291 
151 
91.1 
58.0 
91.0 
93.0 
100.0 
1.5 
4.7 
2.1 
0.6 
0.0 
7.5 
37.3 
6.9 
6.4 
0.0 
Plaice VIIa 
Plaice VIIde 
Plaice VIIfg 
Plaice VIIhjk 
1,035 
1,797 
175 
170 
86.6 
70.8 
86.6 
100.0 
2.8 
5.4 
1.6 
0.0 
10.6 
23.8 
11.8 
0.0 
Cod VIIa 
Cod VIIb-k 
950 
1,740 
98.0 
72.6 
1.6 
2.4 
1.3 
25.0 
Whiting VIIa 
Whiting VIIb-k 
1,220 
1,527 
98.0 
77.9 
0.6 
3.3 
1.4 
17.8 
Anglerfish 3,990 93.8 2.0 4.2 
Source: DEFRA 
 
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 show the proportions of the main UK demersal and pelagic quotas for 2000 
allocated to all the POs, to the non-sector and to the 10m and under fleet. The figures are those 
for the end of 2000 and therefore take account of all in-year international and sectoral swaps. 
Firstly, it is evident that for most stocks the majority of allocations are managed by the POs. Only 
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in the case of the Nephrops fisheries and the inshore demersal fisheries of the English Channel 
(Areas VIId & e) and the South West peninsular (Areas VIIf & g) are the non-sector and the 10m 
and under fleet responsible for fishing quota stocks in significant quantities. Except in a few 
small specialised inshore fisheries, non-sector vessels are almost entirely uninvolved in the 
pelagic fisheries. 
 
Table 3.7: Allocation of UK pelagic quotas in 2000 
 
 
Quota stock 
 
UK quota (t) 
 
% to POs 
 
% to others* 
 
Western mackerel 
 
192,770 
 
90.7 
 
9.3 
 
North Sea herring 
 
40,570 
 
91.7 
 
8.3 
 
West of Scotland herring 
 
24,990 
 
91.4 
 
8.6 
*mainly independent pelagic boats; in the case of mackerel the small allocation for the inshore handline fishery is 
included. Source: DEFRA 
 
Table 3.8 shows the 2000 distribution of quota among the POs and other groups in terms of the 
total value of quota held. Because the relationship between the selling/lease prices of quota on the 
one hand and the quayside (market) fish price on the other for quota of different species is 
complex, and is likely to vary significantly both across species and across time, it is difficult to 
extrapolate from those species for which quota prices have been observed to those for which there 
has been little or no trading under the current arrangements. In order to compile this table, 
therefore, the quota values have been assumed to be determined in the same way for each species, 
and so the ratio of the quota price to the market fish price is assumed constant across species.(39) 
 
It is apparent that the distribution of quota in terms of value is highly concentrated in one PO (the 
SFO). This PO holds some 31% of the total value of UK demersal quotas and 45% of the value of 
pelagic quota, nearly 32% of the total value overall. The SFPO holds 24% of the value of pelagic 
quota but less than 10% overall. Otherwise no single PO holds more than 10% of the total value 
of either demersal or pelagic quotas. 
 
As part of the survey undertaken for this report (see Chapter 4), all the POs were asked to 
describe the quota management arrangements they adopted in 2000. Responses to these questions 
were received from all the POs except the SFO, NESFO and GFPO but the quota allocation 
methods used by these POs were commonly known within the industry. The basic approaches 
adopted by the various POs are summarised in Table 3.9, together with the number of (over 10m) 
vessels which operate under different management regimes as a result.(40) 
 
                                                
39 Effectively, therefore, the quota price is simply standardised to the market price. 
40 The quota management arrangements adopted by the POs in 1996 were reviewed by Hatcher (1997). 
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Table 3.8: Distribution of 2000 quotas by value 
 
 % Demersal % Pelagic % Total 
Aberdeen Fish Producers’ Organisation (AFPO) 5.8 0.0 4.8 
Anglo-North Irish Fish Producers’ Organisation (ANIFPO) 2.5 3.4 2.6 
Anglo-Scottish Fish Producers’ Organisation (ASFPO) 4.4 0.0 3.6 
Cornish Fish Producers’ Organisation (CFPO) 3.4 0.0 2.8 
Fife Fish Producers’ Organisation (FiFPO) 3.8 0.0 3.1 
The Fish Producers’ Organisation (FPO) 2.0 9.2 5.8 
Fleetwood Fish Producers’ Organisation (FFPO) 1.5 0.0 1.2 
Grimsby Fish Producers’ Organisation (GFPO) 2.0 0.0 1.6 
Lowestoft Fish Producers’ Organisation (LFPO) 1.3 0.0 1.1 
North East of Scotland Fish Producers’ Organisation (NESFO) 9.9  1.0 8.3 
North Sea Fishermen’s Organisation (NSFO) 6.0 0.7 5.1 
Northern Producers’ Organisation (NPO) 3.4 0.2 3.2 
Northern Ireland Fish Producers’ Organisation (NIFPO) 4.3 6.9 4.5 
Orkney Fish Producers’ Organisation (OFPO) 1.7 0.0 1.4 
Scottish Fishermen’s Organisation (SFO) 30.6 44.7 31.7 
Shetland Fish Producers’ Organisation (SFPO) 4.7 24.1 7.4 
South Western Fish Producers’ Organisation (SWFPO) 3.0 0.0 2.5 
Wales and West Coast Fish Producers’ Organisation (WWCFPO) 2.9 0.0 2.4 
West of Scotland Fish Producers’ Organisation (WSFPO) 1.0 0.0 0.8 
Yorkshire and Anglia Fish Producers’ Organisation (YAFPO) 0.6 0.0 0.5 
Independent pelagic vessels 0.0 9.0 1.3 
Total all POs 94.8 99.2 95.7 
Non-sector 1.8 0.3 1.5 
10m & under 3.4 0.3 2.8 
 
 
Table 3.9: POs’ quota management approaches in 2000 
 
 
Basic approach 
 
POs 
 
Number of 
POs 
 
Number of 
vessels 
 
% all PO 
vessels 
 
“Pure” pool 
 
-- 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0.0% 
 
“Pool-plus” 
 
ASFPO, CFPO, WSFPO 
 
3 
 
251 
 
17.8% 
 
Pool + IQs 
 
AFPO, ANIFPO, FiFPO, FFPO, GFPO, 
NESFO, NIFPO, SFPO, SFO, SWFPO, 
WWCFPO, YAFPO 
 
12 
 
1,022 
 
72.5% 
 
IQs only 
 
FPO, LFPO, NPO, NSFO, OFPO 
 
5 
 
136 
 
9.7% 
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None of the POs now operate only with what might be called a “pure” pool system, i.e., one in 
which no individual member can enhance his allowance relative to other members. Three POs, 
the ASFPO, CFPO and WSFPO, do not allocate IQs as such for any stocks to any vessels, but 
within these POs individual members can lease in quota and fish against their own allocations 
once they have exhausted their monthly limits from the pool (the so-called “pool-plus” system). 
 
Of the remaining POs, twelve allocate IQs, based on vessels’ own FQAs, for at least some stocks 
and to at least some of the membership. Some of these POs, however, did operate a “pure” pool 
for the remaining stocks and/or members in 2000: these included the ANIFPO, the NIFPO 
(although here top-ups were to be permitted from 2001) and the SFPO. The two Northern Irish 
POs allocate IQs to their pelagic boats, as does (as far as we are aware) the SFO. The SFPO 
allocates IQs to its pelagic boats and to one of the larger demersal trawlers. The SWFPO allocates 
IQs to beam trawlers for sole, but the membership has decided these should be non-tradeable 
(although members can top up their quotas by leasing in from outside the PO). Some newer 
members of the SWFPO, however, have IQs for all stocks. The YAFPO also allocates IQs for 
some stocks only (in the North Sea) but allows some members (those with Area VII quota) to 
take IQs for all stocks. A number of the POs allocate monthly limits from a pool to part of the 
membership while giving IQs to others if they demand them. These include the AFPO and 
NESFO as well as the FiFPO and FFPO. Some respondents commented that the PO had to 
allocate IQs to members who wanted them or those vessels would simply move to another PO. 
Similarly, many POs apparently feel obliged to help their members lease in quota if they are 
asked to. 
 
Five POs, the FPO, LFPO, NPO, NSFO and OFPO, allocate all quotas to member vessels or 
companies as IQs based on FQAs plus any quota leased in. In the case of the LFPO just one 
company now represents the entire membership. 
 
Information obtained from the POs about their involvement in quota trading permitted an 
estimation of the extent to which the final year 2000 allocations to those POs (i.e., the allocations 
at the end of the year after all swaps and transfers) are the result of trading. This was quite 
significant for some stocks as Table 3.10 shows. Note that this does not include any data for the 
SFO or GFPO and that only trades between vessels in different POs, i.e., those trades requiring 
movements of fish between POs, are included. 
 
Indications for some other stocks such as Area VII hake, megrim and monkfish are that there is a 
significant amount of trading between vessels within the same POs, if not between POs. Overall, 
however, the extent of trading within POs appeared to be more limited. From the POs for which 
information was available the volume of intra-PO trading was generally around a third of the total 
trade by the membership. 
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Table 3.10: Estimated contributions of trades to final PO allocations in 2000 
 
 
Stock 
 
% overall final allocation 
 
IV whiting 
 
25% 
 
VI cod 
 
19% 
 
IV Nephrops 
 
19% 
 
IV cod 
 
17% 
 
IV haddock 
 
15% 
 
IV sole 
 
15% 
 
VI haddock 
 
8% 
 
IV plaice 
 
4% 
 
 
All but four of the POs hold quota units on one or more “dummy vessels”.(41) These were created 
in 1998 when POs were allowed to reconcile quota trades by reallocating units between vessels. 
In some cases the units associated with the dummy vessel represent additional quota pools for the 
membership as a whole. These units may have derived only from the extra 2.5% allocation of 
units which was made to each group when FQAs were first introduced, but in a number of POs 
this was topped up with quota acquired by the PO from surrendered licences. Some POs arranged 
for member vessels to “park” units on a dummy vessel rather than associate them with their own 
vessel licence. This would enable a licence to be sold on at some later stage without taking the 
units with it. The four POs without units on dummy vessels POs moved all units onto members’ 
licences in 1998. 
 
Table 3.11 indicates the proportion of the POs’ total allocations of units in 2000 that were held on 
one or more dummy vessels. The units have simply been summed across species, so the 
percentages do not represent overall percentages of quota in tonnes (although they would have 
done if TACs had remained unchanged since FQAs were introduced) but they nevertheless give 
an indication of the relative amounts of quota held “centrally” by the POs. A number of the POs 
held quite significant amounts (around a sixth to a quarter) of their total allocations of quota units 
on dummy vessels, while one had over 40% of its units on a dummy vessel. Information is not 
available on whether, in the case of this and a number of the other POs, this fish is held 
collectively for the PO membership as a whole (although it seem likely that in many cases it is), 
but for “IQ-oriented” POs the fish is almost certainly held for particular member vessels. 
 
 
                                                
41 Fisheries Departments associate the units with one or more dummy vessel registration numbers for each PO. 
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Table 3.11: PO quota units placed on “dummy vessels” in 2000 
 
 
% total units on “dummy vessels” 
 
Number of POs 
 
0 
 
4 
 
0 – 10 
 
11 
 
10 – 20 
 
2 
 
more than 20 
 
3 
 
 
All the POs from which information was received monitor their members’ uptake of quota 
allocations through routine checking of submitted copies of the vessels’ logsheets, landings 
declarations and sales notes. These are checked against allowances (e.g., monthly limits or IQs). 
If detected, infringements, which represent violations of the rules of the PO,(42) are then dealt with 
in various ways ranging from a private warning to quota deductions, fines and ultimately the 
threat of expulsion from the PO for persistent offenders. As a general rule it appears that all the 
POs apply a penalty whether or not the PO as a whole is disadvantaged as a result, to the extent 
that quota available to other members is reduced in the current year or the PO suffers a quota 
deduction in the subsequent year.(43) 
 
The schedules of penalties applied by the POs are broadly similar but differ in detail. Some POs 
apply fines plus deductions for all quota “overshoots”, others apply deductions for first offences 
and then deductions plus fines for subsequent offences. Fines range from 10-20% of the gross 
market value of the overshoot to 2 or 3 times the value. In some cases deductions are applied at 
less than 100% of the overshoot, in others at 100% of the value, or even 200%. In at least one PO 
overshoots near the year end automatically result in deductions of twice the amount of the 
overshoot. Many of the POs require members to attempt to cover overshoots by leasing in quota, 
in which case the penalty is not usually applied. Some POs reported no problems with members 
exceeding their allocations while others admitted to dealing with between 6 and 56 overshoots 
during 2000. No POs appeared to have threatened any member with expulsion in recent years. 
 
Apparently none of the POs themselves undertook inspections of members’ landings in order to 
verify the accuracy of the paperwork submitted to the PO. Clearly any vessel deliberately seeking 
to land significant quantities of over-quota fish would falsify its documentation in order to appear 
in compliance with its PO’s quota management rules and hence the ability of the POs 
independently to detect violations is necessarily rather limited. The task of enforcement of the 
requirements of Community control legislation for vessels to keep true logsheets and to submit 
                                                
42 All the POs are legally established as either mutuals or limited companies. 
43 The Fisheries Departments’ quota management Rules provide for compensating deductions from a subsequent 
year’s allocation if overfishing of a PO’s allocation results in another group being prevented from landing its full 
allocation in that year. 
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accurate sales notes and landings declarations falls to officers of the Sea Fisheries Inspectorate (in 
England and Wales), the Fisheries Inspectorate of the Department of Agriculture and Rural 
Development for Northern Ireland and the Scottish Fishery Protection Agency. Offences may be 
referred to the Courts in which case the maximum fine is £50,000.(44) 
 
3.4 A critical evaluation of the UK system 
 
In Chapter 2 it was argued that fixed quotas, i.e., quotas which cannot be varied in the short run, 
will, relative to quotas which can be varied, tend to give rise to stronger incentives to land fish 
illegally and to discard fish in multispecies/multi-quota fisheries. The basic problem with fixed 
quotas, be they annual individual quotas or monthly quota limits, is that given a fixed total supply 
of quota for the industry as a whole, the allocation of quota to individual vessels is more or less 
arbitrary and will almost certainly be inefficient. In theory we could envisage a hypothetical 
arbitrary or administrative allocation of quota that produced exactly the allocation that a market 
in quota would produce, but in a non-static world even this allocation would very soon become 
inefficient and therefore the “perfect” allocation would need to be repeated continuously. A 
market in quota, it was argued, should, if the market functions well, produce an efficient 
allocation of quota automatically at all points in time. Recall that the efficient allocation is the 
allocation which maximises industry profits given the total quota constraint, and which should 
reduce the incidence of quota-induced discarding. 
 
If quota can be traded between vessels then when trade takes place it is the result of units of quota 
being worth more to some vessels than to others (in which case it is implicitly the case that the 
initial allocation of quota was inefficient). That under these conditions trade will inevitably take 
place wherever it proves possible, even if trading is not particularly encouraged or easy to 
accomplish, is exemplified by the UK experience as the evidence in this and the next chapter 
clearly shows. 
 
In an industry in which there is excess capacity in relation to the total supply of quota, quota 
trading should assist a rationalisation of capacity in the fleet. Holders of quota, if they scale down 
their capacity or exit the fishery altogether, will be compensated to the value of the quota they 
sell. If quotas are non-tradeable, operators can only realise the value of other assets such as the 
boat and its gear (and the licence if that is also a tradeable asset). In economic terms the 
opportunity cost of remaining in the fishery, at least with one’s current level of operating 
capacity, is significantly increased if quota is a tradeable asset. As we have suggested, this was 
implicitly recognised by the Government when it sought to increase incentives to take up 
decommissioning grants under the last decommissioning round by allowing owners to retain their 
track records for private disposal.(45) 
                                                
44 The Sea Fishing (Enforcement of Community Control Measures) Order 2000; The Sea Fishing (Enforcement of 
Community Control Measures) (Scotland) Order 2000; The Sea Fish (Conservation) Act 1967 (as amended). 
45 The role of the market in rationalising capacity was also explicitly recognised back in 1990 when the “capacity 
aggregation” scheme was introduced. It may be remembered that at the time the scheme was envisaged as a precursor 
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Although it is often a neglected element in discussions about quota management in general and 
ITQ systems in particular, in Chapter 2 we sought to emphasise the importance of enforcement 
from the outset. Clearly, enforcement is crucial to achieving the management objectives which 
quotas are intended to achieve. We also noted that if there was overcapacity in the fleet, then 
perfect enforcement of fixed quotas would almost certainly result in some downward pressure on 
fleet capacity, at least to the extent that some vessels were operating with non-viable levels of 
quota. The corollary to this observation is that if enforcement is sufficiently weak that vessels are 
able to continue to operate with non-viable levels of quota, then overcapacity and hence, in turn, 
over-quota landings becomes an endemic problem. If, on the other hand, vessels with non-
tradeable quota were forced to exit the fleet because of increased enforcement effort then, as we 
have observed, they would be compensated only to the value of their vessel and other tradeable 
assets.(46) 
 
Enforcement is of course also necessary for the efficient functioning of a tradeable quota system. 
If a vessel can land fish profitably without paying for quota then it will certainly have an 
incentive to do so. The fact that, as in the UK, quota is observed to be traded at relatively high 
prices suggests that enforcement is sufficiently strong to provide significant incentives to hold 
quota, but this does not mean that at the margins there will be no over-quota landings. Data were 
not available to enable any analysis of the effectiveness of quota enforcement in the UK but there 
is ample anecdotal evidence of significant quantities of over-quota fish being landed in parts of 
the UK in the recent past. There have also been studies which have documented the extent to 
which landings over and above quota allowances occur almost routinely in at least some 
fisheries.(47) 
The UK quota management system has both strengths and weaknesses from an economic 
perspective. To begin with, in terms of strengths it is not trivial to observe that in the UK there 
has been a real and commendable attempt to monitor and control the uptake of national quotas 
and to allocate quotas in some rational way to individual vessels within the fleet. This cannot be 
said of the fishery management regimes of some other countries. 
 
Although the system of rolling track records has now been replaced by FQAs, since the initial 
FQA allocations derived directly from the 1997 track record-based allocations our evaluation 
begins by considering the track record system. 
 
The logic underlying the track record-based system of allocation was appealing in that it offered a 
potential mechanism for allocating quota on the basis of capacity, which was taken to be revealed 
by a vessel’s recent history of landings. A drawback of the system, however, was that there were 
incentives for vessels to over-declare their landings, up to permitted limits, in order to maintain 
quota shares (the practice known as “ghost fishing”). At the same time, if a vessel’s track record-
                                                                                                                                                   
to a (quota) “entitlement aggregation” scheme and ultimately some form of ITQ system for the UK. 
46 In a restricted entry fishery the resale value of many fishing vessels may be rather low. 
47 See, for example, Nautilus Consultants (1998) and Hatcher et al (2000). 
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based allocation was or became inadequate there would be incentives, as under any fixed quota 
system,(48) to land fish illegally and then to under-declare landings. Added to this, of course, was 
the problem that nominal quotas could not be secured to the extent that TACs and therefore 
national quotas fluctuated. While any system of fixed quotas makes it difficult to diversify, 
except into non-quota fisheries, the incentives to maintain quota shares under the track record-
based system further discouraged diversification unless vessels were prepared to “ghost fish” 
their allowances at the same time. 
 
There were positive aspects to the development of a PO-centred quota management system, 
however. By pooling their members’ quota allocations, and by swapping quota of different 
species in and out of the PO, the POs had the potential to ameliorate the problems of fixed quotas 
by reallocating quota between the different POs and between vessels within each PO. But, while 
this system could plausibly help to mimic a market allocation of quota to some extent, the 
possibility for an efficient allocation through what was effectively a combination of barter and 
exchange and democratic decision-making was necessarily very limited. Within most of the POs, 
in the absence of price signals for quota, allocations were decided on simple equity grounds, 
hence flat-rate monthly allowances, or as equal shares according to some observable indicator of 
a “need” for quota, hence allowances scaled according to vessel length, crew size etc. The 
Government adopted a similar approach to allocating quota for the non-sector. Within one or two 
POs, however, quota was allocated according to the amount actually brought into the PO by 
individual vessels, as individual quotas (analogous to shareholdings in a company). 
 
The essence of a market is that price signals enable an efficient allocation to be achieved without 
intervention. A good, such as a unit of quota, once it can be traded, is allocated according to the 
value people place on it. In the case of quota, that value is the profit that can be earned by using a 
unit of quota to catch a unit of fish. As we saw in Chapter 2, if someone else (another fishing 
vessel operator) can earn more from a unit of quota than you can, you are better off selling the 
quota than using it yourself, provided a price that is mutually beneficial can be agreed. If quota 
cannot be traded, but can only be given away for nothing or reallocated by mutual agreement, 
then it is not impossible for an efficient allocation to be achieved but it is very unlikely. The most 
likely result is an agreement for all to have equal shares from the outset, which is exactly what 
most of the POs decided, or in some cases, where a system of equal shares is patently a nonsense, 
there is an agreement for scaled allowances, or for each vessel to receive exactly what it brought 
with it, which was the case with one or two of the POs with relatively few, large and/or 
heterogeneous vessels in membership. 
 
Under these conditions it is very difficult for any individual vessel operator to acquire additional 
quota in order to increase (legal) profitability (in some cases possibly to non-negative levels), and 
there are very weak incentives to relinquish quota that is surplus to requirements. It is therefore 
not surprising that trading in quota developed rather quickly once it became possible. POs and 
                                                
48 Note that here we use the term “fixed quotas” as distinct from “tradeable quotas”. In order to avoid confusion we 
will use “FQA” to refer to the system of “Fixed Quota Allocations” introduced in 1999. 
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individuals began to buy licences for their quota allocations, and to lease or purchase quota both 
within POs and between POs, employing the facility for POs to engage in swaps and exchanges. 
 
The implications of the move from track record-based allocations to FQAs for quota trading have 
already been mentioned. Fixing allocations made sense in many respects (ending incentives for 
“ghost fishing”, for example) but fixed allocations that could not readily be traded actually made 
an efficient (or near-efficient) allocation more difficult than under the previous system. With 
track records it was at least possible for quota to move permanently from one vessel to another, 
despite necessitating rather complex deals over at least three years. With FQAs, as we observed, 
any transaction other than a one year lease (the one type of transaction that is made simpler by 
FQAs) involving vessels in different POs requires those POs to swap quota over a number of 
years (theoretically in perpetuity for a straight sale). This has two main consequences. One is that 
sales and long term lease agreements result in a cumulatively increasing number of deals which 
the POs must give effect to each year. Under the present system this might soon overload the 
capabilities of both PO officers and Fisheries Departments. The other is that sale transactions are 
subject to much greater risk, with the possibility of vessels changing hands (and the new owners 
then challenging existing quota agreements), moving into POs not bound by any agreement to 
swap quota, or becoming bankrupt, not to mention the problems caused by large reductions in 
TACs. It is likely that trading will become further dominated by one year leases which will be 
less efficient in allocating quota and rationalising capacity in the fleet. In essence, it is arguable 
that FQAs only really make sense in strengthening property rights that can be traded like any 
other property right. 
 
Despite the potential problems of a democratic approach to quota allocation, there nevertheless 
continue to be good arguments for associating groups of quota-holding vessels in institutions such 
as the POs. The possibility for collective responsibility for monitoring and control of quota 
uptake is a strong one (although with a relatively weak Government enforcement system there is 
also the possibility of collective cheating rather than collective respect for legal rights and 
responsibilities). Another positive argument, as we have seen, is the possibility for the POs to 
play an active role in facilitating trade in quota and hence reducing the transaction costs 
associated with trades. In this context there may indeed be an argument for groups of individual 
quota holders pooling some of their quota if the costs of trade (balancing landings with quota 
holdings) are reduced by operating as a collective. In a multispecies fishery, for example, it may 
make sense for quotas for non-target species to be pooled and for the PO to manage the collective 
quota. 
 
There is no economic argument of principle for excluding the smaller inshore vessels (who 
nevertheless target the same stocks) from the management system applied to the rest of the fleet. 
It is difficult to see why quotas should apply for an 11m trawler but not a 10m trawler in the same 
fishery (the 10m vessel may even have a greater catching capacity!). The only possible argument 
would be that the economic cost to society of enforcing quota controls on the (arbitrarily defined) 
inshore fleet exceeded the economic cost of leaving them free of quota restrictions, but this is not 
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very satisfactory for the governance of the fishery as a whole. There are also no real economic 
arguments for mechanisms such as “underpinning”, which was introduced under the track record 
system in order primarily to protect inshore fisheries from losing track record when stocks failed 
to appear on inshore grounds. Ideally, the quota management system should be such that 
guaranteed shares are unnecessary because there is a more flexible allocation mechanism. 
 
In summary, the positive aspects to the UK quota management system are that it allocates quota 
at the individual vessel level (notwithstanding the subsequent pooling of quota by many POs) and 
does so in some rational manner, it attempts to enforce quota controls at the individual vessel 
level, and by involving the POs in quota management it (potentially, at least) fosters collective 
responsibility for respecting quota limits. 
 
Given the economic arguments for allocating quota efficiently amongst vessels, which we have 
suggested can only really be achieved with a relatively unconstrained market for quota, the 
limited tradeability of quota which the UK system permits is a positive aspect, but against a 
tradeable quota benchmark the obstacles to trade represent negative aspects to the system. These 
obstacles include the relatively complex administrative procedures necessary to accomplish 
trades, the impossibility of permanently transferring quota under the present FQA system (except 
by licence sales and aggregations) and the effective exclusion of many PO members and non-
sector vessels from the opportunity to trade. Logically, this suggests that FQAs should be made 
truly tradeable by annually reconciling quota trades in the FQA allocations, and that every vessel 
owner should have the right to fish against his own FQA should he choose to do so. 
 
Highlighting once again the importance of enforcement, it is apparent that any quota management 
system is only effective (in terms of stock conservation objectives) to the extent that the quota 
constraints imposed upon individual vessels are enforced. As we have said, comprehensive and 
reliable data that would enable an empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of enforcement of 
quotas in the UK is simply unavailable. At the same time, there exists no time series of data on 
the economic performance of fleets during the development of the quota management system and 
the move to FQAs. It is therefore difficult to evaluate in practice the success of the quota 
management in the UK and in particular the current system of FQAs. We suspect, though, that 
despite some reports of recent increases in enforcement effort, particularly on the east coast, the 
performance of the quota management system in terms of stock conservation and economic 
efficiency (including incentives for a rationalisation of capacity) would be greatly improved if the 
enforcement of quotas were considerably more rigorous than we believe is the case at present. 
 
Finally, we were asked to evaluate in a comparative sense the quota management approaches 
adopted by different POs. This is somewhat problematic unless one makes quite clear 
assumptions about the collective objectives of each PO’s membership. As economists we tend to 
adopt a normative stance which assumes the primary objective of efficiency (though not 
necessarily to the exclusion of other objectives which may conflict with the aim of maximising 
efficiency). Efficient use of quotas would suggest the ITQ model of PO management, but given 
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that the UK Government does not seek to capture the gains from efficient fishery exploitation 
through any sort of resource use charge or excess profits tax,(49) and arguably therefore does not 
require POs to maximise efficiency, we should perhaps allow for POs having objectives other 
than economic efficiency. If there is an objective of equity (distributive justice) which underlies 
the pooling and sharing of quota in a PO then implicitly the membership have decided, 
individually and collectively, to forgo some economic profits in that interest. This is a defensible 
approach, provided of course that vessels are adhering to quota limits. We might expect quota-
related discarding to increase under a system of equal shares, with consequent effects upon stock 
conservation, but it is just possible that the PO may be effective enough in swapping quota with 
other POs that this problem is minimised, within the constraints of UK national quotas. 
 
It is a little difficult to understand the rationale for the “pool-plus” approach, however. If the PO 
accepts the argument for a market in individual quota shares, then it is hard to see why it does not 
adopt an ITQ system, at least for the principal target stocks. It may be that this approach is mainly 
the result of a compromise between opposing views within the PO. We suspect, though, that 
within a PO vessels with larger than average FQAs going into the pool might be somewhat 
resentful at having then to lease in quota in order to increase their monthly quota allowances 
above the standard pool limits. 
 
With regard to the performance of POs in terms of fish stock conservation, despite our general 
conclusion that tradeable quotas are likely to reduce over-quota landings and certain types of 
discarding, we simply do not have the data to evaluate the operation of the different POs in this 
respect. While, clearly, POs should do all they can to ensure that their members do not exceed 
their quota allocations, it is apparent that the extent to which they are in a position to do this is 
rather limited. We note, though, that all the POs who responded to our survey appeared to have 
proper disciplinary procedures. 
                                                
49 We referred to the issue of “rent capture” in Section 2.4.2. 
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4. The views of the UK fishing industry 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
A key part of this study was to investigate the attitudes and perceptions of fishing vessel owners 
and their PO representatives about the existing management system and possible changes to the 
system, including the introduction of some form of ITQ regime for the UK.(50) 
 
Structured questionnaires were used to elicit views on the move from track record-based quota 
allocations to fixed allocations (FQAs), the amount of quota trading now taking place and the 
possibility of more freedom to trade in quota. Views on management were sought from non-
sector and 10m and under vessel owners as well as from the sector. Vessel owners belonging to 
POs were also asked about the quota management arrangements operated by their POs and about 
the extent of their own involvement in quota trading. All respondents, vessel owners and PO 
officers, were asked about their attitudes to and perceptions of ITQs as a management instrument 
and whether and to what extent they should be used in the UK.(51) 
 
Section 4.2 below describes the survey of fishing vessel owners, while the results of the survey of 
POs are summarised in Section 4.3. 
 
4.2 Survey of UK vessel owners 
 
4.2.1 Survey methodology 
 
In total 282 owners of UK fishing vessels were approached and telephone interviews were held 
with all but three of these individuals (who did not wish to participate in the survey). The 279 
owners interviewed represented a total of 404 vessels which included more than 20% of the over 
10m fleet. Around a fifth of those interviewed owned more than one vessel (predominantly in the 
demersal trawl and beam trawl groups). The aim was to include the views of the owners of a 
representative sample of vessels from the UK fleet. A decision had to be taken, therefore, about 
whether to duplicate the views of multiple vessel owners onto the vessel sample and the 
arguments for and against this were considered. In the event it was decided to base the results on 
the numbers of vessels in the UK fleet, and so in some sectors the results are weighted towards 
vessel ownership rather than vessel owners as individuals. 
 
For sampling purposes the fleet was stratified, firstly by fishing method, and then where 
appropriate by area of operation and/or vessel length. The following sampling strata were 
identified: 
 
                                                
50 All survey work in this study was undertaken by Richard Banks, assisted by Carl James and Graeme Macfadyen. 
51 Copies of the questionnaires are available from the principal authors of the study. 
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(1) Demersal trawlers, sub-divided into 
- demersal trawlers over 24m overall length (all areas) 
- Area IV and VI demersal trawlers of 24m or under overall length 
- Area VIId-k demersal trawlers of 24m or under overall length 
- Area VIIa demersal trawlers of 24m or under overall length 
 
(2) Pelagic vessels 
 
(3) Beam trawlers, sub-divided into 
- Area IV beam trawlers 
- Area VII beam trawlers 
 
(4) Nephrops trawlers,(52) sub-divided into 
- Area IV Nephrops trawlers 
- Area VI Nephrops trawlers 
- Area VIIa Nephrops trawlers 
 
(5) Gill netters & long liners (all areas) 
 
(6) Non-sector vessels targeting quota species (mostly demersal trawlers) 
 
(7) 10m & under vessels 
 
The distribution of the sample by stratum is shown in Table 4.1. Just under half of the sample 
were vessels fishing predominantly in the North Sea (Area IV), a third were fishing to the West 
of Scotland (Area VI) and the remainder were mainly fishing in Area VII (the Channel, Irish Sea 
and Western Waters). 
 
The results of the survey of fishing vessel owners are tabulated in full in Appendix II. Below we 
present a concise summary of the results, highlighting the main features of the survey responses. 
The overall results for the “sector” (i.e., PO member vessels over 10m in length) are presented as 
weighted averages across the sample strata, to take account of differences between the sample 
structure and that of the entire sector. 
 
 
                                                
52 defined as vessels whose catches comprised at least 45% Nephrops 
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Table 4.1: Vessel survey sample distribution 
 
 
Sector 
 
Population size* 
 
Sample size 
 
% sampled 
 
Demersal trawlers (>10m) 
 
774 
 
168 
 
21.7 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
219 
 
50 
 
22.8 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
395 
 
74 
 
18.7 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
78 
 
26 
 
33.3 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
82 
 
18 
 
22.0 
 
Pelagic vessels (>10m) 
 
45 
 
17 
 
37.8 
 
Beam trawlers (>10m) 
 
108 
 
49 
 
45.4 
 
Area IV 
 
48 
 
19 
 
39.6 
 
Area VII 
 
60 
 
30 
 
50.0 
 
Nephrops trawlers (>10m) 
 
329 
 
82 
 
24.9 
 
Area IV 
 
76 
 
26 
 
34.2 
 
Area VI 
 
152 
 
20 
 
13.2 
 
Area VIIa 
 
101 
 
36 
 
35.6 
 
Netters/liners (>10m) 
 
130 
 
20 
 
15.4 
 
Non-sector (>10m) 
 
244 
 
17 
 
7.0 
 
Total > 10m 
 
1,630 
 
353 
 
21.7 
 
10m and under 
 
5,236 
 
51 
 
1.0 
 
Total 
 
6,866 
 
404 
 
5.9 
*Source: DEFRA 
 
 
4.2.2 General attitudes to the current management system 
 
All respondents were asked: 
 
How satisfied are you overall with the current quota management system? 
 
Some 40% of the sector were quite satisfied but the rest were mostly either slightly unsatisfied or 
very unsatisfied. Only 4% were very satisfied. However, dissatisfaction appeared to relate more 
to quotas per se than the specific attributes of the UK system. Satisfaction was lowest among the 
beam trawlers as well as the smaller trawlers and prawn boats in the Irish Sea. Satisfaction was 
highest among the larger demersal trawlers, the netters/liners and the pelagic vessels. Overall 
there was generally a higher level of satisfaction with the system in Areas IV and VI than in Area 
VII. 
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Among the non-sector and 10m and under vessels satisfaction was low, with more than half in 
each case very unsatisfied with the system. 
 
4.2.3 Attitudes to the FQA system 
 
All respondents were asked: 
 
Did you support the move from track record-based allocations to FQAs? 
 
Now that FQAs have been introduced, do you consider that they represent an improvement on 
track record-based allocations? 
 
Are you in favour of annual adjustments to vessels’ FQAs to take account of quota movements 
between vessels? 
 
Overall, just over 70% of the sector had supported the move to FQAs. Around the same number 
thought that they represented an improvement and nearly 80% were in favour of annual 
reconciliations of units. Support for FQAs was lowest among the smaller trawlers in Area VII and 
highest among the larger demersal trawlers and the pelagic boats. Only among the Area VII beam 
trawlers did a majority oppose the annual reconciliation of quota units, in other segments the 
great majority wanted annual adjustments, including all the over 24m trawlers in the sample. 
 
The views of the non-sector and the 10m and under boats were in almost total opposition to those 
of the sector. The great majority opposed FQAs, did not think they were an improvement over 
track record-based allocations and did not wish to see annual quota reconciliations. 
 
4.2.4 Freedom to trade in quota 
 
All respondents were asked: 
 
Do you think that under the current quota management system there is 
(a) too much freedom to trade quota? 
(b) about the right amount of freedom to trade quota? 
(c) not enough freedom to trade quota? 
 
Do you think that, in principle, quota trading in the UK should be allowed 
(a) within POs, but not between POs? 
(b) between POs, but not between individual vessels? 
(c) only within, and between, POs? 
(d) amongst any vessels over 10 metres? 
(e) amongst any vessels, including those of 10 metres and under? 
(f) or not at all? 
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If some form of quota trading is allowed, should it be possible for quota to be owned by 
(a) anyone? 
(b) only persons or companies actively engaged in fishing? 
 
Just over half the sector thought the freedom to trade quota was about right while the remainder 
were more or less evenly divided as to whether there was too much freedom or not enough. A 
desire for greater freedom was most evident among the larger stern trawlers, the pelagic boats and 
the netters and liners. Among Area VI prawn boats the predominant view was that there was too 
much freedom to trade. 
 
Nearly two-thirds of the sector thought that trade should be allowed between any over 10m 
vessels, with almost two-thirds of those in favour of including the 10m and under boats as well. 
The desire to restrict trade to PO members was most evident in the Irish Sea. Only around one 
tenth of the sector overall were against trade altogether, although around one quarter of the Area 
VI prawn boats and a third of the Area VII beamers were against. The great majority of the sector 
overall were in favour of restricting quota ownership to active fishermen, but a significant 
minority among the larger demersal trawlers and the netters/liners thought that anyone should be 
allowed to hold quota. 
 
Some two-thirds of the non-sector thought there was now too much freedom to trade in quota. 
While more than half considered that there should be no trade, over a quarter thought that trading 
should be allowed between all vessels. Over two-thirds of the 10m and under boats were happy 
with the amount of freedom to trade (within the industry as a whole) while a quarter thought there 
was too much freedom. Most were in favour of trade between any over 10m vessels, with nearly 
40% including their own inshore sector as well. All the non-sector and 10m and under 
respondents wanted quota ownership restricted to those actively engaged in fishing. 
 
4.2.5 PO members’ attitudes to PO management 
 
PO members were asked: 
 
Within your PO, does your vessel currently operate with 
(a) individual vessel or company quotas (IQs)? 
(b) monthly limits from a quota “pool”? 
(c) monthly limits plus extra quota acquired by you (“pool-plus”)? 
(d) IQs for some stocks, monthly limits for others? 
(e) other (please specify)? 
How satisfied are you with these arrangements? 
 
Given the choice, would you prefer your PO to operate different arrangements (under the existing 
quota management system)? If yes, which arrangements would you prefer? 
(a) individual vessel or company quotas (IQs)? 
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(b) monthly limits? 
(c) monthly limits plus extra quota acquired by you? 
(d) IQs for some stocks, monthly limits for others? 
(e) other (please specify)? 
 
Overall, 40% of the weighted sector sample were operating with flat-rate monthly limits and 30% 
were under pool-plus arrangements. Nearly all the rest had IQs for all stocks, including all the 
pelagic boats, nearly half of the larger demersal trawlers and the netters and liners, as well as over 
70% of the Area IV beam trawlers. In all, 84% were satisfied with these arrangements with only 
24% wanting a change. Dissatisfaction with their POs’ management arrangements was highest 
among the smaller Area VII trawlers and the Area VII beamers, although these were still a 
minority of respondents. Few of these wanted a change, however. In fact there was most desire 
for different arrangements among the other demersal trawlers, even though most of these were 
satisfied with present arrangements. Where a change was desired it was generally for IQs, 
although the smaller demersal trawlers in the Irish Sea favoured pool-plus arrangements. 
 
4.2.6 PO members’ involvement in quota trading 
 
PO members were asked: 
 
Have you ever enhanced your vessel’s track record or FQA by 
(a) purchase of a licence with track record/quota units? 
(b) purchase of track record/quota units only? 
 
Do you currently, or have you ever, 
(a) leased quota from another vessel (in your own or another PO)? 
(b) purchased quota from another vessel (in your own or another PO)? 
 
Do you currently, or have you ever, 
(a) leased quota to another vessel (in your own or another PO)? 
(b) sold quota to another vessel (in your own or another PO)? 
 
Can you estimate, at least roughly, the proportion of your current gross earnings which are 
attributable to 
(a) extra units which have been added by acquiring licence(s)? 
(b) extra quota which you have bought or currently lease from another vessel? 
 
Overall, 16% of the sector had increased their quota allocations by licence aggregation, including 
33% of the over 24m trawlers, 35% of the pelagic boats and over 40% of the Area VI prawn 
boats. A slightly greater number, 23% overall, had acquired extra quota off another licence, 
which had been possible during the last decommissioning round. This applied to 47% of the 
under 24m trawlers in the Irish Sea and 41% of pelagic vessels. Some groups were much more 
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likely to have acquired extra quota by licence purchases than by buying quota, while for others 
the opposite pattern was observed. For example, while 32% of the netters and liners had bought 
in quota, none had increased their allowances by licence aggregation. Just over 20% of the North 
Sea beam trawlers had bought in quota but none had aggregated licences, whereas the reverse 
was observed for the Area VII beam trawlers. 
 
The responses to the questions concerning the leasing and purchasing of quota appeared to reflect 
some confusion over our distinction between leases and purchases.(53) We therefore focus only on 
the responses concerning leasing, which we take to cover leasing agreements for one or for a 
number of years. Some 32% of the sector overall had leased quota in, including around half of all 
beam trawlers and pelagic boats. Leasing-in quota was least observed among the smaller trawlers 
in Area VII and the Irish Sea and the North Sea and Irish Sea prawn boats. Slightly fewer (27%) 
in the sample were leasing out quota, but the overall pattern of leasing out among different groups 
was similar. 
 
Estimated dependence on quota acquired through the licence market for the sector as a whole was 
between 10-25% for 12% of the weighted sample and between 25-50% for a further 17%. 
Overall, more than a third of vessels were dependent on quota acquired in this way for a least 
10% of their gross earnings. Most dependent were the larger stern trawlers and the pelagic 
vessels. The estimated dependence on leased quota was rather less, with 18% dependent on 
leased quota for 10-25% of earnings and just 4% dependent for more than 25% of earnings. Most 
reliant on quota leasing were the pelagic boats, the smaller trawlers in Areas IV and VI, and the 
North Sea beam trawlers and prawn boats. 
 
The responses to the questions about purchases and leasing of quota were cross-tabulated in order 
to identify those vessels which had been involved in quota trading at least to some extent and 
those which had had no such involvement. The results are summarised in Table 4.2. 
 
The groups most involved in trading were the pelagic boats (100%), the over 24m demersal 
trawlers (88%) and the North Sea beamers (73%). More than half of the under 24m trawlers in 
Areas IV, VI and VIIa and the Nephrops boats in Area IV, together with almost half of the Area 
VII beamers, had been involved in trading. A little over one third of netters and liners and the 
smaller demersal trawlers in Area VIId-k had traded quota , together with rather less than a third 
of the Nephrops trawlers in Areas VI and VII. In no sector, however, were less than a quarter of 
vessels trading. For the sector overall, more than half had been involved in quota trading by some 
means or another. 
 
                                                
53 The intention in the survey was to distinguish between one-off annual leases and agreements to lease fish over a 
number of years (“purchases”). 
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Table 4.2: Overall involvement in quota trading 
 
 
 
 
involved in trading 
 
not involved in trading 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
88% 
 
12% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
57% 
 
43% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
36% 
 
64% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
59% 
 
41% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
100% 
 
0% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
73% 
 
27% 
 
Area VII 
 
48% 
 
52% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
52% 
 
48% 
 
Area VI 
 
29% 
 
71% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
27% 
 
73% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
39% 
 
61% 
 
Non-sector 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
56% 
 
44% 
 
10m and under 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
 
4.2.7 PO quota pools and “dummy” vessels 
 
PO members were asked: 
 
Does your PO hold any quota over and above the total of its members’ FQAs, for example in the 
form of units attached to a “dummy vessel”? 
 
If yes, do you receive additional quota allowances as a result? 
 
Was the acquisition of this quota funded through 
(a) a one-off contribution from the membership? 
(b) an increased levy? 
(c) other (please specify)? 
 
Do you support the PO in acquiring quota in this way? 
If yes, would you prefer the PO to be more pro-active in acquiring quota? 
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Overall, more than half of the sector reported that their PO had units held centrally on a dummy 
vessel and that they had extra allowances as a result. In most cases this extra fish was acquired 
with funds raised by increasing the PO levy. Only just over half supported their PO in this but of 
those nearly two-thirds thought the PO should be more pro-active in acquiring quota in this way. 
Support was weakest among the pelagic boats and the Area VI prawn boats, the smaller trawlers 
in Area VII and the netters and liners. 
 
4.2.8 The non-sector 
 
Non-sector (over 10m) vessels were asked: 
 
Have you previously had this or another over 10 metre vessel in membership of a PO? 
 
Do you (now) fish in the non-sector 
(a) out of choice? 
(b) because you have tried but failed to join a PO? 
(c) for another reason (please specify)? 
 
If you fish in the non-sector out of choice, is it 
(a) because you target mainly non-quota stocks? 
(b) because you have the flexibility to target a wider range of stocks? 
(c) for another reason (please specify)? 
 
If you have tried but failed to join a PO, was this 
(a) because your track record or FQA was considered too poor? 
(b) for another reason (please specify)? 
 
If it were possible, would you prefer to have your vessel’s current FQA as an individual (annual) 
quota? 
(a) yes 
(b) yes, but only if you were also able to trade quota with other vessels 
(c) no 
 
Only 17% of non-sector vessels in the sample had previously been in a PO. 72% were fishing in 
the non-sector out of choice while the remainder were in the non-sector because they had been 
unable to join a PO. All of these boats had failed to join a PO because their track record/FQA was 
considered too small. Most of the vessels choosing to be in the non-sector saw no advantage in 
belonging to a PO. None stated specifically that it was because they targeted mainly non-quota 
stocks or had more flexibility to target a wider range of stocks. Specific reasons cited by a 
number of respondents included a dislike of PO management structures and rules and the lack of 
a “local” PO. Over half (54%) stated that they would like to have their FQA as an individual 
allocation with only a further 13% making that desire conditional on being able to trade quota. 
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4.2.9 The 10m and under fleet 
 
Respondents with 10m and under vessels (whether or not they belonged to a PO) were asked: 
 
Have you previously owned an over 10m vessel? 
 
Do you (now) fish in the 10m and under sector 
(a) out of choice? 
(b) because you cannot afford the price of a larger vessel? 
(c) because you cannot afford the price of an over 10 metre licence and FQA? 
(d) for another reason (please specify)? 
 
If you fish in the 10m and under sector out of choice, is it 
(a) because you are free from catch restrictions (for most stocks)? 
(b) for another reason (please specify)? 
 
Do you think the quota management arrangements applied to over 10m vessels should be 
extended to the 10m and under fleet, i.e., should it be possible for POs to manage quota on behalf 
of under 10m vessels? 
 
Of the 10m and under vessels in the sample, 56% had previously owned an over 10m vessel. 82% 
fished in the 10m and under sector out of choice while just 10% said that they couldn’t afford a 
larger vessel or an over 10m licence. Over half (54%) were in the inshore sector because of the 
relative freedom from restrictions, others cited a variety of reasons including preferences for 
operating on a small scale. The great majority, 88%, thought that the management arrangements 
applied to the over 10m vessels should not be extended to the 10m and under fleet. 
 
4.2.10 Views on ITQs 
 
All respondents were asked: 
 
Do you consider that a move towards some form of ITQ system for the UK is now inevitable? 
 
From your present understanding of ITQ systems, are you 
(a) broadly in favour of ITQs, at least for some fisheries? 
(b) broadly against ITQs? 
 
If you are basically in favour of ITQs, do you think that ITQs might be appropriate for 
(a) all stocks? 
(b) pelagic stocks? 
(c) whitefish stocks? 
(d) Nephrops? 
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(e) other shellfish? 
(f) don’t know 
 
...and for 
(a) all UK vessels? 
(b) over 10 metre vessels only? 
(c) PO members only? 
(d) other (please specify)? 
 
Do you think that ITQs would tend to 
(a) reduce or increase over-quota landings? 
(b) reduce or increase discarding at sea? 
 
If an ITQ system were to be introduced for the UK, do you think that the POs should be given a 
central role in the organisation of the system, for example handling quota sales and rentals on 
behalf of their members? 
 
Again, if an official ITQ system were to be introduced, do you think that the Government should 
collect some sort of monetary levy or tax on the value of quota sales? 
 
Overall, 78% of the sector thought that ITQs were now inevitable and nearly 60% were broadly 
in favour. Only among the West of Scotland and Irish Sea Nephrops trawlers did a majority think 
that ITQs were not now inevitable. Support for ITQs was strongest among the larger demersal 
trawlers, the North Sea beam trawlers and the pelagic boats, and weakest among the prawn boats 
and the Area VII beamers. 
 
Most in the sector who were broadly in favour of ITQs considered them suitable for certain 
groups of species only rather than for all species. In total, around 70% thought ITQs suitable for 
pelagic and demersal species and just over half considered they should be applied to Nephrops 
(although the support for this was noticeably much lower among the prawn boats themselves). 
Nearly two-thirds thought ITQs should apply to all vessels, even those of 10m and under, while 
80% supported ITQs for all over 10m vessels. Less than 10% would specifically restrict ITQs 
only to PO members. 
 
Nearly 60% of the sector as a whole thought that ITQs would reduce the extent of over-quota 
landings, although more than 20% were unsure. Opinions concerning the effect on discards were 
more or less evenly divided, but many could not offer an opinion. The prawn trawlers and Irish 
Sea trawlers tended to think that discards would increase, while the pelagic boats and the netters 
and liners were most sure discards would decrease. 
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The great majority (84%) thought that the POs should retain a central role in management under 
an ITQ system. Only 20% overall were in favour of some type of quota tax, although more than 
half of the netters and liners thought there should in principal be a charge. 
 
Of the non-sector sample, 78% thought ITQs were now inevitable and 72% were against their 
introduction. Of the one quarter or so in favour, most would like to see them either only for 
pelagic or only for demersal species. None would restrict ITQs to PO members and a few would 
include the under 10m boats. The majority of all respondents either did not know or thought over-
quota landings and discards would increase. Nearly two-thirds supported a key role for POs in an 
ITQ system while all were against a tax on quota values. 
 
Of the inshore (10m and under) boats, 86% were of the view that ITQs were inevitable with 72% 
against their introduction. Of those in favour there was little agreement over which species should 
be covered. While more than half would restrict ITQs to the over 10m boats, some did favour 
including the 10m and under vessels as well. Overall, most respondents could not say whether 
they thought over-quota landings and discards would increase under ITQs. Two-thirds favoured a 
continuing role for the POs. None supported a quota tax. 
 
4.2.11 Concerns over the possible effects of ITQs 
 
All respondents were asked: 
 
Whether you are basically in favour of ITQs or against the idea, do you have concerns about 
(a) the possibility of quota ending up in the hands of a few large companies? 
(b) the possibility of quota moving to more prosperous regions? 
(c) the possibility that high quota prices will discourage “new entrants” to the industry? 
(d) uncertainty over the legal title to quota? 
(e) other aspects (please specify)? 
 
Overall, around two-thirds of the sector were concerned about a concentration of quota ownership 
into the hands of fewer companies or to particular regions, with some 40% very concerned. Least 
concerned were the larger stern trawlers and the North Sea beam trawlers. Nearly three-quarters 
were concerned about the possible impact on new entrants to the industry and nearly 70% were 
concerned about the legal title to quota. Again though, only around a third were very concerned 
in each case. Least concern about discouraging new entrants was expressed by the larger 
demersal trawlers, the Area IV beam trawlers and the pelagic boats, with the latter two groups 
also relatively unconcerned about the legal title to quota. 
 
The non-sector and 10m and under vessels were generally more concerned than the sector about 
the possible impact of ITQs on sectoral and regional concentration and about the supposed 
problems for new entrants, but while few in the non-sector were concerned about the nature of the 
legal title to quota, a large minority of the 10m and under vessels said that they were concerned. 
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4.3 Survey of UK POs 
 
4.3.1 Survey methodology 
 
Questionnaires were distributed to all 20 of the sea fishing POs in the UK. Responses concerning 
views on current management arrangements, FQAs and ITQs were obtained from all except two 
of the POs, the North East of Scotland Fish Producers’ Organisation (NESFO) and the Scottish 
Fishermen’s Organisation (SFO). The responses given by the 18 POs who participated in the 
survey are summarised below.(54) 
 
4.3.2 Views on current arrangements 
 
None of the POs were very satisfied with the current quota management system. Fourteen were 
quite satisfied, three were slightly unsatisfied and one was very unsatisfied. Thirteen had 
supported the move to FQAs while five had not. However, 16 out of 18 now thought they 
represented an improvement on track records. The same number were in favour of an annual 
reconciliation of quota units. 
 
Half of the 18 POs thought that the freedom to trade quota was about right, while 6, a third, 
thought that there was too much freedom. The fact that some of these POs were nevertheless in 
favour of annual reconciliations presumably reflects the administrative burden imposed by the 
increasing numbers of transfers required to give effect to quota trades under the existing 
arrangements. Only three POs said that there was not enough freedom for quota trading. 
 
One PO was of the view that trading should take place between POs but not between individual 
PO members. Four considered that, as at present, trading should only be possible both within and 
between POs, but 5 thought trading should be possible between all over 10m vessels and 7 
favoured trading across the whole fleet, under 10m vessels included. Just one PO would prefer to 
see no trading at all. 
 
Fourteen of the 18 POs considered that quota ownership should be restricted to individuals or 
companies actively engaged in fishing. 
 
Finally, the POs were asked what key changes they would like to see made to the existing system. 
Sixteen out of 18 reiterated that they wanted an annual reconciliation of units. Eight wanted an 
end to underpinning of non-sector and under 10m allocations, and the same number wanted to see 
the introduction of ITQs. Other changes specifically mentioned by just one or two of the POs 
                                                
54 The summary of views presented here is deliberately anonymous. The detailed views of individual POs about 
FQAs and quota trading are almost certainly well known to Fisheries Departments from responses to recent 
consultation exercises. Note that in all cases but one the questions were answered by the Chief Executive of the PO. 
It is assumed that the responses given reflected the views of at least a majority of the membership but the researchers 
were clearly not in a position to verify this. 
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were no reconciliations (2 POs), an end to “slipper skippers”, i.e., fishermen who rent out all their 
quota (2), a formal clarification of the legal title to quota (2), an allocation of quotas according to 
the number of VCUs on a licence (1), an annual reallocation of unused quota (1) and an end to 
the split between quotas in Areas VIa and VIb. 
 
4.3.3 Views on ITQs 
 
Fifteen POs thought that ITQs were now inevitable while just 3 did not. However, only 8 of the 
18 were in favour of ITQs, at least for some stocks. Of these eight, 6 thought ITQs would be 
suitable for all stocks, while one thought they should be restricted to finfish only (i.e., demersal 
and pelagic species) and one wanted ITQs for pelagic stocks only. Seven thought ITQs could 
apply to all UK vessels while one wanted them to apply to over 10m vessels only. 
 
Thirteen POs thought that ITQs would reduce over-quota landings, two thought the opposite and 
3 were uncertain or thought there would be no effect. Seven thought discards would decrease 
while 4 thought they would increase and another 7 thought there would be no real difference. 
 
Sixteen of the 18 POs wanted to see POs retain a central role under an ITQ system while two did 
not. Just two of the POs were basically in favour of some sort of quota tax, 13 were against and 
three were unsure about the idea. 
 
Most of the POs were either very concerned or quite concerned about a concentration of 
ownership and potential difficulties for new entrants, although a significant minority were not. 
Seven were unconcerned about any concentration into fewer hands, with rather less (3) 
unconcerned about regional effects and five unconcerned about high quota prices discouraging 
new entrants. Seven were very concerned about the issue of legal title to quota while 9 were 
slightly concerned. Just two were unconcerned about this. 
  54
5. ITQs in practice: an international review 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Since the general extension of national exclusive economic zones to 200 miles in the 1970s, there 
has been a trend towards the adoption of property rights-based fisheries management systems 
worldwide. Although there are some notable cases of territorial use rights and community fishing 
rights, the development has primarily been toward regimes of individual quotas (IQs) and 
individual transferable quotas (ITQs). 
 
IQs are already quite common. They are widely used in Europe, Russia, Southern Africa, 
America and even Japan. An interesting aspect of IQs is that they tend to evolve over time into 
fully-fledged ITQs. Having secured valuable property rights in the form of IQs, the holders soon 
push for permission to trade these rights. After all, this possibility only enlarges their 
opportunities. This path of evolution has taken place for instance in Iceland, the Netherlands, 
Greenland and Namibia. 
 
ITQs have now been implemented for the management of hundreds of fish stocks around the 
world. With the recent addition of Chile to the list of countries basing their fisheries management 
on ITQs, over 10% of the global ocean fish harvest is currently taken under ITQs. 
 
The first ITQ systems were implemented in the 1970s. Currently, at least seven significant fishing 
nations - Australia, Canada, Chile, Iceland, Namibia, the Netherlands and New Zealand - employ 
ITQs as a major component of their fisheries management systems (OECD 1997, Arnason 
1996a). Several others, including Mozambique, Greenland, Portugal, Mexico and the United 
States, use ITQs in some of their fisheries (OECD 1997). Important fishing nations such as Peru, 
Argentina and Morocco are preparing for the introduction of ITQs in some or all of their 
fisheries. 
 
Thus ITQs can hardly be said to be experimental any longer. A great deal of experience with the 
system has been accumulated in numerous fisheries all over the world for the past 25 years. 
 
The evidence cited in the Annex(55) to this report demonstrates that the experience with ITQs has 
generally been quite positive. Fishing effort has usually decreased and fishing fleets have 
contracted, depleted stocks have recovered and the quality of the landed catch has generally 
increased. In a number of cases, the increased emphasis on product value and quality has resulted 
in additional employment in the industry as a whole, offsetting the impact of reduced fleet sizes. 
Finally, economic rents have generally greatly increased. It seems that ITQs represent the only 
fisheries management system currently employed around the world that can claim this degree of 
                                                
55 This chapter and the accompanying Annex were prepared by Professor Ragnar Arnason of the University of 
Iceland. 
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general success. As a result, ITQ-managed fisheries are becoming more numerous every year. 
 
This chapter summarizes the structure and experiences of some of the more important ITQ 
systems in the world focusing on the following key aspects of their implementation: 
• ·the initial allocation of entitlements; 
• the definition of entitlements; 
• institutions to facilitate trading in quotas; 
• restrictions on quota trades and quota holdings; 
• the volume of quota trades; 
• mechanisms for extracting resource rents and collecting management costs; 
• the enforcement system; 
• evidence of increased economic efficiency in the fishery; 
• evidence of increased or reduced quota-induced discarding; 
• evidence of an increased sense of resource stewardship by the fishing industry; 
• the effect of quota tradeability on 
- concentration of quota ownership, 
- the geographical concentration of fleet activity and (hence), regional employment, 
- the concentration of quota towards particular fleet segments; 
• the effect of restricted quota ownership and tradeability on the above; 
• mechanisms to deal with problems associated with multispecies fisheries; 
• how ITQ systems respond to significant fluctuations in TACs; 
• the legal title to quota. 
 
The summary is based on an extensive study of the experiences with ITQs in the seven major 
fishing nations that have already adopted ITQs as their main fisheries management system, 
namely Australia, Canada, Chile, Iceland, Namibia, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the USA. 
The detailed results of this study (together with sources and references) are to be found in the 
Annex to this report. 
 
5.2 Initial allocation of entitlements 
 
The initial allocation of ITQ rights in various fisheries around the world has been according to 
several criteria, the most important of which have been: 
• historical catch shares; 
• vessel harvesting and hold capacity; 
• investment in vessels; 
• equality, i.e., equal shares. 
 
Of these criteria, the first is by far the most common. The reason is not difficult to fathom. Most 
often ITQs are introduced into an already established fishery. Moreover, quite often there is a 
need to constrain harvesting volumes from what they have been in the past. Under these 
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circumstances, it is socially and legally difficult to allocate the new more restrictive rights 
differently from what has been the case in the recent past. 
 
There is a great variation in the length of catch history employed for the initial allocation of ITQ 
rights. Usually, the period in question is quite short : 3-4 years is quite common. However, there 
are cases of seven or more years being employed for the purpose. In many cases, the criteria for 
initial allocation of quota rights have not been strictly followed. It is quite common to set up 
appeals boards and similar institutions to consider allocation adjustments for those that feel they 
have been particularly unfairly treated by the straight-forward application of the allocation 
criteria. Thus, for allocation on the basis of the historical catch record, it is common to make 
allowances for years during which the vessel in question may not have been operating normally 
due to major repairs, not having entered the fishery and so on. 
 
From the perspective of economic efficiency, it makes little difference how the initial allocation 
of quota rights is conducted provided the rights are subsequently freely transferable. With 
significantly limited transferability, however, the initial allocation of quota rights becomes more 
important in determining the economic outcome. 
 
5.3 Definition of entitlements 
 
The basic quota entitlement is usually a fraction of whatever TAC is set by the fisheries 
authorities every year. This entitlement then gives rise to an annual (seasonal) quota allocation 
equal to the multiple of this fraction and the TAC. This type of quota entitlement thus provides 
the quota holder with a certain share in the annual TAC. Hence it is often more strictly referred to 
as an individual transferable share quota (ITSQ). 
 
Quota entitlements defined in terms of nominal volume of harvest have been used in the past but 
problems are created by the need in most fisheries to alter the TAC from one year to the next. 
When that happens, ITQ rights denominated in volume terms require the fisheries authorities to 
sell or buy quotas according to whether the TAC is increased or decreased relative to the initially 
allocated volume. These market operations by the fisheries authorities obviously create their own 
problems, not the least when funds have to be found to buy quotas back from the industry. As a 
results nations that have employed this method, notably New Zealand, have scrapped this method 
in favour of proportional or share quota entitlements. 
 
Under the share quota system the ITQ is a lasting quota entitlement. Its duration (longevity) 
varies from one system to another. In certain systems (notably New Zealand) the ITQ is explicitly 
in perpetuity. In other systems (notably Namibia) the quota right is formally only for one year at a 
time but is generally automatically renewed. In other systems (e.g., Chile) the duration is for a 
specified number of years without a clear rule as to if and then how renewal is to occur. Often (as 
in Iceland and Australia) the duration of the ITQ right is simply left unspecified. 
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From a theoretical perspective share quotas have a clear advantage in terms of economic 
efficiency over volume quotas, not only because they are administratively easier but, more 
importantly, because they give the holder a greater vested interest in the welfare of the underlying 
fish stocks. For the same reason, “permanent” ITQs are economically superior to those of limited 
duration. Thus a limit on the duration of ITQs must be justified by other considerations. 
 
5.4 Institutions to facilitate trade in quotas 
 
Trading of quotas, both of the permanent and annual (lease) rights, results in their continuous 
reallocation to those able to make the best use of them in accordance with the principles of the 
market system. Hence quota trading is a crucial part of the economic efficiency of the ITQ 
system. 
 
It is well known that for optimal results markets must work smoothly and market trades be as 
easily and inexpensively conducted as possible (that is, transaction costs should be minimised). If 
that is not the case, the economic efficiency of the ITQ system will be correspondingly reduced. 
In spite of this, official mechanisms or institutions to facilitate quota trades have generally not 
been set up in association with the major quota systems in the world. The only case of this that 
we have found is in Iceland, where there is a public quota exchange very much along the lines of 
a conventional stock exchange. This quota exchange, however, only trades in annual quota leases, 
not permanent ITQs. Moreover, its establishment was not at all motivated by the desire to 
facilitate quota trades. It was established as an official response to complaints by hired fishermen 
that their contractual share in the value of the catch was being eroded by artificially low quayside 
prices arranged as a part of quota trading deals between related parties. 
 
In spite of this lack of official mechanisms to facilitate quota trades there is little evidence that 
quota trading has been hampered by market imperfections and high transaction costs. In many 
countries where the ITQ system has been in operation for some time (e.g., Iceland and New 
Zealand) quota traders or brokers have spontaneously emerged to assist the parties in trading 
quotas. In other cases, e.g., the Netherlands, Canada and USA, where the ITQ fisheries have 
generally had fewer participants and been more localized, quota trades have generally taken place 
directly between fishermen on the basis of personal contact. 
 
5.5 Restrictions on quota trade and holdings 
 
Restrictions on quota holdings and trades are common in the ITQ systems around the world. No 
system has no such restrictions. These restrictions take a wide variety of forms, and it is 
convenient to discuss restrictions on quota holdings and on quota trading separately. 
 
Restrictions on quota holdings primarily take two forms: who can hold quota and how much they 
can hold. In almost all ITQ systems there are restrictions on who can hold quota. In the most free 
system in this respect, the New Zealand system, only New Zealand nationals can hold quota. In 
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most other systems the holding of quota is restricted to a much smaller set of the population. 
Typically only those with a fishing licence in the fishery in question can hold quota. In Iceland 
for instance, quotas must be associated with vessels, so only those with licenced fishing vessels 
can hold quota. In other countries, the holding of different species quotas is restricted to those 
with a licence for the particular fishery in question. 
 
It is important to realise, however, that in practice it is usually easy to circumvent restrictions of 
this type. Those wanting to hold quotas can generally enter a contract with someone with the 
necessary qualifications to hold them on their behalf. How well such an arrangement would stand 
up in court would depend on the national legal framework and the particulars of each case. 
 
In some ITQ systems there are also restrictions on the maximum allowable quota holdings. 
These, however, tend to be imposed at a later stage in the evolution of the ITQ system if large 
players start to emerge. Such restrictions vary greatly according to nation and fishery. Thus in 
New Zealand the maximum quota holding ranges from 10-45% depending on the fishery. In 
Iceland it ranges from 5-20%, again depending on the fishery. 
 
Restrictions on quota trades are generally less severe than those on quota holdings. Note, 
however, that restrictions on quota holdings also imply an indirect restriction on quota trading. In 
many countries quotas, although tradeable, are often far from freely tradeable. This applies for 
instance to some USA and Canadian ITQ systems and the Namibian quota system in general. 
These restrictions take many forms. In some cases there are limitations on the volume of trades, 
elsewhere trades may only take place after a certain period, or trading may be restricted to a sub-
group of those allowed to hold quotas. The purpose of these restrictions is generally to limit 
structural changes in the fishery and the fishing industry following the introduction of the ITQ 
system. 
 
Despite such restrictions, all ITQ systems otherwise freely permit the transfer of property rights 
between fishing firms, that is, they allow the sale of permanent quota holdings as well as the 
leasing of quota for shorter periods. 
 
5.6 Volume of quota trade 
 
There is limited quantitative evidence on the extent of quota trades in the various ITQ systems 
around the world. A fairly complete picture of quota trades in Iceland and some more patchy data 
from other countries, however, indicates that quota trades are substantial. This applies to both 
annual trades (leases) and trades in permanent ITQs. In Iceland, trades in annual demersal quotas 
have in recent years been in the region of 80-90% of the year’s total quota (Runolfsson 2000). 
Trade in annual quotas for other species such as pelagics and shellfish, where there are fewer 
players, is much less but still substantial relative to the total volume of quotas. Trade in 
permanent ITQs is generally less as a proportion of the total volume but still very substantial. 
Since 1971 ITQ trades for most species have been some 10-20% of total (outstanding) ITQs. 
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The incomplete quantitative evidence from other countries generally suggests somewhat smaller 
volumes of quota trades than in Iceland but still quite substantial compared to the outstanding 
volume of quota. In the Australian South-East trawl fishery, for example, (a multispecies fishery) 
annual quota trades have in recent years exceeded 30% of the TAC (Geen 2001). The qualitative 
evidence is very much along the same lines. In most ITQ fisheries for which data is available, it is 
reported that trades in quotas is substantial. 
 
Theory suggests that the extent of quota trades depends on a number of factors, the most 
important of which are: 
• the ease of trading; 
• the size of the fishery; 
• the number and diversity of vessels; 
• variability (uncertainty) in the fishery; 
• the state of the fishery in its adjustment towards equilibrium capacity. 
 
It follows that there is little reason to expect much uniformity in the extent of quota trades across 
different fisheries: the larger and more diverse the fishery, the more variable it is, the further it is 
from its long run equilibrium and the easier it is to trade (the lower are the transaction costs), the 
more extensive the quota trades. The available evidence seems in reasonable agreement with 
these general principles. 
 
5.7 Extraction of management costs and resource rents 
 
In most advanced ocean fisheries the cost of management is quite substantial (Arnason et al 
2000). This applies no less to ITQ-managed fisheries than to other fisheries. The difference is, 
however, that ITQ fisheries are capable of generating substantial economic profits to fishing 
companies that enable them to pay for these management services as well as generating net 
economic rents. Economic theory suggests that the collection of management costs from the 
recipients of these services may well enhance the efficiency of the both the industry and the 
management activity. Hence, the collection of fees for fisheries management services represents 
an attractive idea. 
 
In most, but not all, ITQ fisheries there is some imposition of fees to pay for management costs. 
Nevertheless, in most fisheries the fees actually collected are substantially less than the total 
management costs incurred by the fishery authorities. On the other hand, management fees seem 
to be on the increase and many governments have announced their intention to collect repayment 
of all management costs from the fishing industry. In ITQ-managed fisheries the management 
charges range from virtually nothing to about 3-4% of the fishery’s gross revenue. Total fisheries 
management costs, however, are usually well in excess of 3-4% of gross revenues. Thus in almost 
all cases the management fees collected are well under the actual management costs. 
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In very few ITQ-managed fisheries is there any attempt to extract resource rents from the fishery 
(i.e., fees in excess of management costs, designed to capture excess profits generated as a result 
of exclusive rights to the resource). Indeed, as already mentioned, in most ITQ fisheries the fees 
collected are generally well below management costs. The exception is in Namibia where the 
total fee collection from the fishery has for a number of years substantially exceeded the total 
management costs incurred by the government. 
 
A number of fishing nations, including Australia, Chile and Namibia, have announced their 
intention to extract resource rents from the fishing industry under ITQs. Others have announced 
that they will not do so, for example the USA and New Zealand. In some countries, notably 
Iceland, Canada and the Netherlands, the issue is still unsettled. 
 
5.8 Enforcement 
 
The enforcement of an ITQ system involves two components: observation and control, and the 
sanctioning of violators. 
 
The former is often referred to as MCS, a term coined by the UN FAO which stands for 
monitoring, control and surveillance. Its purpose is to observe the fishing activity, induce vessels 
to act in compliance with the rules, detect violations and report them to the sanctioning authority. 
The function of the second component of the enforcement system is to process alleged violations 
and, if appropriate, impose sanctions. In the fisheries management literature, this component is 
often referred to as the fisheries judicial system (FJS). 
 
In ITQ systems the focus of the enforcement activity is naturally on the quota constraint, i.e., 
ensuring that quota holders do not exceed the landings stipulated by their quota. Under most ITQ 
systems existing MCS and FJS structures have initially been assigned to this particular function 
and, with the passage of time, have adapted and been modified to deal with the challenges posed 
by ITQs. Few ITQ enforcement systems have been designed from scratch, although the New 
Zealand system may be regarded as something of an exception in this respect. 
 
There is a range of approaches for enforcing the quota constraint. These may be broadly divided 
into enforcement at sea and on land. While the logical method for enforcing the quota constraint 
is at sea where the harvesting takes place, practical considerations have forced all major ITQ 
nations to rely primarily on enforcement on land. There are essentially two means for monitoring 
catches and thus enforcing ITQs on land: monitoring at the landing site (quayside monitoring) 
and the collection of catch and landings reports from the industry. 
 
Quayside monitoring involves the measurement of landings from fishing vessels. Clearly this is 
potentially very effective, but the problem can be the cost. While a range of techniques such as 
restrictions on the place and time of landings and the design of the monitoring system will reduce 
the cost, it will not be economical if there are too many small landing places. In many ocean 
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fisheries the landing places are sufficiently few and large to make this method economical. 
Otherwise inspections must be rationed in some way. In general, quayside monitoring, where it 
has been feasible, has been relatively successful. 
 
Catch and landings reports must be backed up by a secondary monitoring activity, which can 
involve both spot checks and the “paper trail” approach. Spot checks are employed to verify that 
the reports given are accurate. Clearly this will not work for a low frequency of checks unless the 
penalties for violations are sufficiently heavy. The paper trail approach requires quantity reports 
not only from the vessel landing the catch but also the subsequent handlers and processors of the 
fish. Comparing these reports should reveal inconsistencies that may indicate violations. The 
problem, of course, is then to prove to the satisfaction of the officials of the FJS (often the courts) 
that a violation has actually occurred and who is the guilty party. Another fundamental problem 
with the paper trail method is that it seeks to uncover violations some time after they occur. To 
the extent that the probability of successful prosecution diminishes, this approach may therefore 
need to rely on heavier penalties than are socially acceptable and straightforward to implement. 
 
5.9 Evidence of increased economic efficiency 
 
The evidence concerning the impact of ITQs on economic efficiency is fairly unequivocal. 
Without exception, ITQs have been found to improve the profitability of the fishing industry, 
which is in accordance with theoretical predictions. With a reasonably undistorted price system, 
and in the absence of serious stock externalities,(56) profitability is a good measure of economic 
efficiency in a fishery. Therefore we can conclude that ITQs have improved the economic 
efficiency of the fisheries to which they have been applied. 
 
Similarly, as a part of the increased profitability, ITQs have been generally been found to 
substantially reduce fishing effort in previously overexploited fisheries. The effect on fleet size, 
however, is often much less dramatic. While in many fisheries the number and size of vessels 
applied to a newly ITQ-managed fishery has been found to be dramatically reduced (e.g., in the 
US surf clam and ocean quahog fisheries, the Australian bluefin tuna fishery and the Icelandic 
purse seine fishery) the reduction in fleet size in some other fisheries (e.g., the Icelandic demersal 
fisheries and the Dutch flatfish fishery) has been quite slow. Given the reduction in fishing effort, 
however, this may be explained by a number of factors. First, due to the generally depressed price 
of fishing vessels in the world, the opportunity cost of retaining largely redundant vessels has 
been rather low. Second, many of these extra vessels have been assigned to fisheries outside the 
ITQ system, some of which have even been entirely new fisheries or fisheries on the high seas or 
both. Third, it seems that there are cases where fishing vessels made redundant by an ITQ fishery 
have actually been kept as an insurance in the case the ITQ system was to be scrapped in the near 
future. 
 
                                                
56 We assume that the industry is competitive and there are no public transfers (subsidies). We also assume that 
profitability is sustainable, i.e., there is no short term increase in profits at the expense of stock depletion. 
  62
The evidence about the effects of ITQs on fish stock biomass is also generally positive. In most 
cases the state of the stocks has improved and fish stock biomass has increased under ITQs. It is 
important to realize, however, that in principle an ITQ system as such does not have any 
particular effect on fish stock biomass. The ITQ system merely encourages the economically 
efficient fishing of whatever TAC is set by the fisheries authorities. Under ITQs, however, 
especially the permanent ITQ (individual transferable share quota) version, the quota holders 
should have a vested interest in the size and good condition of the fish stocks and their 
environment. Thus it is generally found that under ITQs the fishing industry is much more willing 
to accept reductions in the TACs to rebuild the fish stocks. Sometimes, it has even taken the 
initiative in this direction. Under ITQs bold stock rebuilding programs have been initiated. 
Moreover, it is generally found that under ITQs, it is much easier than under alternative fisheries 
management systems to enforce whatever TAC is imposed. This is also conducive to the proper 
biological management of stocks. 
 
It should be noted in this context that while an ITQ system may be beneficial to the welfare of the 
stock(s) subject to ITQs, the effect on other stocks not subject to ITQs may be the opposite. The 
reason is that effort pushed out of the ITQ fishery for reasons of efficiency may be applied to 
these alternative fisheries which, as a result, sometimes become more overexploited than before. 
However, the same is true of any quota system, or indeed any management system which restricts 
access to some stocks and not others. 
 
5.10 Evidence of increased or reduced quota-induced discarding 
 
Compared to unmanaged fisheries (but not necessarily to other fisheries management systems) 
ITQs are known to generate additional incentives for discarding. These incentives arise only in 
the case of fisheries with different grades (often size) of the same species (Arnason 1994). 
Fishermen find it to their advantage to discard any fish whose landed value does not exceed the 
cost of actually catching and landing it. In the case of ITQs, the quota introduces an additional 
cost item associated with landing the fish. This is the value of the quota that is used up when the 
fish is landed. In valuable fisheries, this cost, i.e., the quota price, can be very substantial 
compared to the landed value of the fish.(57) Under these circumstances it will be economical for 
the fisherman to discard fish whose value does not exceed the cost of catching and landing it plus 
the corresponding quota value. 
 
It is often claimed that discards will also arise through fishermen deciding to “save” quota for a 
later opportunity (in the expectation of higher prices). While there is indeed a stronger incentive 
to obtain the highest prices possible for the catch under an ITQ system, in order for it to be 
profitable to discard fish for this reason, the future price expected must effectively cover not only 
the cost of the quota, but also the revenue foregone through discarding, and the cost of catching 
the fish a second time! This is unlikely to be a profitable exercise in most circumstances. 
                                                
57 In the Icelandic and New Zealand demersal fisheries, for example, quota prices typically amount to 20-50% of the 
landed value of the catch. 
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It is important to realize that many other fisheries management systems also generate incentives 
for the discarding of fish. In particular, non-transferable quota systems (IQs) may generate an 
even greater incentive to discard than ITQ systems. One obvious reason is that since quota trades 
are impossible, fishermen in multispecies fisheries have no alternative but to discard all catches 
of species for which they have filled their quota in order to keep on fishing for other species. 
 
It is similarly important to note that while ITQs generate an incentive for discarding, they also 
generate an additional incentive for more selective fishing (Arnason 1995). There are many 
reasons for this. One is that permanent ITQ holders have a vested interest in the welfare of the 
stocks and, as a result, are more willing to employ appropriate fishing methods. Another is that 
under an ITQ system, fishermen have a guaranteed share of the catch. Hence they have more 
opportunity for using selective fishing methods than under, say, competitive fishing, without 
having to worry about losing out in competition with other fishermen. Third, under ITQs there 
will often be an increase in fish stock sizes. Hence there will generally be a greater supply of 
large fish which is also often the highest value fish. Therefore concentrating on high value fish 
may be easier under ITQs than many alternative fisheries management systems. 
 
Thus under ITQs we have two opposing forces as far as discarding is concerned. First, ITQs 
generate an incentive to discard lower grades of fish due to the ITQ price. On the other hand the 
ITQ system generates a tendency for more selective fishing methods. Hence there may be less 
low grade fish to discard. Therefore it is not possible to say a priori whether or not a shift to ITQs 
will result in increased or decreased volume of discards. 
 
The available evidence on discarding in actual ITQ systems is quite mixed. There is some 
evidence of both increased and decreased discarding under the various ITQ systems, but overall 
there is little evidence of significantly increased discarding. In fact, where there is evidence of 
substantial changes in discarding following the introduction of ITQs, it is of reduced discarding 
(as in several of the USA fisheries). 
 
5.11 Evidence of increased “resource stewardship” 
 
Theory suggests that granting permanent, share-based, harvesting rights in the form of ITQs 
should generate an increased sense of resource stewardship. The reason is that quota holders have 
a vested interest in the welfare of the fish stocks and their environment. The better the condition 
of the fish stocks, the more valuable is the ITQ property. Note that this applies much less to 
non-transferable quotas (IQs) and to ITQs of very limited duration. 
 
Reports from the various ITQ systems around the world tend to confirm these predictions. 
Although the evidence is mostly anecdotal, taken together it is compelling. It is generally 
reported that compliance, fishing selectivity, fish handling and quality, and the willingness of 
industry to rebuild fish stocks all improve under ITQs. Moreover, there are a number of cases of 
industry voluntarily funding research and enforcement activity under ITQ systems. 
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It should be noted, however, that there are certain organisational obstacles to a fragmented fishing 
industry being in position to harness individual “resource stewardship” incentives to the full. The 
reason is essentially the classic free-rider problem - it would pay every member of the industry to 
act irresponsibly if he knew that the others would act responsibly. Hence, it may be advisable for 
the fisheries authorities to assist the fishing industry in setting up the appropriate organisational 
structures that would encourage full member participation in initiatives of this nature. 
 
5.12 Industrial concentration in the fishery 
 
ITQs may affect concentration in the fishing industry in (at least) three different ways: 
• concentration of quota ownership; 
• geographical concentration of fleet activity and (hence) regional employment; 
• concentration of quota towards particular fleet segments. 
 
ITQs enable the fishing industry to become more economically efficient. Hence, under ITQs the 
industry will develop in whatever direction is in accordance with economic efficiency. This may 
imply more concentration in corporate structure (ownership), geographical location or fleet 
structure (vessel types). But it may just as well imply less concentration in these factors. It is only 
if concentration is more economically efficient under ITQs than under the previous fisheries 
management system that these developments will take place. Thus, as a matter of economic 
theory, ITQs are “concentration-neutral”.(58) It is possible that the previous fisheries management 
system may well have been distortive with respect to the above dimensions of concentration. 
 
In short, quota tradeability facilitates the development toward greater economic efficiency and to 
the extent that increased economic efficiency implies more concentration, quota tradeability will 
be a factor in that. Note, however, that even without tradeable quotas, e.g., in an IQ system, there 
will normally still be a substantial movement toward increased efficiency and, consequently, a 
similar kind of concentration. Even without quota tradeability there will typically still be ways to 
consolidate quotas (e.g., by company mergers or acquisitions) which are likely to be exploited if 
the economic gains are sufficiently high. Indeed, restricted quota tradeability might well lead to 
larger fishing companies than would otherwise be the case! 
 
Note also that if ITQs (or, for that matter, IQs) lead to less fishing effort and a reduction in the 
fleet size (as would be expected) then that reduction by itself implies (given the imperfect 
divisibility of vessels and firms) concentration along the above dimensions, i.e., fewer firms, 
relatively more of certain types of vessels, etc. 
 
Moreover, ITQs are not imposed on a static fishery. Inevitably, the fishery to which the ITQ 
system is applied is subject to various technological, social and market forces. Consequently, the 
                                                
58 The only inherent concentration effect of ITQs that has been suggested is that efficient quota trading requires large 
companies. This is somewhat doubtful in principle, but may well occur where trading is very restricted. 
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fishery, before the introduction of the ITQ system, is already responding to these various forces 
and evolving along the various dimensions of concentration. Thus any developments toward or 
away from concentration that may be observed under ITQs might equally well have occurred 
under an alternative fisheries management system. 
 
The concentration experience under ITQ systems around the world is very much along the 
theoretical lines described above. Generally, when ITQs are imposed on mature fisheries some 
reduction in the number and an increase in the average relative size of fishing companies is 
observed. The few cases to the contrary of this, as in the Icelandic demersal fisheries, are due to 
exemptions of fleet segments from some or all of the ITQ restrictions. 
 
The evidence on the geographical distribution of the fishing activity is somewhat less clear-cut. 
Obviously this depends very much on the spatial nature of the fishery in question, the technology 
involved, the impact of ITQs on the total level of harvest and other factors. Since, as already 
suggested, ITQs tend to encourage the development of new fisheries,(59) the overall geographical 
distribution of fishery-related activity may actually increase. Nevertheless, overall it seems that 
the evidence from ITQ systems around the world is rather in the direction of less geographical 
distribution of the fishing activity than before. 
 
The influence of the ITQ system on sectoral concentration (or fleet homogeneity) is even less 
clear. As already stated, ITQs further economic efficiency. This may or may not imply fleet 
homogeneity. Given the heterogeneity of many fisheries with respect to fishing areas, fish 
behaviour, fish size and so on, not to mention fishery variability over time, it may well be that the 
optimal composition of the fishing fleet is quite heterogeneous. If so, the ITQ system will 
encourage that. In fact, taking it for granted that stocks will improve under ITQs, a wider 
distribution of age cohorts in the catch will, indeed, encourage fishing fleet heterogeneity 
compared to what would be the case in a fishery consisting of few cohorts. 
 
The evidence available on the development of fleet composition under ITQs is simply too limited 
to allow us to draw any conclusions in this respect. In many fisheries, fishing vessels have 
become fewer and larger. This, however, is a result of technological improvements which have 
little to do with the ITQ system. Indeed there are fisheries that have been under ITQs for years 
(e.g., the Icelandic inshore shrimp fishery) where there has been very little change in the types of 
vessels employed. 
 
                                                
59 There are two reasons for this. First, because ITQ-holders retain their access rights to the fisheries for which they 
already own quota they do not run the risk of losing such rights by engaging in exploratory fishing trips. Second, in 
most ITQ fisheries initial quota allocations depend upon track records and there is therefore an economic incentive to 
establish a track record in a new fishery. 
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5.12.1 Fleet concentration and restricted quota tradeability 
 
Restrictions on quota tradeability are often imposed with the intention of reducing concentration 
effects along the dimensions discussed above. One of the most pronounced cases of this is the 
ITQ system in the Alaskan halibut and sablefish fisheries where one of the main objectives is to 
avoid radical industrial and geographical restructuring of the fishery. Similar considerations 
motivated the Norwegian government to reject suggestions to move its IQ system toward ITQs. 
Many other cases of restricted transferability in ITQ systems for this express purpose can be 
mentioned. So the application of limited ownership and quota tradeability for the purpose of 
avoiding concentration is quite common. The question, however, is of the advisability and 
effectiveness of these measures. 
 
First, these types of restrictions clearly subtract from the economic efficiency of the system. They 
are, in other words, costly. This cost has, of course, to be set against the benefits. Second, as 
regards effectiveness, there can be little doubt that these measures will delay whatever adjustment 
toward efficiency (and therefore also concentration) would otherwise have taken place. The long 
run effect is more doubtful. It may, for instance, be the case that in order to overcome the 
economic disadvantages of restricted tradeability, companies, through mergers and acquisitions, 
become even larger than they would have been under unrestricted tradeability in order to be able 
to move harvesting relatively freely across vessels and geographical areas.(60) It may also be the 
case that complete adjustments of this nature are impossible, even in the long run, and that 
restrictions on quota tradeability will have a long term discouraging impact on concentration. The 
empirical evidence provides little information on this issue. 
 
5.13 Mechanisms to deal with problems associated with multispecies fisheries 
 
Problems stem from a mis-match between the quotas for the various species and the actual catch 
rates of these species. This leads to a bycatch of the species for which the quota has been filled 
and, possibly, its discarding at sea. It is the discarding that is the problem for at least three 
reasons: it may represent an economic waste, it tends to distort the catch statistics and, hence, 
stock assessment, and it tends to undermine the legitimacy of the ITQ system. This problem, 
however, which has been used as an argument against using ITQs in multispecies fisheries, is 
actually far less serious than is often claimed. 
 
First, transferable quotas reduce the problem greatly. If a vessel’s quota for one species filled, it 
can buy additional quota for that species on the quota market. So, within the ITQ system, 
individual vessels’ quota holdings can in principle be fitted to the vessel’s pattern of fishing. 
Therefore, under the ITQ system the problem of quota/catch mismatch should not arise until a 
TAC is exhausted or close to being exhausted.  
 
                                                
60 This obviously assumes that quotas could freely be moved between vessels under the same ownership. 
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Second, the ratio of species in the catch is technically more flexible than is often acknowledged. 
By judicious selection of fishing gear (type, mesh size, hook size, etc.), fishing methods (i.e., how 
the fishing gear is employed), fishing areas and fishing times, it is possible in most multispecies 
fisheries to capture the various species in more or less the proportions desired. There is ample 
empirical evidence in support of this claim. In Iceland, for instance, vessels have not only 
generally solved the bycatch problem by altering their fishing methods, some of them can even 
select the size categories of fish that are sought. 
 
However, the drawback is that increasing species selectivity is not necessarily costless. In many 
cases altering the species composition of the catch will reduce the overall catch rates even for the 
species that is being targeted. For this reason, fishermen may be reluctant to use more selective 
fishing methods and often claim inability to do so. Therefore the imposition and enforcement of 
appropriate regulations may be necessary to induce them to adopt more selective fishing methods. 
 
Several nations, e.g., New Zealand, Australia, Iceland and Canada, have employed ITQs in their 
multispecies fisheries for years with good results. In this connection, it should be noted that the 
general experience is that under ITQs fishermen are much more willing to adopt selective fishing 
methods than under other fisheries management systems. 
 
Nevertheless, to the extent that quota/catch mismatches are a problem in a multispecies fishery 
under ITQs, there are certain measures that can alleviate the problem and make it easier for 
fishermen to catch in the desired proportion. These include: 
• attempting to set quotas in accordance with the actual abundance of fish; 
• giving some flexibility by allowing the transfer of quota between species at specified 
conversion rates (although with sensitive species this should only be allowed at the 
margins);(61) 
• allowing limited overages of quotas for one season to be made good during the next season 
(although, again, with sensitive species this should only be allowed at the margins); 
• setting some quota aside each year (a “quota fund”) that the authorities can use to supply the 
quota market as the quota prices increase in response to an expected exhaustion of the TAC 
or if for any other reason vessels cannot buy quota on the market; 
• assisting the development and adoption of more selective gear and fishing practices. 
 
5.14 Responding to significant fluctuations in TACs 
 
Share-based ITQ systems (i.e., those in which the quota is a percentage of the TAC) are in many 
respects well-designed to cope with significant fluctuations in TACs. First, clearly the individual 
quota, being defined as a percentage of the TAC, is automatically adjusted to variations in the 
TAC. Second, the holders of ITQs for species subject to significantly fluctuating TACs are, or at 
                                                
61 This approach carries the danger of higher levels of over-quota catches than would have occurred with discarding 
and can reduce incentives to adopt more selective gear (Baulch and Pascoe 1992). 
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least should be, aware of the associated risk.(62) Hence they will (or should) already have taken 
this risk into their business calculations and adjusted to it. They could even insure against it, at 
least in principle. In any case, the market prices for such ITQs will reflect the market’s general 
assessment of and attitude to the risk involved. Thus, to the extent that economic agents can cope 
with risk in general, there is every likelihood that appropriate measures will be taken within the 
ITQ system, i.e., the ITQ system is conducive to optimal risk management by the ITQ holders. 
 
Note that we would expect industry profitability to increase under ITQs, and hence firms will be 
better able to cope with fluctuations in output due to TAC changes. Note also that permanent ITQ 
prices will tend to reflect long term expectations about stocks and will not fluctuate to the extent 
that TACs may year on year. Hence income variability will not be matched by the similar 
variability in asset values. 
 
Essentially, there is no reason to add to the standard ITQ model any special provisions to deal 
with fluctuations in the TACs. In fact, it could be argued that such measures would be 
economically inappropriate as they would shield quota holders from the real variability in nature 
and thus prevent or reduce their appropriate adjustments to it. 
 
Many ITQ fisheries are subject to large TAC fluctuations. One of the most dramatic examples is 
the Icelandic capelin fishery where during the past two decades the annual TAC has varied 
between zero and 1.2 million metric tonnes without causing any particular problems. There are 
many other cases of very substantial fluctuations in the TACs in the Icelandic, Namibian, New 
Zealand and Canadian ITQ fisheries. Nevertheless, at least in the Icelandic fisheries management 
legislation there are provisions for the fisheries authorities to compensate those subject to large 
TAC reductions with temporary quotas in other species. As these quotas have to be subtracted 
from someone else, this provision is highly controversial within the industry. To date it has only 
been used twice and then in a relatively minor way. 
 
This is not to say that large fluctuations in TACs are not problematic for the industry. They are, 
and managers will seek to create more stable conditions in the fishery. Under an ITQ system, 
however, the industry is arguably in a better position than under, say, a system of fixed quotas 
where individual agents cannot alter their fishing opportunities. More positively, an ITQ regime 
underpinned by a strong enforcement system should be effective in controlling fishing effort, 
enabling a rebuilding of stocks and consequently more stable TACs from year to year. 
 
5.15 Legal title to quota 
 
In most ITQ systems the legal title to the quota is actually rather vague. ITQs represent property 
rights, not property rights in the fish stocks but rights to a certain share in the permissible harvest 
of fish from given stocks. This type of property right does not usually enjoy the same legal status 
                                                
62 This risk is actually very similar to that of derivative volatility in financial markets. 
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as more conventional property rights such as, say, the ownership of a house or company stock. 
Thus, in general ITQs do not enjoy constitutional protection as other property usually does. The 
exception to this rule is the New Zealand ITQ system where ITQs are explicitly defined as the 
permanent property of the holder and protected by the Constitution. In most other countries the 
legal status of the ITQs as property is much weaker. The duration of the ITQ is usually either 
explicitly limited or left unspecified. In many countries, the relevant legislation explicitly states 
that ITQs do not have the status of permanent property. In the USA and Canada ITQs are 
regarded legally as a privilege granted by the state that can be revoked at any time. In many cases 
the motivation seems to be to ensure that the ITQ system can be revoked in the future or the 
allocation of ITQs altered without the legal need to compensate ITQ holders. 
 
Economic theory suggests that the more secure the property right, the more economically 
efficient the associated activity. Hence it may be expected that the relatively weak legal title to 
ITQs observed under most regimes will subtract to some degree from the efficiency of the 
fishery. 
 
5.16 Summary 
 
When ITQs have been introduced, the initial allocation of entitlements has normally been made 
on the basis of catch history (track record). In all existing ITQ systems quotas are defined in 
terms of percentage shares of the current TAC. 
 
Only rarely have institutions been set up by governments in order to facilitate or manage the 
trading of quota. Generally the industry itself has created the necessary institutions for trade to 
take place efficiently. In almost all cases, however, governments have restricted the freedom to 
trade quota in some way or another. Typically quota ownership is limited to fishing firms. Firms 
may be restricted in the amount of quota they can own (as a proportion of the TAC). Often there 
are other quantitative and temporal restrictions. In all ITQ systems, however, quota can be both 
leased on a temporary basis and sold permanently. 
 
In many ITQ fisheries governments have taken the opportunity to impose on quota holders a 
charge towards the costs of fishery management. Few governments, however, have attempted to 
extract a resource rent from the industry (by imposing a charge greater than that necessary to 
cover management costs). 
 
Enforcement of ITQs is essential to their successful operation. Generally, enforcement relies 
upon self-reporting of landings backed up by an effective system of random checks, together with 
sanctions which have a real deterrent effect. Checks will involve inspections of landings but may 
also include the monitoring of buyers, processors etc where a “paper trail” approach has been 
adopted. 
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ITQs generally result in increased industry profitability, which in most cases will reflect real 
increases in economic efficiency. Although fishing effort is likely to be significantly reduced 
under ITQs, the effect on capacity will depend upon a number of factors such as the extent of 
overcapacity under the previous management regime, the market for second-hand vessels and 
fishing opportunities for non-quota stocks. We would usually expect some reduction in capacity 
under ITQs, although the evidence shows that this varies greatly from country to country. Under 
ITQs stocks have generally improved in health, although this may reflect more the increased 
attention to controlling output effectively than the use of ITQs per se. 
 
ITQs will tend to reduce incentives to discard in multispecies quota fisheries but do create 
incentives to discard low value grades of fish. However, the incentives to discard low value fish 
under fixed individual quotas may be as great, while ITQs tend to encourage more selective 
fishing which will tend to reduce discards. The empirical evidence is inconclusive but reports of 
significant changes in discarding behaviour point to reduced discards under ITQs. 
 
ITQs appear to foster a greater sense of resource stewardship in the fishing industry, although 
sound organisational structures may be needed to harness this effectively in improving stock 
conservation outcomes. 
 
ITQs may be associated with industrial concentration, in terms of quota ownership, geographical 
distribution of fishing activity and fleet make-up, but only to the extent that such concentration 
follows from increased economic efficiency. Other factors are also making fisheries 
technologically more efficient, and ITQs will only alter the pace of change. While there is 
evidence of some concentration of ownership in many ITQ fisheries, this largely reflects the 
reduction in overall capacity. There is no clear pattern of geographical or sectoral change under 
ITQs, but in many cases there are restrictions on quota trade designed to limit such changes. 
 
ITQs have been used extensively in multispecies fisheries and they generally reduce problems of 
quota mis-matches at the vessel level. Where problems persist despite quota trading they may 
reflect TACs which are not in proportion to the actual relative abundance of fish. Increased 
fishing selectivity and flexibility of quota rules can ameliorate the problem but only to a limited 
extent. Significant fluctuations in TACs are a problem for the industry under ITQs as they are 
under any quota system, but the operational flexibility provided by ITQs will give the industry 
more capacity to cope with TAC fluctuations than under other systems. To the extent that ITQ 
management is successful in rebuilding the fishery, however, future TACs should be more stable. 
 
Finally, in all existing ITQ fisheries the nature of the property right inferred by quota 
“ownership” extends only to the permission to harvest a given share of the TAC. No ownership 
over the fish stocks themselves is established. The permission to harvest may be defined over 
some specified time period but in many cases the legal title to quota is rather vague in this and 
other respects. 
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6. Modelling the possible socio-economic impacts of ITQs 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Under a newly-introduced system of (well-enforced) tradeable fishing entitlements, such as ITQs, 
we would expect some vessels to purchase additional entitlements to improve the efficiency of 
their operation and others to sell their entitlements and exit the fishery. The reduction in the total 
level of inputs used in the fishery and the improved efficiency of the remaining vessels will lead 
to an overall increase in profits in the industry. However, any reduction in boat numbers will also 
result in a reduction in the level of direct employment in the industry. 
 
In this chapter the potential impact of ITQs on the structure of the fishing fleet and the 
consequent impact on regional employment and profits is assessed using a computer model of the 
UK industry. The model assumes that boats that have FQAs that currently restrict them to 
operating at less than full capacity will either seek to purchase quota to enable them to operate at 
full capacity, or sell their quota and exit the fishery (or concentrate on non-quota species). This is 
consistent with the economic theory presented in Chapter 2, and has been observed in fisheries 
that have adopted an ITQ system (see, for example, Adulaja et al 1998). 
 
6.2 Methodology and key assumptions 
 
The analysis is run in two steps. First, the capacity utilisation of each boat is estimated relative to 
other boats with which it can trade. In the second stage, the model allocates quota to individual 
vessels based on their current level of capacity utilisation, with the quota of boats at low levels of 
capacity utilisation being allocated to boats with relatively higher levels of capacity utilisation. 
The model is used to estimate the minimum fleet size required to fill the quota for each and every 
species with all boats operating at or close to full capacity. The model is specified so that the 
boats with the lowest capacity utilisation are the first to leave, their quota being allocated to boats 
operating closer to full capacity. Full mathematical details of the model are given in Appendix III. 
 
The level of capacity utilisation for each vessel is defined as the ratio of actual output (restricted 
by the FQAs) to the potential output, given the size and configuration of the vessel. As a result, it 
provides a measure of technical over-capacity, rather than economic over-capacity which would 
also take into account the costs of production (rather than just the potential output). Information 
on potential output is not available, but a proxy estimate for potential output given a set of inputs 
can be derived from examining the FQA holdings of the rest of the fleet: vessels that hold the 
greatest level of FQAs for a given boat size and type are assumed to be operating at full capacity. 
 
An analytical method exists (see Appendix III) to identify which boats are operating at full 
capacity taking into account differences in physical input use (e.g., engine power and boat size) 
and catch composition (defined by the FQAs). Information on fleet characteristics and FQA 
holdings in 2001 was used in the analysis (such that any previous quota trades under the existing 
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quota management system had already been factored into the analysis, although quota leases are 
not considered). 
 
As capacity utilisation is a relative measure, it will depend on the set of boats which can be 
compared. For the purposes of this analysis, this is the set of boats which can trade quota. A 
number of separate trading scenarios were examined, resulting in different measures of capacity 
utilisation for each vessel. There were as follows: 
• complete transferability between all boats; 
• transferability between boats within the same fleet segment; 
• transferability between boats with the same administrative port; 
• transferability between boats within the same region. 
 
For the last scenario, four regions were defined (English Channel, Irish Sea, West of Scotland and 
North Sea). Boats were allocated to each of these regions according to their home port. While 
there are no economic reasons why trade should be restricted between vessels, it was assumed 
that concerns over employment implications may result in some restrictions on trade being 
imposed. 
 
The analysis was limited to boats that currently hold quota in the form of FQAs. As a result, the 
10m & under fleet are not included in the analysis, nor are any over 10m boats that target only 
non-quota species. While adjustment in the 10m & under fleet would also be likely to occur as a 
result of improved transferability of quota, this is presently not quantifiable. Previous 
bioeconomic modelling exercises in the English Channel that have incorporated the inshore boats 
have suggested that an economically optimal fleet might include no 10m & under boats all. 
However, a multi-objective optimal fleet (incorporating employment considerations) would 
involve between a zero and 50 per cent reduction in the 10m & under fleet depending on the 
relative importance attached to regional employment (Pascoe and Mardle 2001). Note, however, 
that the extent of any adjustment that might actually take place in the fishery is likely to be 
substantially less than the “optimal” amount, and will depend in part upon the degree of 
transferability permitted in the management system. 
 
For the purposes of the analysis, it was assumed that vessels were fishing against their own FQAs 
only. While some vessels lease in additional quota, and others lease out quota, this will have little 
effect on the overall results. The capacity utilisation of an individual vessel will be 
underestimated if it leases in quota, and overestimated if it leases out quota, but these effects will 
cancel out when looking at the average of the overall fishery. Ignoring quota leasing would only 
have an impact if the vessels currently identified as operating at full capacity actually leased in 
quota as well. In such a case, the level of capacity utilisation in the fleet would be lower than 
estimated using the model, as the harvesting potential of these boats would be greater than 
suggested by their FQAs. As a result, the amount of fleet reduction following quota reallocation 
would be greater than estimated. However, this would only significantly affect the results if most 
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of the vessels identified as currently operating at full capacity leased in additional quota, and the 
additional quota substantially increased their total quota holdings.  
 
As the analysis excludes non-quota species, vessels that hold quota but primarily target non-quota 
species, principally the shellfish boats, are likely to be considered as operating under-capacity 
when compared to all boats, but are not likely to be disadvantaged when compared with boats 
within the same gear segment. This catch is also not considered, so the capacity utilisation of this 
segment is likely to be underestimated, and the level of adjustment will be overestimated. To 
examine the effect of this, the analysis was undertaken both allowing shellfish boats to trade their 
quota and exit the fishery (the most extreme case), and also preventing shellfish boats from 
trading their quota, thereby forcing them to remain in the fishery. Depending on which 
assumption is made, the reduction in fleet size estimated using the model may overstate or 
perhaps understate the potential reduction. 
 
A further assumption of the model is that boats are able to exit the fishery easily. However, low 
levels of profitability in many fleet segments and difficulties in raising finance may act as a 
constraint on adjustment, at least in the short to medium term. As a result, both the potential costs 
(in terms of employment loss) and benefits (in terms of increased profits) may be overestimated 
for all fleet segments. 
 
6.3 Estimated fleet structure after trade 
 
The estimated proportion of the current fleet remaining after all potential trades have taken place 
is illustrated in Figure 6.1 by segment and in Figure 6.2 by region. These figures represent the 
number of vessels remaining (not the number of VCUs) after all quota has been reallocated. 
These should be considered as minimum figures, as they assume that all boats will be operating at 
full capacity as a result of quota trading. Transaction costs and imperfections in the quota market 
will no doubt prevent a “perfect” reallocation of quota, so many boats will not be able to purchase 
all the quota they require, and other boats that should have sold their quota (based on the model 
assumptions) will probably still remain in the fishery. 
 
Generally, the greater the degree of transferability permitted, the greater the level of adjustment 
and the smaller the overall final fleet size. The fleet segments least likely to be reduced 
significantly are the pelagic boats, the beam trawlers and the distant water vessels. These 
segments were found to have a high degree of capacity utilisation on average (see Appendix III), 
so the number of boats needing to buy quota to fully utilise their capacity was relatively small. In 
contrast, in the model the shellfish boats are likely to experience the greatest reduction as a result 
of increased quota transferability. However, as noted above, the analysis does not take into 
consideration the non-quota species activity. While some adjustment in quota holdings is likely in 
this segment, the number of boats that exit the fishery would almost certainly be much fewer than 
is suggested in Figure 6.1. Instead, most of these boats will simply increase their activity on non-
quota species. The reduction in the number of net and line boats is also likely to be overestimated 
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for the same reason, although many of these boats do target predominantly quota species. It is 
expected that some of these boats will also concentrate their activity on non-quota species rather 
than exit the fishery, although some will exit. Finally, the reduction in the distant water fleet 
segment is also over-estimated by the model as consideration is not given to the activity outside 
the UK quota management system.(63) 
 
Figure 6.1: Minimum proportion of current over 10m fleet remaining after quota trade 
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To compensate for some of these effects, the analysis was also undertaken under the assumption 
that shellfish boats (both mobile and static) would not exit the fishery. The model was re-run 
given this assumption only for the case of unrestricted quota trade and for the case of regionally-
restricted quota trade as these scenarios had the greatest impact on the estimated final fleet size. 
 
At the regional level (Figure 6.2), the impact is likely to be fairly evenly distributed between the 
Channel, Irish Sea and North Sea, although the West of Scotland may experience a greater 
proportional decrease in fleet size. As noted previously, the greater the degree of transferability, 
the greater the potential reduction in vessel numbers. As would be expected, assuming that 
shellfish boats would not exit the fishery has a substantial impact on the estimated minimum fleet 
size, particularly for the West of Scotland. 
 
Recall that the estimated fleet reduction only refers to the over 10m fleet and to vessels that 
currently hold FQAs: boats targeting only non-quota species and those of 10m & under in length 
are excluded from the analysis. In some regions, particularly the English Channel, these groups 
may dominate the fleet. No doubt some of the inshore vessels would exit the fishery if included in 
an ITQ system. However, it is likely that the proportion of the total fleet remaining in each region 
                                                
63The absolute number of boats in this segment is small, so a small change in vessel numbers will appear relatively 
large in percentage terms. Any adjustment through a consolidation of distant water quotas could not be  considered in 
the analysis. 
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(when including the vessels not considered in the analysis) will be greater than indicated by the 
model. 
 
Figure 6.2: Minimum proportion of current over 10m fleet by region 
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6.4 Socio-economic impact 
 
Fleet reduction has two main effects on a region. First, the fleet reduction is associated with a 
reduction in the level of direct employment in the sector, with possible secondary effects on 
employment in sectors supplying the fishing industry. Second, the increased efficiency of the 
remaining vessels (now operating at full capacity) results in higher levels of profitability in the 
industry, while the increased catch per vessel results in higher incomes to the remaining crew 
members. The higher incomes and profits of the remaining boat owners and crews would result in 
increased consumption in the regions, as well as stimulating capital investment in the fishery. 
Further, the level of activity of the remaining boats will increase in order to fill their higher quota 
allocations, resulting in an increase in demand per vessel for many variable inputs (e.g., fuel). 
The extent to which these factors would offset the secondary effects created by fleet reduction is 
not quantifiable, however. Hence only the direct impacts will be considered here. 
 
The estimated potential employment effects of an ITQ system are illustrated in Figure 6.3. These 
were derived using average employment figures for given boat types, and multiplying these by 
the number of boats that left the fishery of each type. Data on average crew numbers were 
available for some fleet segments by region (SFIA 2000). 
 
The potential reduction in crew numbers as a result of the increased quota transferability mirrored 
the estimated reduction in fleet size. The greatest fleet size reduction, and hence employment 
reduction, was estimated to occur if no restrictions on transferability were imposed, whereas the 
smallest impact on employment was estimated to occur if trade were limited to administrative 
ports. 
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Figure 6.3: Minimum proportion of crew numbers by region (%) 
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If sufficient quota trade occurred to allow all remaining boats to achieve a quota holding 
equivalent to their full capacity, then it is possible that direct employment in the fleet segments 
examined might be reduced by around 53% in the West of Scotland, and by around 35% in the 
other regions. As noted above, however, such figures are the maximum potential reduction in 
employment. In practice, it is unlikely that sufficient boats would be willing or able to leave the 
fishery to provide the quota for the remainder to operate at full capacity even under an ITQ 
system. There are generally few alternative uses for the vessels outside fishing, and a limited 
demand for vessels within the industry (due to licence limitations). In some cases, the boats 
would not exit the industry but instead concentrate on non-quota species. In addition, changes in 
employment on vessels without FQAs are excluded. Where these vessels are prominent in a 
region, the reduction in employment will be less. Overall, it is likely that the fleet reduction and 
subsequent reduction in employment, at least in the short term, would be substantially less than 
suggested by the analysis. 
 
As the total quotas, and hence revenues, are assumed to remain constant, the increase in 
economic profits generated as a result of improved transferability of quota can be estimated 
directly from the reduction in costs in the industry as boats exit. Not all costs are likely to reduce 
with the exit of boats from the fishery. Crew payments (which are linked to revenues and running 
costs) from the boats that exit the fishery are likely to be substantially transferred to the crews on 
the boats that remain. Similarly, the remaining boats will most likely have to increase their 
individual effort (and hence running costs) to take the higher levels of quota. As a result, the 
reduction in costs may be limited only to the reduction in annual fixed costs and capital costs.(64) 
The fixed and capital costs associated with the boats that exit the fishery were estimated based on 
the average cost per VCU of boats in that fleet segment and region, and the VCUs of the 
                                                
64There is actually no way of knowing by how much total variable costs may change. This will depend on the average 
variable costs of the remaining vessels and the level of effort required to fill the quota, which may be less than the 
current level of effort due to reduced crowding effects. By assuming there is no change in effort or variable costs, 
then the total gains are likely to be underestimated, giving a more conservative estimate. 
  77
individual boats assumed to exit the fishery. While cost data for Channel fisheries vessels were 
available for 1999-2000 (Cattermoul and Pascoe 2001), the latest available cost information for 
the other fleet segments were for the 1997-98 financial year (SFIA 2000). For consistency, the 
SFIA data were used for all fleet segments, so the increase in profitability is necessarily related to 
the levels of fixed and capital costs in 1997-98. 
 
The increase in profitability was assumed to equal the reduction in annual fixed costs, plus an 
allowance for interest (i.e., the opportunity cost of capital, assumed to be 5%) and economic 
depreciation (assumed at 2.7% of the capital value, based on other economic studies).(65) 
 
The estimated potential increase in economic profits by region (in 1997-98 values) is presented in 
Figure 6.4. These results are expressed in absolute terms rather than as a proportion of the current 
level of profitability of the fisheries, as the latter is not known (but is generally believed to be 
rather low). Again, the degree of transferability of quota affects the potential increase in 
economic profits. These figures therefore represent the maximum likely benefits, as not all boats 
will exit the fishery. In particular, as noted previously, shellfish boats (and many net and line 
boats) estimated to exit the fishery using the allocation model are more likely to increase 
concentration on non-quota species instead. Assuming that these boats remain in the fishery may 
reduce the estimated potential economic benefits that could be generated with an ITQ system. 
 
Figure 6.4: Potential economic benefits of increased quota transferability 
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The greatest potential increase in profitability occurs if transferability of quota is unrestricted. 
However, this option was found to have the biggest impact on employment (see Figure 6.3). By 
contrast, the lowest potential economic benefits accrue by restricting quota trade to within fleet 
segments, although this was also found to have the smallest impact on employment. Note, once 
more, that the estimated benefits are likely to be the upper bounds on the economic benefits of 
                                                
65Note that economic depreciation differs from financial depreciation, which is an accounting convention largely 
determined by the prevailing taxation legislation. Economic depreciation refers to the real loss in capital value 
through the use of the boat after the effects of repairs and maintenance have been taken into account. 
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quota trading, as it is not likely (at least in the short term) that complete adjustment will occur due 
to the lack of alternative uses for vessels. 
 
Figure 6.5: Trade-off between employment (as % current employment) and increased 
economic profits (total UK) 
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The trade-off between employment and increased profits for the UK fleet as a whole is illustrated 
in Figure 6.5. As can be seen, the objectives of maintaining employment and increasing industry 
profitability are conflicting. On the other hand, a smaller, more profitable fleet is more likely to 
be economically sustainable over a wider range of economic and environmental conditions. This 
may have longer term economic benefits for local communities than a larger less profitable fleet 
which is more susceptible to fluctuations in prices and quotas, even though the short term 
consequences of fleet reduction are negative (i.e., reduced direct employment in fishing). 
 
6.5 Discussion 
 
As with any modelling exercise, the results of this analysis are indicative rather than predictive. 
Further declines in key stocks may result in the estimated fleet reductions being optimistic rather 
than pessimistic, while stock recovery in the longer term may result in a larger fleet being 
sustainable. 
 
While the potential fleet reductions estimated using the model may not be achieved in the short 
term, it is possible that an ITQ system might well lead to fleet reductions of these magnitudes in 
the longer term. Although these reductions appear substantial (and have some negative socio-
economic implications), reductions of these magnitudes are arguably necessary if the aim is to 
bring the harvesting capacity of the fleet in line with the reproductive capacity of the stock. 
Consequently, if ITQs are not imposed, some other form of fleet rationalisation will be required. 
In short, the sort of negative socio-economic impacts which may accompany ITQs will probably 
occur in any case, but at a potentially higher cost to the industry and the community as a whole. 
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Although a range of restrictions on quota trade was examined, there is no real economic rationale 
for imposing such restrictions. To an extent the current system of FQAs allows trade across all 
regions and ports. Indeed, as indicated by the model, restricting trade may reduce the 
effectiveness of the ITQ system as an industry rationalisation tool, necessitating the increased use 
of other, more costly, measures to achieve capacity reduction targets. 
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7. Future management options for UK fisheries 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In the light of our economic analysis of quota management in general and the current UK quota 
management system in particular, and taking account of the views and practices of UK fishermen 
and POs as well as the experience of ITQs in other countries, in this final chapter we examine 
several possible (and not all mutually exclusive) future options for quota management in the UK. 
These include: maintaining the management status quo; permitting an annual reconciliation of all 
traded quota units; clarifying the legal title to FQAs and the fishing rights they confer; 
introducing an ITQ system proper for the over 10m fleet; and finally, bringing the 10m and under 
fleet into the quota management system. 
 
7.2 Maintenance of the status quo 
 
What we imply here is that there are no changes to the current system as a result of this report. It 
is actually rather difficult to envisage what this might mean, however. As we have seen, the quota 
management arrangements have changed considerably in a number of respects since they were 
introduced in the early 1980s and it seems inconceivable that further changes will not take place. 
Indeed one or two of the (arguably not very radical) changes we discuss below might well occur 
“naturally” sooner or later in any case. Nevertheless, assuming for the sake of argument that the 
current system is now more or less frozen in time, we can take the critique presented in Section 
3.4 as an initial appraisal of the status quo option. 
 
The main problem with the system as it now stands is that the UK has moved very substantially 
toward transferability of quota but retains obstacles and constraints to trade without any apparent 
rational justification for these. A significant part of the industry clearly want to trade quota and 
many are already doing so to the extent that the system allows, but the obstacles to free and 
efficient trade appear to be considerable. For the vessels able to benefit from trading, which are 
those PO members with either individual quotas or the facility to top up their pool allowances, 
complex deals need to be arranged which involve not only the parties directly concerned but also 
their POs. Because FQAs remain fixed from year to year, permanent trading of quota is 
frustrated. Attempts to sell quota outright necessitate agreements involving a seemingly very high 
degree of risk with continual transfers of quota between as well as within POs. 
 
Vessels in membership of a PO which discourages trading, for example by operating a pool and 
not permitting members to top up allowances, as well as vessels in the non-sector, are arguably at 
a disadvantage compared to other vessels in the fleet who can trade. Allied to this, quotas are (or 
have certainly become) valuable assets which have been given away free by the Government, and 
yet some vessels are able to realise the value of their assets while others are not. While it is true in 
principle that vessels are free to join the PO of their choosing, exercising this freedom may not 
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always be feasible in practice (even if only because of strong loyalty to a local PO). It is therefore 
arguable that the system is rather unfair in providing opportunities for quota trading. We suspect 
that the current complexities of trading together with uneven access to the quota market will soon 
result in unbearable strains on the system as it now stands and that this will force change. 
 
As we discussed in Section 3.4, there are, nevertheless, positive aspects to the current quota 
management system. In particular, the organisation of vessels into POs with quota management 
responsibility is a very positive aspect, with potentially very significant benefits in terms of 
collective responsibility for compliance and facilitating trade in quota. As we suggested 
previously, and infer again below, we do not necessarily dismiss the “traditional” PO 
management model of pooling quota for the membership, but believe that in order for this model 
to be demonstrably beneficial, it should be seen to be adopted by a PO membership who have 
made an explicit decision to pool some or all of their individual quota rights in order to make 
both individual and collective gains in management effectiveness and efficiency. This does not 
even preclude sharing of quota on grounds of equity, for example, if a group of vessels of similar 
capacity explicitly chose to pool their allocations because of some idea of fairness (although in 
this case they might do better to trade quota as necessary and then share the resulting profits). 
 
Lastly, even if no other changes are made to the management system we would reiterate the 
importance of adequate enforcement of quotas in order to (at least) ensure adherence to national 
quota limits. 
 
7.3 Annual reconciliation of quota units 
 
Given that quota trading is possible and does take place to a considerable extent under current 
arrangements, we can see no economic reason why Departments should not allow an annual 
reconciliation of units between licences. This would undoubtedly relieve the POs of a growing 
administrative burden since quota sales could now be completed in a single transaction.(66) It 
would also reduce the complexity, cost and riskiness of transactions for all concerned since deals 
would not need to cope with uncertainty over the future financial health of the private parties, or 
the future cooperation of their POs. In this context we note that 16 of the 18 POs surveyed were 
in favour of annual reconciliations, as were the overall majority of the PO membership. We are 
also aware of the strong opposition from some, including the largest UK PO, the SFO. 
 
Merely undertaking annual reconciliations of FQAs would probably not make quota trading 
significantly more widespread, since as argued above many vessels are currently effectively 
excluded from trading. On the other hand, such a move might well increase demands from PO 
members to be allowed to participate in trading. 
 
                                                
66 The POs could presumably quite readily determine which quota movements were to be made permanent and 
which were not (i.e., those reflecting annual leases of quota, or simple inter-PO swaps on behalf of the 
membership). 
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7.4 Clarification of the “legal title” to quota 
 
While annual reconciliations of FQAs would remove much of the current complexity and 
uncertainty surrounding quota trades, we note that there is widespread concern among both 
fishermen and their POs about the precise nature of the legal title to FQAs. Particular concerns 
exist where there might in future be claims against the value of FQAs, for example from banks 
and other creditors. In detail this issue is clearly a matter for legal, rather than economic, advice, 
but it is a general economic argument that efficiency in resource allocation depends upon the 
security and durability of property rights. Note that here the notion of “property rights” has to be 
interpreted in the widest sense. We are not talking about physical property as in the case of land 
or buildings, but rights to exploit a particular share of a national fishery quota. In fishery 
economics the term “use rights” is often used to make it clear that no actual ownership of the 
fishery resource itself is implied. It is also worth noting that the legal title to quota is actually 
rather vaguely defined in most ITQ systems around the world. 
 
Notwithstanding this, we suggest that Departments should seek to clarify the nature of the rights 
which FQAs confer and to whom they apply. Under existing legislation FQAs are associated with 
licences which are issued at the discretion of the Secretary of State and it is only the (essentially 
informal) management arrangements agreed between Government and industry that enable 
certain vessels, principally those within POs that choose to reallocate quota to their members on 
the basis of their individual FQAs, that are in practice able to realise their FQAs as individual 
entitlements to catch and land a given share of national quotas, i.e., as I(T)Qs. 
 
A (re-)definition of FQAs as such individual entitlements independent of the practice of particular 
POs, however, would raise a number of significant issues. Policy challenges would be presented 
by the status of FQAs in the non-sector, and indeed within POs that currently operate pooled 
quota systems of allocation. With individual rights to FQAs it would be difficult for the non-
sector FQAs to remain entirely notional as they are at present unless, as is effectively the case 
now, FQAs could only be realised as individual quotas within membership of a PO. Each PO 
membership would then have to make the decision to pool quota if they considered that would be 
in their best interests. In reality this is not substantially different from the present position, but in 
effect the “default” internal PO allocation would now become IQs rather than a pool. 
 
Note that if FQAs remained associated with licences then quota rights would remain conditional 
upon compliance with various rules and regulations and the Secretary of State would have the 
power to revoke quota rights along with a licence entitlement. At the same time, quota 
“ownership” would in principle be restricted to the owners of active fishing vessels or 
associations thereof. 
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7.5 ITQs for vessels of over 10 metres 
 
It is apparent that if FQAs became quota use rights in the sense discussed above, which individual 
fishermen could exercise independently of their membership of a PO, then we would be very 
close to having an ITQ system for the over 10m fleet. Many in the industry consider that we are 
already very close to having ITQs and many, though by no means all, are broadly in favour of 
ITQs. An ITQ system proper, however, would require that all owners have the freedom to trade 
quota for sale or for lease in any quantity at any time (subject to necessary administrative 
restrictions, for example during a year-end reconciliation period). 
 
We do not discuss whether ITQs might be introduced only for particular quota stocks or only for 
particular fleet segments because we can see no economic reason, nor indeed any apparent 
technical reason, why any quota stocks or fleet segments should be excluded. As we have seen, 
the market itself has not so far excluded any identifiable sectors or species from trading. 
 
The arguments for ITQs in terms of the effectiveness of quota management and economic 
efficiency have been set out in this report, but there are evident concerns about the possible socio-
economic impacts of a fully-transferable quota system. While these may be understandable 
concerns, it must be said that some rationalisation of capacity in the industry is inevitable with an 
ITQ system and indeed is essential to the full realisation of the long term management objectives 
which ITQs are designed to achieve.(67) Restricting the transferability of quota in various ways 
will impose costs to the extent that the economic benefits of an ITQ system are compromised as a 
result. 
 
Nevertheless, there are sound economic arguments for rules to constrain market outcomes to 
some extent, in particular to prevent excessive concentration of ownership and hence the 
acquisition of market power in either or both of the quota and output markets. Thus there would 
be a case for limits on individual ownership (as, say, a maximum percentage of the national quota 
for a given stock) in order to prevent the possibility of excessive concentration.(68) There could 
also be some rule of forfeiture of unused quota over and above a given margin in order to deter 
speculation. Other constraints might be imposed in order to avoid the possibility of excessive 
socio-economic upheaval (in particular employment impacts) but while such constraints are 
common in ITQ systems the evidence for very significant structural changes in unconstrained 
ITQ markets is inconclusive. Although the theoretical model outlined in Chapter 6 predicts 
potentially very significant employment reductions in some fleet segments following a full 
rationalisation of quota allocations, it should be remembered that a modelling exercise of this 
type requires a number of working assumptions which are not wholly realistic. For example, the 
model assumes that excess vessel capacity can be readily disposed of, whereas in reality the 
                                                
67 As we have previously observed, it is also quite likely that if the existing quota system was better enforced 
there would be a rationalisation of capacity in any case (but at greater financial cost to the industry). 
68 In practice, however, such rules might be circumvented in various ways, for example by complex ownership 
structures or contractual arrangements between firms. 
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market for second-hand vessels may be relatively weak so that some over-capacity will remain, at 
least in the short term. In short, the scale of employment impacts are in practice unlikely to be as 
great as predicted by the model. 
 
A related issue is the extent to which an ITQ system could be expected to result in the UK fleet 
meeting nominal capacity targets under the MAGPs (multiannual guidance programmes). In 
economic terms this is actually a trivial question. The implicit justification for the MAGPs is to 
make up for a collective failure of national fishery management policies adequately to control 
fishing effort. Under a well-enforced ITQ system fishing effort will not be excessive (to the 
extent that national quotas are respected) and therefore there can be no justification for having 
MAGP targets as well. As long as output targets (quotas) are not exceeded, normal market forces 
will determine the “right” level of capacity. Practical impediments to capacity adjustment may 
mean that the resulting level of capacity is not the economically optimal level, however, and there 
may be a case for some short term adjustment mechanism such as a decommissioning scheme. 
 
Assuming that MAGPs continue to be implemented under the CFP, however (and the signs are 
that they will), similar arguments apply. ITQs will assist a reduction in fleet capacity but are 
unlikely to result in meeting MAGP targets exactly (the latter being based on some rather “rule of 
thumb” calculations(69)). If the equilibrium fleet size under ITQs is in excess of the MAGP target 
level, some intervention will be required. If the MAGP target figures are too low compared to the 
optimal equilibrium fleet size under ITQs, it might then be much more costly to induce additional 
capacity to exit the fleet. 
 
While in most circumstances subsidies to the fishing industry tend to be damaging to the long 
term health of the fishery,(70) under an ITQ system where the overall level of exploitation is well 
controlled it is not impossible to make a case for public assistance in buying quota in order to 
secure fishing employment within a particular region.(71) Indeed, this type of assistance has 
already been seen in Shetland and Orkney. However, distorting the efficient market allocation of 
quota in this way has an economic cost (in this case, the full cost is borne directly by the local 
public authority) as would distorting the efficient allocation by “ring-fencing” a certain amount of 
quota within a particular region in order to achieve similar objectives. The former is arguably 
more transparent and the cost can be judged on a case-by-case basis. Ring-fencing quota within a 
region is an inflexible approach which may lead to increasing inefficiency over time (although 
this is not in essence any different from “ring-fencing” quota within particular EU countries by 
allocating national quotas). 
 
                                                
69 Hatcher (2000) gives a critique of the MAGP approach. 
70 Subsidies reduce the costs of fishing and therefore tend, under most management regimes, to increase levels of 
effort. See, for example, Hatcher and Robinson (1999). 
71 This is provided any such assistance were judged to be compatible with Community rules on State Aids to the 
fishing industry 
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As previously indicated, it is also possible to restrict quota ownership to active fishermen, for 
example by requiring quota holders to possess (and utilise) a fishing licence. It may be difficult, 
however, to prevent the establishment of contractual arrangements resulting in beneficial 
ownership by non-fishing entities. 
 
As we have suggested, an ITQ system would not mean an end to the role of the POs in quota 
management. Indeed, despite our previous remarks about FQAs and individual entitlements, PO 
membership could in some way be made a de facto condition for holding ITQs, provided that 
Community rules on the free and voluntary membership of POs were not infringed.(72) 
 
The POs could (and almost certainly should) play a key role in facilitating the trade in quota and 
in helping to ensure compliance with individual quota holdings (which is crucial). For example, 
in a highly multispecies fishery vessels might operate most efficiently by using their ITQs 
independently for some species while pooling their ITQs for others. For non-target species where 
the catch is very variable and therefore uncertain, the number of necessary trades and hence 
transaction costs could be reduced by pooling quota within the POs. In such a model, while 
vessels would manage their own ITQs for the target species they would draw on the PO pool for 
by-catch species, with the PO buying or leasing in quota as necessary on its members’ behalf. 
 
Lastly, we believe that enforcement would, if anything, be simplified under an ITQ system. 
Assuming that there is some administrative system in place for annually reconciling each vessel’s 
recorded landings with its final quota allocations (as the total permanent quota holding plus quota 
leased in, less quota leased out) then the key is to ensure that logbooks and landings declarations 
are accurately completed. This requires an effective system of quayside checks backed up by 
penalties which have a real deterrent effect. 
 
In the context of multispecies fisheries and the enforcement of multispecies quotas, the fact that 
quota can be traded at all will assist vessels in matching quotas with landings. In addition, a 
number of mechanisms have been proposed in order to aid vessel owners who for some reason 
are unable to match their quota holdings with their landings for the year.(73) To some extent the 
market itself would be expected naturally to evolve such mechanisms in response to the demands 
of ITQ holders. Also, vessel operators will normally be aware of what constitutes risky behaviour 
in a particular ITQ market; for example, a vessel owner would be ill-advised to wait until the last 
minute before attempting to secure quota to cover a significant quantity of additional landings 
over and above his initial quota holding. Nevertheless, possible institutional mechanisms include 
permitted marginal over-runs (with a corresponding deduction from the following year’s quota); 
allowing marginal over-runs to be counted against quotas for other species (limited quota  
 
                                                
72 In the Netherlands, for example, ITQ holders are presented with strong incentives to belong to the PO-related 
quota management “Groups”. 
73 In practice shorter periods for reconciling quotas and catches might be adopted, say 30 days after landing, 
depending partly on how the monitoring and enforcement system is structured. 
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substitution); a “clearing house” to organise the leasing of quota from those with unused quota at 
the year end; and the leasing of quota from a central Government reserve fund.(74) 
 
7.6 Bringing in the 10m and under fleet 
 
As we have said, there is in principle no economic reason why the inshore sector should operate 
under a different system to the over 10m fleet (this is now discussed in the context of ITQs, 
although the problems are really the same even if FQAs are retained for the over 10m fleet). 
Again, the only economic justification for excluding the inshore sector would be that the costs of 
the necessary additional administration and enforcement activity would exceed the social benefit 
of bringing this sector under the same management system. We are certainly aware of the 
potential problems. After all, the 10m and under sector includes over twice as many vessels as the 
over 10m sector and yet lands a very small overall proportion of the total catch. On the other 
hand, the inshore sector lands quite significant quantities of some quota stocks, including 
Nephrops and a number of the Area VII demersal stocks. 
 
A move toward ITQs for the over 10m fleet is greatly facilitated by the fact that a more-or-less 
acceptable allocation has already been made at the individual vessel level. In other parts of the 
world one of the most problematic issues in introducing ITQ systems where there was no existing 
well-established quota management system has been deciding the initial allocation. In the UK this 
problem has largely already been overcome. 
 
In the case of the great majority of the 10m and under fleet, however, there are no existing - even 
notional - individual allocations. Departments and industry would therefore need to agree on an 
acceptable first round allocation mechanism and this would not be easy or painless. Except for a 
small number of vessels which have voluntarily kept logbooks, there are no individual track 
records for the inshore vessels. Possible mechanisms might include a flat-rate allocation (perhaps 
scaled according to an estimated percentage reliance on quota stocks as opposed to shellfish) or 
an allocation based on some physical measure of capacity such as engine power or VCUs. It 
would probably be necessary to bring in the under 10m vessels gradually, by extending the lower 
threshold for full quota management by a small amount (say, one metre of vessel length) each 
year over a number of years. This would create incentives for reducing vessel length but in 
practice owners are unlikely to repeatedly shorten their vessels on an annual basis. 
 
The 10m and under vessels could be encouraged to join POs or form their own POs. As we have 
suggested, POs or groups of vessels within POs would be able collectively to decide to pool quota 
if that was what they wanted to do. As an example of this we are aware of the case of a group of 
inshore vessels (in this case a little over 10m) who have their own pooled allocation within one of 
the POs which operates a system of individual quotas. There would be no reason to restrict trade 
in quota across the (arbitrary) 10m divide. 
                                                
74 For a review of mechanisms to deal with quota imbalances and associated discard problems see Pascoe (1997) 
and Squires et al (1998). 
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7.7 Conclusions 
 
The UK quota management system has a number of strengths, as we have observed. In terms of 
restricting output at the individual vessel level, despite some concerns about the adequacy of 
enforcement we consider that the UK system has probably contributed more to the attainment of 
stock conservation objectives than have the arrangements adopted by some other countries. In 
terms of the economic efficiency of fishing operations, the UK system in the past undoubtedly 
resulted in a more efficient allocation of quota to the fleet than might have been achieved by a 
more arbitrary system, but a system of allocation now based upon fixed quotas can only become 
increasingly inefficient over time. Although we recognise that a number of problems which were 
created by the old rolling track record-based system were removed under FQAs, we do believe 
that there would be significant benefits in terms of stock conservation objectives and economic 
efficiency if quota trading were made considerably easier, at least by enabling firms to trade 
quota permanently as well as on an annual lease basis. 
 
Fully-tradeable quotas should reduce incentives to land over-quota fish and for certain types of 
discarding, for example in multispecies fisheries. Tradeable quotas should also enable individual 
firms to operate more efficiently, while the exit of inefficient vessels is facilitated if quota can 
readily be sold. The limited tradeability of quota under the current system may go some way to 
achieving such conservation and efficiency objectives, but the impediments to free trading would 
appear to be considerable and must surely hamper progress in these respects. 
 
Extending the allocation of IQs and the possibilities for freer quota trading to all vessels (at least 
those over 10m in length) would effectively result in an ITQ system for the UK and we believe 
that this possibility should be seriously considered. The experience with ITQs in other countries, 
which includes the Netherlands within the EU, is generally positive and where they have been 
introduced ITQs have in most cases proved popular with vessel owners.(75) As we have said, the 
POs could play a key role in an ITQ system and hence would retain their important management 
function. 
 
While there are concerns over the possible effects of an ITQ system on fleet size and structure, 
and hence fishery employment, we would draw attention to the fact that if ITQs result in a 
smaller fleet, then it is implicitly the case that the previous fleet capacity was excessive. It might 
be argued that a fleet larger than is economically optimal can be justified if an explicit political 
trade-off is made between efficiency and employment, but if enforcement is much less than 
perfect the result is also likely to be significant levels of over-quota landings and hence a negative 
impact on stocks.  
 
It is also the case that the UK will have to reduce its fleet size in any event, if only because of its 
MAGP commitments. The scale of fleet impacts predicted by our computer model, as we have 
                                                
75 A recent economic study of the introduction of ITQs in Nova Scotia in 1991 illustrates how successful ITQs 
can be in a multispecies fishery (Dupont and Grafton 2001). 
  88
said, are in practice somewhat unlikely, although to the extent that ITQs do not result in a 
sufficient reduction in capacity, external intervention may be required in the form of further 
decommissioning schemes. 
 
Finally, we wish to emphasise once again the importance of enforcement in quota management. 
Allowing fleets to exceed output targets will seriously compromise stock conservation objectives 
and hence enforcement of quotas must be taken very seriously indeed. Although this observation 
is made in a general sense, and we suspect that enforcement by the UK authorities may compare 
very favourably with some other countries, we would urge Departments to consider how the 
enforcement side of the quota management system might be improved in order that compliance 
with UK quotas is assured. Increased enforcement effort can be costly, and in the context of the 
considerable value acquired by tradeable quota entitlements we do suggest that Government 
revisit the possibility of some industry contribution towards the costs of management.(76) 
 
                                                
76 This was the subject of a previous report to the Ministry (Hatcher and Pascoe 1998). 
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Appendix I: Development of the UK licensing system 
 
Before 1983 fishing licences were a requirement for UK vessels operating in the main pelagic 
fisheries (mackerel and herring) and demersal fisheries (cod, haddock, whiting, sole and plaice) 
in all areas around the UK. However, in most cases they were only required by vessels of 40ft or 
over in length, and with the exception of licences for the large pelagic purse-seine and freezer 
vessels, they were quite freely available. 
 
During 1983 licensing was extended to cover fishing for all the stocks subject to catch quotas 
(under the Community’s new conservation and management system) by all vessels over 10m in 
length. To begin with, most licences continued to be freely available, but in 1984 the number of 
licences authorising fishing for those quota stocks considered to be under greatest pressure was 
restricted. The so-called “pressure stock licences” (PSLs) required were only issued to registered 
vessels which could demonstrate at least a 12-month record of fishing for one or more of the 
stocks concerned,(77) or which already held an appropriate licence. Although restricted in number, 
pressure stock licences were transferable. They could only be transferred between ownerships 
while they remained attached to a vessel, but within the same ownership they could be transferred 
from one vessel to another, the only restriction initially put in place being that licence transfers 
from under 40ft vessels to those of 40ft and over were not permitted. 
 
For those vessels targeting other quota stocks, the required “non-pressure stock licences” (non-
PSLs) continued to be issued freely to any fishing vessel on the UK register,(78) while vessels 
under 10m in length were still not required to have a licence. 
 
The licensing scheme as it was introduced in 1984 was originally intended to run for a period of 
three years. However, because of the free availability of non-PSLs and the ease with which PSLs 
could be transferred to more powerful vessels (as well as the complete lack of control of the 
under 10m sector) the overall size and capacity of the UK fleet was allowed to expand. For this 
reason, a series of additional restrictions on the availability and transferability of licences were 
                                                
77 The “pressure stocks” originally designated in 1984 were as follows (species/area): 
herring all quota stocks  cod  all except VII & VIII 
mackerel all quota stocks  haddock all except VII & VIII 
saithe  all quota stocks  whiting IIa, IV, Vb, VI 
anglerfish all quota stocks  plaice  Vb, VI, VIIdefg 
hake  IIa, IV   sole  VIIadefg 
The following stocks were also designated pressure stocks from 1986: 
hake  Vb, VI & VII   cod  VIIb-k, VIII, IX, X 
sole  IIa, IV   haddock VII, VIII, IX, X 
megrim VII 
78 From 1986, the list of “non-pressure stocks” was as follows: 
plaice  IIa, IV, VIIahjk  cod  VIIa 
sole  VI, VIIhjk   megrim Vb, VI 
whiting VII    sprat  VIIde 
pollack Vb, VI, VII   nephrops Vb, VI, VII 
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introduced during the next few years. Certain restrictions were designed in particular to try and 
control the expansion of the beam trawler sector fishing for sole and plaice in Area VII (the 
Channel and Western waters) and to impede the acquisition of licences by non-UK 
(predominantly Spanish) interests.(79) 
 
In 1988, pending the implementation of new measures to reduce capacity (and with no 
decommissioning scheme in operation at the time), a temporary ban was placed on all transfers of 
licences between vessels except in cases where there was no resultant increase in either tonnage 
or engine power. Then in 1989 the Government indicated that it intended to employ a market-
oriented approach, specifically by introducing flexible licence transfer arrangements which would 
also allow some measure of licence aggregation in order to “allow the fleet to modernise and 
adapt to changing conditions and to permit individuals to expand their enterprises while 
preventing any growth in the licensed fleet as a whole”.(80) 
 
In the following year licence requirements were extended to include fishing for all species in all 
areas by all vessels over 10m and a new “miscellaneous species” licence was introduced for those 
over 10m vessels (mainly shellfish boats) which had not previously required a licence. As all 
licences were now restricted, the free availability of non-pressure stock licences for vessels under 
40ft and of licences for Nephrops was ended. 
 
At the same time, transfers of licences between vessels were once again permitted under a new 
system of “vessel capacity units” (VCUs). Each licence was assigned a certain number of VCUs, 
calculated for the vessel to which the licence was attached according to a formula taking into 
account vessel size and power.(81) Licence transfers were now allowed more or less freely, 
provided that there was no increase in either vessel tonnage or engine power, or that there was a 
10% decrease in VCUs for the recipient vessel. In addition, under the new “capacity aggregation” 
scheme, two or more licences (which had to be of a similar type) could be transferred onto a 
single larger or more powerful vessel provided that the capacity of that vessel measured in VCUs 
was no more than 90% of the combined capacity of the “donor” vessels.(82) 
 
Since 1990 the VCU “penalties” for licence transfers and aggregations have been altered a 
number of times, while additional restrictions were again introduced in an attempt to make some 
                                                
79 In order to try and foil attempts by Spanish interests to gain access to various UK quotas in Area VII, the 
Government accompanied a restriction on the issue of non-PSLs in 1987 with a ban on transfers between 
ownerships. In addition, in the previous year a number of key stocks (including hake and megrim in Area VII) 
had been added to the list of pressure stocks. Vessels with non-PSLs having a record of fishing for the new 
pressure stocks were issued with special “limited pressure stock licences” which were also non-transferable 
between ownerships. 
80 MAFF News Release 445/89, 13 November 1989 
81 (overall length in metres x maximum breadth in metres) + (engine power in kW x 0.45) 
82 For the purposes of capacity aggregation the rule that a licence could only be transferred between ownerships 
while attached to a vessel was relaxed, so that licences from vessels in different ownerships could be aggregated 
onto another vessel, provided that the owners of the “donor” vessels were at least part-owners of the “recipient” 
vessel. 
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progress towards meeting the UK’s MAGP targets for tonnage and engine power. In particular, 
the inshore (10m & under) sector was finally restricted in 1993 and in the previous year the 
number of beam trawlers licensed to fish in the North Sea (Area IV) was restricted (partly 
because of licence acquisitions by Dutch interests wishing to gain access to UK North Sea sole 
and plaice quotas). 
 
In February 1996 it was announced that in addition to the existing VCU penalties, no licence 
transfers or aggregations would be allowed to result in any increase in either tonnage or engine 
power. On the other hand, since an overall revision of the licensing system in 1995 (when licence 
categories “A”, “B” and “C” replaced the old PSLs, non-PSLs and MS licences) all licences were 
by now fully transferable independently of vessels. 
 
More recently, most changes have involved tinkering with the capacity penalty rules in order to 
exert greater control over fleet capacity in relation to MAGP targets, and in particular the growth 
of the 10m and under fleet.(83) An overall review of the licensing system, reporting during 1999-
2001, recommended substantially retaining the existing “ABC” arrangements. 
 
The changes to the licensing system since 1983 are summarised in the Table below. 
 
 
Year 
 
Licence availability 
 
Licence transfer restrictions 
 
1983 
 
all freely available (except for 
pursers/freezers); not required for non-quota 
stocks or under 10m vessels 
 
none 
 
1984 
 
introduction of PSLs; non-PSLs still available; 
licences still not required for non-quota stocks 
or under 10m vessels 
 
PSLs not transferable from vessels under 40ft to 
those over 40ft 
 
1985 
 
restriction on PSLs for beam trawlers in Area 
VII 
 
Area VII beam trawl PSLs only transferable if 
no increase in length, tonnage or power; other 
PSLs not transferable onto beam trawlers in 
Area VII 
 
1986 
 
 
 
Area VII PSLs not transferable from vessels 
under 80ft to those over 80ft 
 
1987 
 
no new non-PSLs for vessels 40ft and over 
(except for Nephrops in Areas VI/VII) 
 
no PSLs transferable across either 40ft or 80ft 
limits; non-PSLs not transferable across 40ft 
limit and now not transferable between 
ownerships 
 
1988 
 
 
 
temporary ban on all licence transfers except 
where no increase in tonnage or power would 
result 
                                                
83 New VCU penalties announced in 2001 were designed to stop the increase in capacity in the 8-10m band. 
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1990 introduction of miscellaneous species licence; 
licences now required for all vessels over 10m 
(no new licences of any category) 
introduction of VCU system: transfers permitted 
with either no increase in tonnage or power or a 
10% decrease in VCUs; aggregations (similar 
licences only) also required 10% cut in VCUs 
 
1991 
 
 
 
Nephrops licences now transferable between 
ownerships 
 
1992 
 
restriction on PSLs for beam trawlers in Area 
IV 
 
no aggregation of PSLs onto beam trawlers in 
Areas IV or VI; VCU “penalty” for all transfers 
and aggregations increased to 20% 
 
1993 
 
licences now also required by 10m & under 
vessels (no new licences now available for any 
fishing vessels) 
 
VCU penalty reduced to 10% for aggregations 
where increase in engine power limited to 15% 
and for all over 10m transfers; no penalty for 
10m & under transfers (but no increase in 
VCUs); no transfers across 10m limit or 
aggregations combining under and over 10m 
licences; no more than two vessels in 10-17m 
band involved in aggregations 
 
1995 
 
new licence structure: cat. “A” for over 10m 
vessels (equivalent to old PSLs); cat. “A” for 
10m & under vessels; cat. “B” (equivalent to 
old non-PSL/Nephrops licences), cat. “C” 
licences (old miscellaneous spp. licences) 
 
all licences now transferable between vessels 
and between ownerships but still only similar 
licences can be aggregated: licences no longer 
have to be attached to a vessel when transferred 
between ownerships 
 
1995 
 
 
 
penalty for aggregation of 3 or more licences 
increased to 30% (except for purse-
seiners/freezer trawlers); aggregations of more 
than 2 licences between 10-17m now permitted; 
Area IV/VI beam trawler licences can now be 
aggregated if resultant engine power does not 
exceed 1500kW 
 
1996 
 
 
 
no licence transfers or aggregations to increase 
either tonnage or power; no 10m & under 
aggregations to result in more than 100 VCUs 
 
1998 
 
introduction of cat. A pelagic trawler licences 
 
zero penalties for transfers of pelagic 
freezer/purser licences and 10% penalty for 
aggregations 
 
1998 
 
 
 
exemption from capacity penalties for distant 
waters licences 
 
1998 
 
 
 
derogation for aggregating cat. A pelagic or 
demersal licences onto pelagic freezer/purser 
vessels until June 2001 
 
1999 
 
introduction of measures to verify maximum 
rated or permanently de-rated engine power 
declared on licences 
 
aggregations needed to correct for 
underestimated VCUs (due to under-declared 
engine power) subject to 20% penalty only on 
additional VCUs (10% before 31/12/01) 
1999 introduction of (over 10m) scallop licences  
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1999 
 
licensing review: upgrading of moratorium 
licences and single spp cat B licences to cat A 
 
 
 
1999 
 
 
 
various changes to capacity rules for licence 
transactions: minor mismatches in tonnage, 
engine power or VCUs tolerated provided one 
measure is exactly met; 30% penalty on 
aggregations correcting for engine power if 
licences transferred from 18m or under vessels 
onto an over 18m vessel; other minor changes 
and provisions relating to change from GRT to 
GT measurements 
 
2001 
 
 
 
no aggregations of licences from under 8m 
vessels onto 8-10m vessels; limit of 70 VCUs 
applied to aggregations onto vessels under 8m 
 
2001 
 
 
 
in the case of engine up-rating or replacement 
capacity penalties applied to increase in VCUs 
only, as long as power does not increase by 
more than 35%: 20% (10% before 31/12/01) or 
30% if licences transferred from 18m or under 
vessels onto an over 18m vessel 
 
2001 
 
 
 
announcement of a single capacity penalty to 
apply to tonnage, engine power and VCUs from 
01/04/03. 
 
  94
Appendix II: Tables of responses to the survey of fishermen 
 
 
General attitudes to the current management system 
 
All respondents were asked: 
How satisfied are you overall with the current quota management system? 
  
 
 
very unsatisfied 
 
slightly unsatisfied 
 
quite satisfied 
 
very satisfied 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
10% 
 
20% 
 
70% 
 
0% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
22% 
 
23% 
 
51% 
 
4% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
28% 
 
44% 
 
28% 
 
0% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
78% 
 
17% 
 
6% 
 
0% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
24% 
 
24% 
 
41% 
 
11% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
26% 
 
68% 
 
5% 
 
0% 
 
Area VII 
 
69% 
 
28% 
 
3% 
 
0% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
19% 
 
33% 
 
48% 
 
0% 
 
Area VI 
 
5% 
 
37% 
 
58% 
 
0% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
84% 
 
10% 
 
6% 
 
0% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
15% 
 
32% 
 
32% 
 
21% 
 
Non-sector 
 
62% 
 
22% 
 
16% 
 
0% 
 
Weighted total >10m 
 
31% 
 
26% 
 
39% 
 
4% 
 
10m and under 
 
52% 
 
20% 
 
13% 
 
2% 
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Attitudes to the FQA system 
 
All respondents were asked: 
Did you support the move from track record-based allocations to FQAs? 
  
 
 
yes 
 
no 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
90% 
 
10% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
78% 
 
22% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
40% 
 
60% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
56% 
 
44% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
83% 
 
17% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
75% 
 
25% 
 
Area VII 
 
70% 
 
30% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
67% 
 
33% 
 
Area VI 
 
60% 
 
40% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
56% 
 
44% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
79% 
 
21% 
 
Non-sector 
 
12% 
 
88% 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
71% 
 
29% 
 
10m and under 
 
14% 
 
86% 
 
Now that FQAs have been introduced, do you consider that they represent an improvement on track record-based 
allocations? 
  
 
 
yes 
 
no 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
90% 
 
10% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
66% 
 
34% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
36% 
 
64% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
61% 
 
39% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
93% 
 
17% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
83% 
 
17% 
 
Area VII 
 
70% 
 
30% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
70% 
 
30% 
 
Area VI 
 
76% 
 
24% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
48% 
 
52% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
79% 
 
21% 
 
Non-sector 
 
18% 
 
82% 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
69% 
 
31% 
 
10m and under 
 
14% 
 
86% 
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Are you in favour of annual adjustments to vessels’ FQAs to take account of quota movements between vessels? 
  
 
 
yes 
 
no 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
100% 
 
0% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
78% 
 
22% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
92% 
 
8% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
88% 
 
12% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
88% 
 
12% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
91% 
 
9% 
 
Area VII 
 
40% 
 
60% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
74% 
 
26% 
 
Area VI 
 
60% 
 
40% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
78% 
 
22% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
73% 
 
27% 
 
Non-sector 
 
6% 
 
94% 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
79% 
 
21% 
 
10m and under 
 
22% 
 
78% 
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Freedom to trade in quota 
 
All respondents were asked: 
Do you think that under the current quota management system there is (a) too much freedom to trade quota?; (b) 
about the right amount of freedom to trade quota?; (c) not enough freedom to trade quota? 
  
 
 
too much 
 
right amount 
 
not enough 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
2% 
 
39% 
 
59% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
14% 
 
69% 
 
17% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
16% 
 
72% 
 
12% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
33% 
 
56% 
 
11% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
24% 
 
29% 
 
47% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
0% 
 
71% 
 
29% 
 
Area VII 
 
32% 
 
44% 
 
28% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
37% 
 
56% 
 
7% 
 
Area VI 
 
58% 
 
37% 
 
5% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
27% 
 
54% 
 
19% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
26% 
 
37% 
 
37% 
 
Non-sector 
 
67% 
 
22% 
 
11% 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
22% 
 
53% 
 
25% 
 
10m and under 
 
26% 
 
69% 
 
5% 
 
Do you think that, in principle, quota trading in the UK should be allowed (a) within POs, but not between POs? (b) 
between POs, but not between individual vessels? (c)  only within, and between, POs? (d) amongst any vessels over 
10 metres? (e) amongst any vessels, including those of 10 metres and under? (f) or not at all? 
  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
 
(e) 
 
(f) 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
2% 
 
0% 
 
8% 
 
43% 
 
43% 
 
4% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
3% 
 
2% 
 
5% 
 
23% 
 
53% 
 
14% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
16% 
 
0% 
 
16% 
 
44% 
 
8% 
 
16% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
44% 
 
17% 
 
28% 
 
11% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
29% 
 
0% 
 
71% 
 
0% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
0% 
 
38% 
 
4% 
 
13% 
 
54% 
 
0% 
 
Area VII 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
16% 
 
12% 
 
40% 
 
32% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
0% 
 
7% 
 
30% 
 
15% 
 
37% 
 
11% 
 
Area VI 
 
5% 
 
0% 
 
17% 
 
21% 
 
32% 
 
26% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
6% 
 
0% 
 
48% 
 
25% 
 
17% 
 
4% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
5% 
 
11% 
 
16% 
 
16% 
 
47% 
 
5% 
 
Non-sector 
 
0% 
 
0%  
 
0% 
 
17% 
 
28% 
 
55% 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
4% 
 
4% 
 
16% 
 
24% 
 
41% 
 
11% 
 
10m and under 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
3% 
 
43% 
 
39% 
 
15% 
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If some form of quota trading is allowed, should it be possible for quota to be owned by  
(a) anyone?  
(b) only persons or companies actively engaged in fishing? 
 
  
 
 
anyone 
 
only those engaged in fishing 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
30% 
 
70% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
11% 
 
89% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
4% 
 
96% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
0% 
 
100% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
12% 
 
88% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
4% 
 
96% 
 
Area VII 
 
24% 
 
76% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
4% 
 
96% 
 
Area VI 
 
0% 
 
100% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
0% 
 
100% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
26% 
 
74% 
 
Non-sector 
 
0% 
 
100% 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
11% 
 
89% 
 
10m and under 
 
0% 
 
100% 
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PO members’ attitudes to PO management 
 
PO members (over 10m) were asked: 
Within your PO, does your vessel currently operate with (a) individual vessel or company quotas (IQs)? (b) monthly 
limits from a quota “pool”? (c) monthly limits plus extra quota acquired by you (“pool-plus”)? (d) IQs for some 
stocks, monthly limits for others? 
  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
49% 
 
28% 
 
23% 
 
0% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
24% 
 
23% 
 
53% 
 
0% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
27% 
 
50% 
 
23% 
 
0% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
0% 
 
94% 
 
6% 
 
0% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
100% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
71% 
 
4% 
 
8% 
 
16% 
 
Area VII 
 
0% 
 
56% 
 
2% 
 
32% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
13% 
 
29% 
 
58% 
 
0% 
 
Area VI 
 
0% 
 
63% 
 
37% 
 
0% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
0% 
 
84% 
 
16% 
 
0% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
47% 
 
42% 
 
11% 
 
0% 
 
Non-sector 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
27% 
 
40% 
 
30% 
 
3% 
 
10m and under 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
How satisfied are you with these arrangements? 
  
 
 
satisfied 
 
not satisfied 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
82% 
 
18% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
90% 
 
10% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
59% 
 
41% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
89% 
 
11% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
94% 
 
6% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
92% 
 
8% 
 
Area VII 
 
64% 
 
36% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
92% 
 
8% 
 
Area VI 
 
78% 
 
22% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
96% 
 
4% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
74% 
 
26% 
 
Non-sector 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
84% 
 
16% 
 
10m and under 
 
-- 
 
-- 
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Given the choice, would you prefer your PO to operate different arrangements (under the existing quota management 
system)? 
  
 
 
yes 
 
no 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
37% 
 
63% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
34% 
 
66% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
5% 
 
95% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
39% 
 
61% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
10% 
 
90% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
8% 
 
92% 
 
Area VII 
 
8% 
 
92% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
8% 
 
92% 
 
Area VI 
 
5% 
 
95% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
20% 
 
80% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
26% 
 
74% 
 
Non-sector 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
24% 
 
76% 
 
10m and under 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
If yes, which arrangements would you prefer? (a) individual vessel or company quotas (IQs)? (b) monthly limits? (c) 
monthly limits plus extra quota acquired by you? (d) IQs for some stocks, monthly limits for others? 
  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
27% 
 
0% 
 
10% 
 
0% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
28% 
 
0% 
 
10% 
 
1% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
5% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
6% 
 
0% 
 
30% 
 
0% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
4% 
 
0% 
 
4% 
 
0% 
 
Area VII 
 
8% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
4% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
4% 
 
Area VI 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
10% 
 
0% 
 
10% 
 
0% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
16% 
 
11% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Non-sector 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
16% 
 
1% 
 
7% 
 
1% 
 
10m and under 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
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PO members’ involvement in quota trading 
 
PO members (over 10m) were asked: 
Have you ever enhanced your vessel’s track record or FQA by (a) purchase of a licence with track record/quota 
units? (b) purchase of track record/quota units only? 
  
 
 
licence plus quota 
 
quota only 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
33% 
 
31% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
7% 
 
27% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
20% 
 
12% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
12% 
 
47% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
35% 
 
41% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
0% 
 
21% 
 
Area VII 
 
12% 
 
0% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
43% 
 
4% 
 
Area VI 
 
11% 
 
0% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
19% 
 
20% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
0% 
 
32% 
 
Non-sector 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
16% 
 
23% 
 
10m and under 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Do you currently, or have you ever, (a) leased quota from another vessel (in your own or another PO)? (b) purchased 
quota from another vessel (in your own or another PO)? 
  
 
 
leased quota in 
 
purchased quota 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
35% 
 
0% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
41% 
 
0% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
8% 
 
0% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
6% 
 
0% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
53% 
 
0% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
58% 
 
0% 
 
Area VII 
 
44% 
 
0% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
11% 
 
0% 
 
Area VI 
 
29% 
 
0% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
17% 
 
0% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
26% 
 
0% 
 
Non-sector 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
32% 
 
0% 
 
10m and under 
 
-- 
 
-- 
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Do you currently, or have you ever, (a) leased quota to another vessel (in your own or another PO)? (b) sold quota to 
another vessel (in your own or another PO)? 
  
 
 
leased quota out 
 
sold quota 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
35% 
 
2% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
30% 
 
0% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
4% 
 
0% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
18% 
 
0% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
53% 
 
0% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
50% 
 
0% 
 
Area VII 
 
8% 
 
0% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
7% 
 
14% 
 
Area VI 
 
29% 
 
0% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
9% 
 
0% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
21% 
 
0% 
 
Non-sector 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
27% 
 
1% 
 
10m and under 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Can you estimate, at least roughly, the proportion of your current gross earnings which are attributable to extra units 
which have been added by acquiring licence(s)? 
  
 
 
< 10% 
 
10 - 25% 
 
25 - 50%  
 
> 50% 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
16% 
 
8% 
 
22% 
 
24% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
1% 
 
8% 
 
24% 
 
11% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
0% 
 
12% 
 
6% 
 
0% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
47% 
 
41% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
21% 
 
0% 
 
Area VII 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
0% 
 
18% 
 
21% 
 
0% 
 
Area VI 
 
0% 
 
35% 
 
6% 
 
0% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
2% 
 
15% 
 
9% 
 
0% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
0% 
 
16% 
 
16% 
 
0% 
 
Non-sector 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
3% 
 
12% 
 
17% 
 
8% 
 
10m and under 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
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Can you estimate, at least roughly, the proportion of your current gross earnings which are attributable to extra quota 
which you have bought or currently lease from another vessel? 
  
 
 
< 10% 
 
10 - 25% 
 
25 - 50%  
 
> 50% 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
18% 
 
8% 
 
4% 
 
0% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
12% 
 
36% 
 
8% 
 
1% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
23% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
4% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
6% 
 
0% 
 
6% 
 
0% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
24% 
 
53% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
54% 
 
25% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Area VII 
 
56% 
 
4% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
11% 
 
32% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Area VI 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
16% 
 
16% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Non-sector 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
15% 
 
18% 
 
3% 
 
1% 
 
10m and under 
 
– 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
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PO quota pools and “dummy” vessels 
 
PO members (over 10m) were asked: 
Does your PO hold any quota over and above the total of its members’ FQAs, for example in the form of units 
attached to a “dummy vessel”? 
  
 
 
yes 
 
no 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
61% 
 
39% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
77% 
 
23% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
42% 
 
58% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
81% 
 
19% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
30% 
 
70% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
56% 
 
44% 
 
Area VII 
 
52% 
 
48% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
75% 
 
25% 
 
Area VI 
 
79% 
 
21% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
76% 
 
24% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
35% 
 
65% 
 
Non-sector 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
56% 
 
44% 
 
10m and under 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
If yes, do you receive additional quota allowances as a result? 
  
 
 
yes 
 
no 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
61% 
 
39% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
77% 
 
23% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
36% 
 
64% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
81% 
 
19% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
0% 
 
100% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
56% 
 
44% 
 
Area VII 
 
52% 
 
48% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
72% 
 
28% 
 
Area VI 
 
79% 
 
21% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
76% 
 
24% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
35% 
 
65% 
 
Non-sector 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
54% 
 
46% 
 
10m and under 
 
-- 
 
-- 
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Was the acquisition of this quota funded through (a) a one-off contribution from the membership? (b) an increased 
levy? (c) other (please specify)? 
  
 
 
levy 
 
PO funds 
 
loan 
 
2.5% 
 
don’t know 
 
one-off 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
63% 
 
23% 
 
14% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
71% 
 
8% 
 
12% 
 
0% 
 
9% 
 
0% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
60% 
 
0% 
 
20% 
 
0% 
 
20% 
 
0% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
100% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
100% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
0% 
 
21% 
 
0% 
 
15% 
 
0% 
 
64% 
 
Area VII 
 
45% 
 
0% 
 
13% 
 
0% 
 
42% 
 
0% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
38% 
 
38% 
 
0% 
 
24% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Area VI 
 
47% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
53% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
100% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
67% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
33% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Non-sector 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
56% 
 
8% 
 
6% 
 
9% 
 
5% 
 
2% 
 
10m and under 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Do you support the PO in acquiring quota in this way? 
  
 
 
yes 
 
no 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
63% 
 
37% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
77% 
 
23% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
42% 
 
58% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
88% 
 
12% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
30% 
 
70% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
56% 
 
44% 
 
Area VII 
 
48% 
 
52% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
57% 
 
43% 
 
Area VI 
 
37% 
 
63% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
80% 
 
20% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
41% 
 
59% 
 
Non-sector 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
52% 
 
48% 
 
10m and under 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
  106
If yes, would you prefer the PO to be more pro-active in acquiring quota? 
  
 
 
yes 
 
no 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
73% 
 
27% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
59% 
 
41% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
77% 
 
23% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
95% 
 
5% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
30% 
 
70% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
43% 
 
57% 
 
Area VII 
 
84% 
 
16% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
100% 
 
0% 
 
Area VI 
 
93% 
 
7% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
100% 
 
0% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
100% 
 
0% 
 
Non-sector 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
65% 
 
35% 
 
10m and under 
 
-- 
 
-- 
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Views on ITQs 
 
All respondents were asked: 
Do you consider that a move towards some form of ITQ system for the UK is now inevitable? 
  
 
 
yes 
 
no 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
88% 
 
12% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
91% 
 
9% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
81% 
 
19% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
76% 
 
24% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
94% 
 
6% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
100% 
 
0% 
 
Area VII 
 
67% 
 
33% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
83% 
 
17% 
 
Area VI 
 
37% 
 
63% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
48% 
 
52% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
79% 
 
21% 
 
Non-sector 
 
78% 
 
22% 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
78% 
 
22% 
 
10m and under 
 
86% 
 
14% 
 
From your present understanding of ITQ systems, are you (a) broadly in favour of ITQs, at least for some fisheries? 
(b) broadly against ITQs? 
  
 
 
in favour 
 
against 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
88% 
 
12% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
66% 
 
34% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
77% 
 
23% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
59% 
 
41% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
82% 
 
18% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
75% 
 
25% 
 
Area VII 
 
36% 
 
64% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
21% 
 
79% 
 
Area VI 
 
6% 
 
94% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
58% 
 
42% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
53% 
 
47% 
 
Non-sector 
 
28% 
 
72% 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
59% 
 
41% 
 
10m and under 
 
28% 
 
72% 
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If you are basically in favour of ITQs, do you think that ITQs might be appropriate for (a) all stocks? (b) pelagic 
stocks? (c) whitefish stocks? (d) Nephrops? (e) other shellfish? (f) don’t know 
  
 
 
all 
 
pelagic 
 
whitefish 
 
Nephrops 
 
shellfish 
 
don’t know 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
29% 
 
55% 
 
59% 
 
55% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
34% 
 
49% 
 
46% 
 
46% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
42% 
 
31% 
 
27% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
47% 
 
18% 
 
18% 
 
6% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
24% 
 
59% 
 
11% 
 
6% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
34% 
 
38% 
 
38% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Area VII 
 
32% 
 
8% 
 
40% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
8% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
7% 
 
59% 
 
66% 
 
14% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Area VI 
 
0% 
 
84% 
 
63% 
 
11% 
 
6% 
 
0% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
48% 
 
8% 
 
2% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
6% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
16% 
 
16% 
 
47% 
 
10% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Non-sector 
 
11% 
 
39% 
 
39% 
 
6% 
 
0% 
 
33% 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
28% 
 
44% 
 
44% 
 
25% 
 
1% 
 
1% 
 
10m and under 
 
20% 
 
22% 
 
26% 
 
2% 
 
0% 
 
34% 
 
Again, if you are basically in favour of ITQs, do you think that ITQs might be appropriate for (a) all UK vessels? (b) 
over 10 metre vessels only?(c) PO members only? (e) other (please specify)? 
  
 
 
all vessels 
 
>10m only 
 
PO vessels only 
 
other 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
66% 
 
25% 
 
9% 
 
0% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
73% 
 
19% 
 
4% 
 
4% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
31% 
 
46% 
 
8% 
 
15% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
53% 
 
18% 
 
0% 
 
29% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
64% 
 
14% 
 
8% 
 
14% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
38% 
 
42% 
 
4% 
 
16% 
 
Area VII 
 
36% 
 
8% 
 
32% 
 
24% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
90% 
 
0% 
 
10% 
 
0% 
 
Area VI 
 
47% 
 
0% 
 
6% 
 
47% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
60% 
 
32% 
 
8% 
 
0% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
53% 
 
0% 
 
16% 
 
0% 
 
Non-sector 
 
44% 
 
30% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
62% 
 
18% 
 
9% 
 
11% 
 
10m and under 
 
37% 
 
63% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
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Do you think that ITQs would tend to reduce or increase over-quota landings? 
  
 
 
reduce 
 
increase 
 
don’t know 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
88% 
 
4% 
 
8% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
73% 
 
5% 
 
22% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
23% 
 
23% 
 
54% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
18% 
 
53% 
 
29% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
65% 
 
11% 
 
24% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
71% 
 
4% 
 
25% 
 
Area VII 
 
44% 
 
12% 
 
44% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
59% 
 
34% 
 
17% 
 
Area VI 
 
21% 
 
79% 
 
0% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
32% 
 
34% 
 
38% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
79% 
 
0% 
 
21% 
 
Non-sector 
 
6% 
 
28% 
 
66% 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
59% 
 
20% 
 
21% 
 
10m and under 
 
10% 
 
10% 
 
80% 
 
Do you think that ITQs would tend to reduce or increase discarding at sea? 
  
 
 
reduce 
 
increase 
 
don’t know 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
47% 
 
35% 
 
18% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
55% 
 
26% 
 
19% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
8% 
 
35% 
 
58% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
12% 
 
82% 
 
6% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
65% 
 
11% 
 
24% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
21% 
 
0% 
 
79% 
 
Area VII 
 
16% 
 
4% 
 
80% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
17% 
 
69% 
 
14% 
 
Area VI 
 
11% 
 
89% 
 
0% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
24% 
 
40% 
 
36% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
74% 
 
0% 
 
26% 
 
Non-sector 
 
6% 
 
44% 
 
50% 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
39% 
 
37% 
 
25% 
 
10m and under 
 
6% 
 
18% 
 
76% 
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If an ITQ system were to be introduced for the UK, do you think that the POs should be given a central role in the 
organisation of the system, for example handling quota sales and rentals on behalf of their members? 
  
 
 
yes 
 
no 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
69% 
 
31% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
85% 
 
15% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
92% 
 
8% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
100% 
 
0% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
76% 
 
24% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
100% 
 
0% 
 
Area VII 
 
68% 
 
32% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
79% 
 
21% 
 
Area VI 
 
79% 
 
21% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
100% 
 
0% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
84% 
 
16% 
 
Non-sector 
 
39% 
 
61% 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
84% 
 
16% 
 
10m and under 
 
64% 
 
36% 
 
Again, if an official ITQ system were to be introduced, do you think that the Government should collect some sort of 
monetary levy or tax on the value of quota sales? 
  
 
 
yes 
 
no 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
29% 
 
71% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
15% 
 
85% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
0% 
 
100% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
0% 
 
100% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
29% 
 
71% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
4% 
 
96% 
 
Area VII 
 
0% 
 
100% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
3% 
 
97% 
 
Area VI 
 
11% 
 
89% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
0% 
 
100% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
53% 
 
47% 
 
Non-sector 
 
5% 
 
95% 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
20% 
 
80% 
 
10m and under 
 
0% 
 
100% 
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Concerns over the effects of ITQs 
 
All respondents were asked: 
Whether you are basically in favour of ITQs or against the idea, do you have concerns (a) about the possibility of 
quota ending up in the hands of a few large companies? 
  
 
 
very concerned 
 
slightly concerned 
 
not concerned 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
18% 
 
16% 
 
66% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
28% 
 
23% 
 
49% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
42% 
 
19% 
 
39% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
76% 
 
18% 
 
6% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
35% 
 
30% 
 
35% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
21% 
 
12% 
 
67% 
 
Area VII 
 
36% 
 
28% 
 
36% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
41% 
 
33% 
 
26% 
 
Area VI 
 
37% 
 
37% 
 
26% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
76% 
 
12% 
 
12% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
16% 
 
37% 
 
47% 
 
Non-sector 
 
78% 
 
11% 
 
11% 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
41% 
 
22% 
 
37% 
 
10m and under 
 
74% 
 
16% 
 
8% 
 
(b) about the possibility of quota moving to more prosperous regions? 
  
 
 
very concerned 
 
slightly concerned 
 
not concerned 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
18% 
 
18% 
 
64% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
20% 
 
30% 
 
50% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
35% 
 
26% 
 
39% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
70% 
 
24% 
 
6% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
0% 
 
47% 
 
53% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
17% 
 
12% 
 
71% 
 
Area VII 
 
60% 
 
28% 
 
12% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
48% 
 
26% 
 
26% 
 
Area VI 
 
58% 
 
42% 
 
0% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
72% 
 
16% 
 
12% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
21% 
 
37% 
 
42% 
 
Non-sector 
 
61% 
 
27% 
 
11% 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
38% 
 
28% 
 
34% 
 
10m and under 
 
56% 
 
34% 
 
8% 
 
  112
(c) about the possibility that high quota prices will discourage “new entrants” to the industry? 
  
 
 
very concerned 
 
slightly concerned 
 
not concerned 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
8% 
 
42% 
 
50% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
32% 
 
34% 
 
34% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
35% 
 
30% 
 
35% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
88% 
 
6% 
 
6% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
30% 
 
5% 
 
65% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
25% 
 
4% 
 
71% 
 
Area VII 
 
56% 
 
24% 
 
20% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
41% 
 
55% 
 
4% 
 
Area VI 
 
26% 
 
74% 
 
0% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
46% 
 
44% 
 
6% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
21% 
 
47% 
 
32% 
 
Non-sector 
 
50% 
 
33% 
 
17% 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
35% 
 
38% 
 
27% 
 
10m and under 
 
62% 
 
28% 
 
8% 
 
(d) about uncertainty over the legal title to quota? 
  
 
 
very concerned 
 
slightly concerned 
 
not concerned 
 
Demersal trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> 24m (all areas) 
 
38% 
 
54% 
 
8% 
 
≤ 24m Area IV/VI 
 
34% 
 
32% 
 
34% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIId-k 
 
19% 
 
57% 
 
23% 
 
≤ 24m Area VIIa 
 
82% 
 
12% 
 
6% 
 
Pelagic vessels 
 
10% 
 
47% 
 
43% 
 
Beam trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
12% 
 
67% 
 
21% 
 
Area VII 
 
40% 
 
44% 
 
16% 
 
Nephrops trawlers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area IV 
 
37% 
 
53% 
 
6% 
 
Area VI 
 
21% 
 
53% 
 
10% 
 
Area VIIa 
 
56% 
 
26% 
 
4% 
 
Netters/liners 
 
21% 
 
42% 
 
37% 
 
Non-sector 
 
11% 
 
17% 
 
61% 
 
Weighted total > 10m 
 
31% 
 
38% 
 
27% 
 
10m and under 
 
40% 
 
10% 
 
50% 
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Appendix III: Methodological appendix to Chapter 6 
 
The method used to estimate the socio-economic impact of quota trade in the UK involved 
several steps. The first step required an estimation of the potential impact of quota trade on fleet 
structure by region. Given the different fleet structures under the different assumptions regarding 
restrictions on quota trade, the fixed costs and crew number associated with each vessel that was 
estimated to be removed from the fishery was estimated. The fixed cost per vessel was estimated 
using the average fixed cost per VCU (including an allowance for economic depreciation and 
interest, reflecting the opportunity cost of capital) for the different fleet segments. Where 
possible, region specific information was used. Similarly, average crew numbers per vessel 
(again, estimated for individual vessels based on their main gear type and region) were used to 
estimate the employment effects of the different restrictions on quota trading.  
 
Average fixed cost per VCU and crew number information were derived from SFIA (2000). The 
data related to the 1997-98 financial year, these being the most recent data that were available on 
a consistent basis for the UK as a whole.(84) 
 
Estimating the change in fleet structure 
 
The analysis is run in two steps. First, the capacity utilisation of each boat is estimated relative to 
other boats with which it can trade. In the second stage, the fleet size required to fill the quota if 
all boats operated at full capacity was estimated using an allocation model. 
 
Capacity utilisation (CU) can be defined in terms of the ratio of actual (current) to potential 
(capacity) output. CU is measured on a [0,1] scale, where a measure of CU < 1 implies that the 
same fleet, if fully utilised, could produce more than it is currently doing. Conversely, the same 
level of catch could have been taken by a smaller fleet if fully utilised. As a result, capacity 
under-utilisation is also an indicator of existence of excess capacity in a fishery, and the measure 
can be used to provide an indication of the extent of excess capacity.  
 
In this study, it was assumed that the quota allocations (FQAs) reflected the output of each 
species, and hence capacity utilisation refers to the ratio of actual FQA holdings to potential 
holdings given the physical characteristics of the vessel. The latter potential FQA holdings are 
estimated on the basis of the FQA holdings and physical characteristics of the other vessels 
against which the vessel is compared (the reference set). In this case, the reference set of vessels 
is determined by the restrictions on quota trade. 
 
                                                
84 More recent data were available for certain regions. For example, economic data were available for the 
English Channel for the 1999-2000 financial year (Cattermoul and Pascoe 2001). However, for consistency, the 
SFIA (2000) data were used. 
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An analytical method exists (Data Envelopment Analysis) to identify which boats are operating at 
full capacity taking into account differences in physical input use (e.g. engine power, boat size) 
and catch composition (defined by the FQA which limits the catch of the quota species). 
Although the application of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to fisheries is relatively new, this 
technique has become established as the preferred method employed to estimate capacity and 
capacity utilisation in fisheries (see, for example, Hsu, 1999; Kirkley, Färe et al., 1999; Kirkley, 
Squires et al., 1999; Vestergaard et al., 1999; FAO, 2000; Pascoe et al., 2001; Tingley et al., 
2001). 
 
Information on fleet characteristics and FQA holdings in 2001 was used in the analysis (such that 
any previous quota trades under the existing quota management system had already been factored 
into the analysis, although quota leases are not considered).  
 
Four different trade scenarios were examined: 
 Complete transferability between all boats; 
 Transferability between boats in the same fleet segment; 
 Transferability between boats in the same administrative port; or 
 Transferability between boats in the same region. 
For the latter, for regions were defined (English Channel, Irish Sea, West of Scotland and North 
Sea). Boats were allocated to one of these regions based on their home port. 
 
While there are no economic reasons why trade should be restricted between vessels, it was 
assumed that concerns over employment implications may result in some restrictions on trade 
being imposed. 
 
The second stage of the analysis is an industry allocation model. The model estimates the 
minimum fleet size required to fill the quota of each and every species with all boats operating at 
or close to full capacity. The model is specified such that the boats that have the lowest capacity 
utilisation are the first to leave, with their quota being allocated to boats close to full capacity.  
 
Description of the DEA technique 
 
DEA is a non-parametric approach to the estimation of capacity and technical efficiency. An 
advantage of DEA is that it is able to incorporate multiple outputs directly in the analysis. 
Further, the technique does not require any pre-described structural relationship between the 
inputs and resultant outputs, which allows greater flexibility in the frontier estimation.  
 
The technique can be illustrated using a simple example (Figure III.1), based on a set of five 
boats (j = {A,B,C,D,E}) catching two species (m = {1,2}). The catch per unit of fixed input, uj,m, 
can be plotted to determine the production possibility frontier, defined by boats A, B C and D. As 
these boats lie on the frontier, they are assumed to be operating at full capacity. In contrast, boat 
E is producing less of both species relative to the frontier and is therefore assumed to be operating 
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at less than full capacity. The production potential of boat E can be found by expanding the 
output of both species radially from the origin until it reaches the frontier (point E*). OE*/OE is 
the expansion factor (θ) by which output of boat E could be increased. Capacity utilisation of boat 
E is given by OE/OE* (i.e. 1/θ).  
 
Figure III.1. Two output production possibility frontier 
uj,1
uj,2
E
A
B
C
D
E*
O
 
 
The shape of the frontier will differ depending on the scale assumptions that underlie the model 
(Figure III.2). Three scale assumptions may be incorporated into the analysis: constant returns to 
scale (CRS, defined by OB), variable returns to scale (VRS, defined by ABCD), and non-
increasing returns to scale (NIRS, defined by OBCD). The VRS specification encompasses both 
increasing and decreasing returns to scale. There are generally a priori reasons to assume that 
fishing would be subject to non-constant returns, and in particular non-increasing returns to scale. 
 
Figure III.2. CRS and VRS efficient frontiers 
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The NIRS DEA model is formulated as a linear programming (LP) model, where the value of θ 
for each vessel can be estimated from the set of available data. Following Färe et al. (1989, 
1994), this DEA model of capacity output given current use of inputs is given as: 
 
 θMax  
subject to 
 
0
1
,0,
,,0
≥
≤
∈≤
∀≤
∑
∑
∑
j
j
j
n
j
njj
j
mjjm
z
z
nxxz
muzu
α
θ
 (1) 
 
where θ  is a scalar denoting how much the output of the target boat (i.e. j=0) can be increased, 
uj,m is the output m produced by boat j, xj,n is the amount of input n ( α∈n , where α is the set of 
fixed inputs) used by boat j and zj are the weights that relate the target vessel to the set of peers 
(i.e. the boats against which it is compared). The value of θ  is estimated for each vessel 
separately (i.e. so effectively a set of jθ  are estimated), with the target vessel’s outputs and inputs 
being denoted by u0,m and x0,n respectively. Inputs are restricted to fixed factors only (i.e. the set 
α ). This is estimated in the model for each boat j and variable input αˆ∈n  (Färe et al., 1994). 
The restriction Σjzj ≤ 1 allows for non-increasing returns to scale85.  
 
Capacity utilisation (CU) is defined as CU=1/θ. The measure of CU ranges from zero to 1, with 1 
being full capacity utilisation (i.e. 100 per cent of capacity). The capacity output of each vessel is 
determined by mjmj uu ,, θ=′  where uj,m is the FQA for each species m held by boat j and mju ,′  is 
the full capacity quota holding of species m by boat j. 
 
The DEA technique does not allow for trade-offs of one quota against another - to expand output 
of a species the boat must already have been catching the species, and catch of all species must 
increase by the same proportion. The linear programming technique effectively estimates ‘virtual 
boats’ based on the outputs and inputs of boats that are estimated as operating at full capacity. 
These ‘virtual boats’ have the same physical characteristics as the boat being examined, and the 
same catch composition, so the estimation of capacity utilisation is based on a like-for-like basis. 
 
The allocation model 
 
The allocation model adopted in the second stage of the analysis was based on industry allocation 
models developed by Färe et al. (1992) and Dervaux et al. (2000). The original versions of the 
                                                
85 In contrast, excluding this constraint implicitly imposes constant returns to scale while Σzj=1 imposes variable 
returns to scale (Färe et al., 1989). 
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models were used to estimate the minimum inputs required at an industry level necessary to 
achieve the same level of outputs (Färe et al. 1992, Dervaux et al. 2000). The source of the inputs 
(i.e. which firms) was not included as a consideration. In this study, the model was modified to 
ensure that the boats that 'left' the industry in the model were those with the lowest capacity 
utilisation scores. This is more consistent with the economic theory presented in Chapter 2. 
 
The model is given by 
 
 ∑=
j
jjwMin θλ  
subject to 
 
10
,,
,
≤≤
∀≤
∀≥′
∑∑
∑
j
j
nj
j
njj
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j
mjj
w
nxxw
mTACuw
 (2) 
 
where θj are the expansion factors for each vessels j estimated in the first stage of the analysis 
(i.e. the inverse of the capacity utilisation scores), TACm is the total allowable catch of species m 
(estimated as the sum of the FQAs), and wj are the weights associated with each boat j. As θj ≥ 1, 
the objective function is minimised by ensuring the constraints are satisfied by first utilising the 
boats already operating at full capacity (i.e. θj = 1), and by discarding vessels with high values of 
θj (i.e. low levels of capacity utilisation). The first constraint is that the sum of the full capacity 
allocation of FQAs (i.e. mjjmj uu ,, θ=′ ) held by the remaining boats (i.e. wj ≥ 0) must at least 
equal the TAC for the species. The second constraint equation relating to input use is largely 
superfluous, but is maintained in the analysis for completeness to ensure that final input use does 
not exceed current input use (which cannot happen in any case as wj ≤ 1). 
 
Estimated Capacity Utilisation (CU) 
 
The average capacity utilisation of the existing fleet varies substantially by fleet segment (Figure 
III.3). Pelagic boats (which includes both trawlers and purse seiners) were estimated to average 
between 90 and 95 per cent capacity utilisation, depending on the degree of transferability, while 
the shellfish boats were estimated to average between 20 and 50 per cent. What this means is that 
pelagic boats would need to increase their quota holdings by about 5 to 10 per cent on average to 
operate at full capacity, whereas shellfish boats would need to more than double their quota 
holding to operate at full capacity on average. This last result is probably an overestimate, as it 
does not take into account the non-quota species that make up a large proportion of the shellfish 
boats' catch. 
 
The estimated capacity utilisation increased as the number of potential trading partners decreased. 
When compared to boats in the same fleet segment, average capacity utilisation of the shellfish 
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boats was still relatively low. This suggests that many of these boats would still need to increase 
their quota holdings to operate in the same fleet segment at full capacity. 
 
Figure III.3. Average capacity utilisation by fleet segment (>10m), 2001 
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The estimated distribution of capacity utilisation (Figure III.4) suggests that only a limited 
number of boats are currently operating at full capacity. When all boats are compared (i.e. the 
industry analysis), only about 23 per cent of the fleet are operating at full capacity. In contrast, if 
trade is restricted to ports, nearly 60 per cent of the fleet are effectively operating at full capacity 
(i.e. these boats have no incentive to purchase additional quota from the available pool in the 
administrative port). By contrast, between 20 and 30 per cent of the fleet (depending on the 
assumptions regarding transferability) are operating at less than 50 per cent capacity utilisation. 
These boats are more likely to be willing to sell their quota and exit the fishery rather than 
purchase quota, provided the market price for quota is determined appropriately (as discussed in 
Chapter 2). 
 
Figure III.4. Distribution of capacity utilisation over the fleet (>10m), 2001 
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